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ABSTRACT
A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF 129 POLICE LETHAL FORCE INCIDENTS IN 2016
EXAMINING PARTICIPANT BEHAVIOR RELATING TO MENTAL ILLNESS
THAT CONTRIBUTES TO THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE
Edward H. Byers

July 13, 20201

This multi-case, exploratory research study examined videos and related news
media articles of lethal police shootings and found commonalities and possible
contributing factors. Videos and informational articles posted on news media websites in
the public domain were used in a qualitative content analysis to identify common
elements in police lethal force incidents. The results of this study revealed contributing
behaviors by the participants related to mental illness that contribute to lethal force. The
decision to use lethal force by a police officer is framed using four analytical themes.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………...iv
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………v
LIST OF TABLES.……………………………………………………………………..viii
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION ….……………………………………………...1
Theoretical Framework………………………………………………………...14
CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………27
CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH DESIGN….………………………………………68
Data Collection Procedures and Analysis …….…………………………..……74
Hypothesis...……………………………………………………………..……...82
Threats to Validity........……………………………………………………...….84
CHAPTER FOUR - FINDINGS………………………………………………....……...89
General Observations about the Dataset………………………………………...89
The Encounters…………………………………………………………………..91
Mental Illness…………………………………………………………………….98
Adverse Behavioral Reactions…………………………………………………...99
Erratic Behavior………………………………………………………………...100
Interaction between the Research Themes……………………………………...100
Race……………………………………………………………………………..102
CHAPTER FIVE - DISCUSSION……………………………………………………..105
The Encounters…………………………………………………………………106

vii

Suicide by Cop………………………………………………………………….109
The Analytical Themes…………………………………………………………112
Mental Illness…………………………………………………………………...125
Adverse Behavioral Reactions……………………………………………….....132
Erratic Behavior………………………………………………………………...135
Emotion Dysregulation…………………………………………………………137
Mental Illness and Police Culture………………………………………………144
Race…………………………………………………………………………….148
Policy Implications for Policing………………………………………………..149
Limitations……………...………………………………………………………162
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...164
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………166
APPENDICES………………………………………………………………………….174
CURRICULUM VITA…………………………………………………………………198

viii

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE

PAGE

1. Deceased Civilian Age at Time of Incident……………………………………..92
2. Cameras Present and Recording at the Scene…..……………………………….93
3. Time Occurrence of the Incidents………………………………………….……94
4. Type of Incident….……………………………………………………………...95
5. Number of Officers Present when Shooting Officer Arrives….………………...96
6. Number of Officers Firing at the Citizen………………………….…………….97
7. Number of Seconds Officer is On-Scene before Firing………………………….97
8. Number of Shots Fired by Officers………………………………………………97

ix

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In August of 2014, Michael Brown Jr., a Black man, was fatally shot by Darren
Wilson, a White male Ferguson (MO) police officer. Officer Wilson stated that Mr.
Brown attacked him while he was seated in his police vehicle and a struggle ensued
involving the service handgun of Officer Wilson. Mr. Brown fled, and Officer Wilson
chased him on foot before Mr. Brown stopped and advanced towards him. A witness
stated that Mr. Brown raised his hands in the air in a gesture of surrender, but Officer
Wilson disputed this account. Officer Wilson shot Mr. Brown, striking him six times in
the front of his body. The alleged actions of Mr. Brown and Officer Wilson were not
compatible with the expected typical behavioral response of persons under similar
circumstances.
The Brown protests in Ferguson, some of which resulted in rioting, were the
subject of international news media reports. In the wake of these events, Governor Jay
Nixon ceded local policing authority to the Missouri State Highway Patrol. Subsequent
investigations, including a grand jury presentation, found that there was no evidence that
Officer Wilson had violated any state or federal laws. Additionally, a U.S. Department of
Justice investigation did not charge Officer Wilson with any violations of Mr. Brown’s
civil rights. Witnesses and evidence supported Officer Wilson’s version of events, and
investigators found that testimony contradicting the police officer’s account of the event
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was not credible. In 2020, a newly elected prosecutor reviewed the case and declined to
charge Officer Wilson with any criminal activity. Despite these outcomes, publicity
about the event remains a topic in the ongoing national discussion of distrust between
marginalized members of society and the police.
Over 1,000 civilians were killed by American law enforcement officers in 2016.
Although this number is modest when compared to the 62.9 million law enforcement and
civilian contacts in 2011 (retrieved from https://www.nationalreview.com/2014/12/dojspolicing-statistics-dont-lie-ian-tuttle/ on April 21, 2018), many of the civilian deaths in
2016 were contested and several were associated with major urban riots. All the deaths
generated public interest and became the subject of television news segments and
newspaper articles as citizens attempted to understand the factors involved in the lethal
police/citizen encounters. Current criminal justice research has begun to examine
elements of the encounter, but the behaviors of participants have historically received
minimal research efforts.
Among the many factors considered, mental health has been overlooked. Dane
County District Attorney Ismael Ozanne, discussing a police shooting incident in
Wisconsin, stated that “mental health issues have been present in far too many” police
shootings. District Attorney Ozanne cautioned that researchers cannot continue to ignore
mental health if society hopes to prevent further loss of life (retrieved from
https://madison.com/wsj/news/ local/crime-and-courts/madison-police-officer-cleared-infatal-shooting-of-mentally-ill/article_7ef8f698-054b-5afc-a509-c67d9cbf4238.html on
June 1, 2017). This dissertation takes District Attorney Ozanne’s advice toward a
practical, evidence based understanding of lethal force encounters by considering the
behavioral elements that precipitate such events. The goal of this dissertations is to
2

understand what impact mental health behaviors have on police behaviors and decision
making.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Police use of deadly force has been a significant topic of scholarship for decades.
Civil liability and harm to police legitimacy have been associated with many fatal police
actions. Beginning in the 1960s, police use of deadly force became a precipitating issue
for urban riots after police officers killed citizens (Fyfe, 1988). In or around 2015, public
unrest emerged in some American cities when incidents of police officers using lethal
force against civilians were publicized via public media and social media platforms.
These media representations frequently included videos of the actual shooting of civilians
by police officers, but they offered no background information to show situational
context or provide knowledge of the behaviors leading to the shooting. As a result of the
lack of explanatory factors and possible mistrust of police, some cities such as Ferguson
experienced violent unrest due to the actions of police officers as representatives of local
government (Chaney, 2015). Some riots have historically been caused by civilian
dissatisfaction with police actions when protesters were inclined to immediate and violent
civil disobedience (Fyfe, 2015). Even when used with great restraint, police use of lethal
force has created polarization, suspicion, and distrust from marginalized members of
society (Fyfe, 1988), including those subjects suffering from mental illness or associated
behaviors (Goldberg, White, & Weisburd, 2019). A lack of openness and transparency in
the investigation of deaths of minorities by police officers has inspired a decline of
confidence in local police agencies. The resulting mistrust has negatively characterized
the perceptions of local police departments during encounters with some minority
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communities (Micucci & Gomme, 2005; Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015; Koper, 2016;
DeGue, Fowler, & Calkins, 2016).
This study illuminates behavioral factors related to mental illness during law
enforcement encounters and contributes to the current knowledge of lethal force
incidents. The units of analysis used are those actions by the subject which occur before
police officers arrive at the scene, actions by both the police officer and the subject
during the encounter, and the notation of mental illness suffered by participants in media
outlets.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
This multi-case, exploratory, qualitative content analysis examined videos and
related news media articles of police shootings that resulted in the death of civilians in
2016 with the purpose to identify behavioral actions related to mental illness that may
cause police encounters to develop into lethal confrontations. The results of this study
revealed common contributory behaviors exhibited by participants which occur before
and during the lethal encounter. Specifically, three aspects of mental illness were present
in many of the videos and news media articles. Ultimately, this study shows that
identifiable behaviors contribute to many lethal force encounters, and the recognition of
such factors can be used by responding police officers to encourage non-lethal closures to
such events.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
Seven years after Mr. Brown’s death in Ferguson, many cities are still
experiencing violent and peaceful protests concerning the deaths of civilians by police
officers. Social tension between communities and their police departments remains a
significant problem and this examination of police lethal force encounters revealed
4

practical perspectives and policy implications that can decrease the likelihood of mental
health issues contributing to lethal situations between officers and subjects. While other
studies concentrate of the racial attributes of the police lethal encounter, this study
examined the issues of behavior of participants in shooting incidents and recognizes the
limitations for marginalized people to obtain mental health treatment before their actions
place them into a police encounter.
Weaknesses of Existing Studies
The need for this study stems from three weaknesses in exiting studies; a lack of
standard definitions for research efforts, limited transparency by police agencies, and
incomplete data collection. First, past studies of police use of deadly force have
encountered difficulties as definitions used in lethal force incidents are not standardized
within criminal justice agencies and no clear common definitions exist that allow
comparisons to use in research efforts. Terminology on death certificates vary between
states and the lack of written standardization of causes of death by coroners and medical
examiners makes potential studies of deaths by police improbable (Sherman and
Langworthy, 1979). Death reports provided to the National Center of Health Statistics
(NCHS) revealed that police figures of lethal force were twice as high as those reported
by local coroners to the NCHS (Sherman and Langworthy, 1979; Banks, Couzens,
Blanton, and Cribb, 2015). Common definitions are also needed to compare use of force
rates between different agencies and geographical locations. (Alpert & MacDonald,
2001).
Restrictions to public access of information concerning police use of lethal force
incidents place additional limitations on academic studies. Koper (2016) cited a lack of
transparency and available data while trying to study the use of deadly force by police
5

and called for compulsory reporting methods for such incidents, including accessible
databases which are available for research efforts. Koper found that not all law
enforcement agencies considered police shootings to be public information and details
were kept from the public domain. This lack of transparency means that “we know next
to nothing about how often American police officers exercise their prerogative to use
deadly force” (Klinger, 2012, p.78) and that existing data collection systems cannot
provide information that researchers can trust.
Finally, data does not exist for the examination of contributing behavioral factors
associated with shooting incidents involving police officers and members of the public.
Past scholarly investigations have commonly used the factors of race, agency
characteristics, and data about police and citizen contacts to examine police use of force.
Data for research is available that reflects the national representation of incidents by
examining the types of calls, area demographics, and respective agency size associated
with lethal force situations. Past and current databases used by the United States
Department of Justice and its bureaus have historically identified but underestimated
approximately 40% to 70% of civilians killed by law enforcement officers (Maguire,
Nix, & Campbell, 2017). Notably, these datasets did not include contributing behavioral
factors in events of police use of lethal force. Fyfe (1988) recognized the severity of the
lack of data and argued that the omission of data collecting by the federal government
about police use of lethal force “can only be defined as inexcusable” (p. 174).
The federal government has historically not kept statistics or information
concerning the number of people killed in police encounters or recorded the interpersonal
behaviors which contribute to these situations. In 2017, the FBI launched a pilot program
to collect cursory data from police departments during law enforcement encounters where
6

civilians were killed by officers, but this information was not available for use in this
study. As the FBI does not routinely release information concerning shootings which
involve special agents within their agency, the legitimacy of this dataset is being
questioned (retrieved from https://www.nbcnews. com/politics/justice-department/whenfbi-shoots-someone-including-bystander-or-hostage-it-investigates-n968451 on March
23, 2019). Although criminal justice academics have asked for a national research
database on officer-involved shootings, to date the absence of such a public database in
the United States remains “an embarrassing situation” (Alpert, 2015, p. 239). The
present study provides information that bridges the information gap concerning
participant behaviors in police lethal force encounters.
Policy Implications
Police administrators generally agree that quality data collection and research
would be beneficial to examine police lethal force incidents since missing or inaccurate
data impedes improvements to existing policies. Police professionals recognize the need
for further study of lethal force situations to learn how to reduce all levels of force used
by police officers. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) is an independent
research organization that focuses on critical issues in policing by identifying best
practices on fundamental issues in policing. PERF encourages officers to reduce use of
force incidents, including force that is intended to be lethal. The objectives of PERF are
to advance professionalism in policing, to improve the delivery of police services through
the exercise of strong national leadership, to increase public debate of police and criminal
justice issues, and to encourage research and policy development (retrieved from
http://www.police forum.org/about-us on May 20, 2018).
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Police lethal force encounters can challenge relationships that officers attempt to
build with community members. When incidents are questioned by members of the
public and police agencies respond without transparency, the community becomes
suspicious about the incident and the factors leading to the use of lethal force. The
performance of individual officers is affected as community members no longer trust the
law enforcement agency, resulting in less public cooperation during the investigation of
crimes and calls for service.
Police use of force relies on legal factors as defined in the United States Supreme
Court Decisions Graham v. Connor (1989) and Tennessee v. Garner (1985). The
Supreme Court established that the reasonableness of an officer's use of force is to be
determined from the perspective of a reasonable officer under the circumstances that
were apparent to him or her at the time of the incident. The Supreme Court made clear
that this deferential standard prevents post event legal speculation of an officer's
judgment about use of force as hindsight and information known to the officer after the
incident would not be considered in the reasonableness standard (Broome, 2011). The
Supreme Court also acknowledged that many police incidents involving force occur
quickly and judgements are made rapidly. Objective standards, with situational variables
that are known to affect most officers, are used to determine reasonableness (Blair et al.,
2011).
Perceived danger is legally relevant when an officer evaluates the need for lethal
force but the Supreme Court decision acknowledged the difficulty to access the situation
accurately from the relative scant information available to most officers when they
initially respond to calls for service that may evolve to deadly force (Homant, Kennedy,
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& Hupp, 2000). Further, the laws that govern police use of deadly force can be too
nebulous to be used as operational guidelines and agency policy (Fyfe, 1988).
Use of Force in Marginalized Communities
Beginning in or around 2015, public unrest became apparent in some American
cities when incidents of police officers killing civilians became readily available through
videos posted to social and media websites. Chaney (2015) found that many
economically and racially marginalized communities had historically experienced social
unrest and citizens directed violence towards police officers. Included in the public
turmoil were calls for openness and transparency in the investigations of deaths of
minorities by police officers. Eventually, this citizen unrest led to political movements
such as Black Lives Matter.
Black Lives Matter is an activist movement that originated in the AfricanAmerican community. The movement campaigns against police killings of Black people
and broader issues of racial profiling, police brutality, and racial inequality in the
criminal justice system. Black Lives Matter became internationally recognized for its
street demonstrations following the 2014 deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner, who
was selling cigarettes in New York City. Both deaths occurred during police encounters
after officers used force against the individuals. Since 2015, participants in the
movement have continued to demonstrate against the deaths of numerous other Black
Americans by police actions and has generated enough public interest to bring a larger
portion of the American population to question police tactics, protest the lack of
transparency concerning enforcement encounters that resulted in deaths to civilians, and
demand openness in post-event investigations.
Use of Force and the Quality of Work Life for Police Officers
9

Use of force is an established work-related component for the contemporary
American police officer. In 2015, the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated
that 606,505 full-time state and local police officers performed law enforcement duties in
America (retrieved from U.S. Department of Labor website https://www.
bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi-/police-officers-2014.htm on May 30, 2018). On average, each
day two or three of these officers were involved in lethal force incidents in which a
civilian was killed (Hirschfield, 2015). Additionally, 117,973 law enforcement officers
were feloniously assaulted by offenders in the United States in 2003 and 2004 with 318
officers dying from their injuries (retrieved from http://www. nleomf.-org/facts/officerfatalities-data/year.html on May 29, 2018). The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the
Law Enforcement Officers Killed or Assaulted database, cites that 118 officers died in
the performance of their duties while 57,180 officers were assaulted in 2016 (retrieved
from https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2016 on June 23, 2020).
Use of force incidents expose police officers to a higher risk of injury or death
risk than most other occupations. The Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities Program of the
U.S. Department of Labor provides annual information on the rate and number of workrelated injuries, illnesses, fatalities, and how these statistics vary by incident, industry,
geography, occupation, and other characteristics. These data are collected through the
Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses and the Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries. An examination of this dataset reveals that police officers are exposed to a
higher risk of work-related injury or illness than most other occupations. On average,
115 police officers suffered fatal work injuries each year from 2003 to 2014 and an
average of 30,990 nonfatal injuries involving days-away-from-work were reported for
police officers each year from 2009 to 2014. The rate of fatal work injuries for law
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enforcement officers in 2014 was 13.5 per 100,000 full-time-equivalent workers,
compared to a rate of 3.4 for all occupations. Similarly, the rate of nonfatal occupational
injuries and illnesses involving days-away-from-work among police officers was 485.8
cases per 10,000 full-time workers in 2014, whereas the rate was 107.1 cases for all
occupations. Nonfatal injuries and illnesses in 2014 that caused police officers to miss
work resulted primarily from violence, but other causative factors included injuries by
persons or animals, falls, slips, and trips. The primary cause of fatal occupational injuries
among police officers in 2014 was violence performed by other persons or animals in
56 % of the reported incidents. Homicides, one type of violence, accounted for 45% of
fatal work injuries for police officers in 2014, but only 8% for all occupations. Of the 97
reported fatal work injuries to police officers in 2014, 10 were killed in multiple-fatality
incidents where more than one worker was killed. In 2014, 64% of these fatal work
injuries to police officers occurred on streets or highways and 56% of the injuries to law
enforcement officers involved a person as the source of the fatal injury. Most often this
was an assailant such as a robber, suspect, or inmate involved in hitting, kicking, beating,
or shooting the officer (retrieved from U.S. Department of Labor website https://www.
bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi-/police-officers-2014.htm on May 30, 2018).
The Department of Labor’s collection efforts offer only a brief synopsis of
information that cannot be relied upon solely for research data but is revealing of the
risks that police officers are exposed to while in the line of duty due to violent acts during
from law enforcement encounters with the public. Statistics such as these can reinforce
an officer’s perception of risk and lead to increased efforts of self-protection. Although
aware of these risks to police officers during use of force incidents, members of academia
and law enforcement administrators cannot monitor at the national level how police use
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force or why lethal force is used as no trustworthy data collection system currently exists
(Klinger, 2012).
THE INFREQUENCY OF POLICE USE OF LETHAL FORCE
Police use of lethal force is an uncommon event that many officers will not
experience in their career. Researchers are unlikely to personally observe a police lethal
force incident due to the rarity of such events, and actual field observational studies
conducted by researchers make the ability to view police shootings in person improbable
(Croft, 1985; Alpert & Dunham, 2004; James et al., 2013; Buehler, 2017). Selected
studies have estimated that the rate of all types of force during law enforcement
encounters were between 5% and 10% of all contacts (Friedrich, 1980; Croft & Austin
1987; Fyfe, 1988). Garner, Buchanan, Schade, and Hepburn (1996) examined police data
and found that only one in five arrests involved some level of use of force and that most
police officers used no force or low levels of force in most arrests. Ariel, Fararr, and
Sutherland (2015) conducted a randomized controlled study in which nearly 1,000 officer
shifts (a measure defined as one officer working one shift) were studied by using officers
from the Rialto Police Department in California for 12 months using body-worn cameras.
They found only 25 incidents of use of force in these nearly 1,000 officer shifts, or
approximately 2.5% of the officer shifts involved any level of use of force. It is not
believed that any officer of the Rialto Police Department was involved with a lethal force
incident during their study.
The use of videos of actual shootings to identify behavioral actions of civilians
and police officers contributes to the academic discussion of police use of lethal force to
inform contemporary police practices and policies. Due to the rarity of police lethal force
incidents, videos in the public domain that record deaths by police are an important tool
12

for the investigation of these encounters. Video recordings are often used by police
agencies during media briefings as administrators and supervisors include the causative
reasons for the decisions to use force by their officers. In many of these briefings, the
videos of dash mounted cameras and body worn cameras are made available to the public
to allow police administrators to offer their version of the incident, usually to counter the
anti-police narrative being offered by detractors. Videos from police dash mounted
cameras, body worn cameras, cell phone cameras, and other recording systems are also a
method to provide additional information to the public and are brought into public
scrutiny to support either side of a discourse concerning police use of force.
Former Chief of Police Steve Conrad of the Louisville (KY) Metro Police
Department (LMPD) routinely released the videos from body worn cameras and dash
mounted vehicle cameras when LMPD officers used lethal force against a civilian subject
in the performance of their duties. On April 24, 2018, former Chief Conrad released
videos of four officers engaging a suspected armed robber in the Portland neighborhood
of Louisville. The suspect, later identified as Demonjhea Jordan, shot at responding
officers as they attempted to contact him about the crime on a city sidewalk near the
robbery location. The officers responded by using their firearms and Jordan died from
his wounds (retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=ygkaz2MksQQ on June
3, 2018). On April 9, 2018, LMPD officers engaged Russell Bogan, who threated
officers and neighbors with a large screwdriver while using a stabbing motion. After two
conducted energy weapon deployments failed to stop Bogan, officers used lethal force as
he moved aggressively closer towards the officers and continued to use the screwdriver in
a stabbing motion (retrieved from https://www. courierjournal.com/story /news/-crime/2018/04/26/louisville-police-shootings-2018/553053002/ on June 3, 2018). In both
13

incidents, former LMPD Chief Conrad cited the need for public scrutiny to ensure
confidence in the police department’s actions during these lethal force incidents and
provided video representations of each event to assist the public to decide if respective
officers had acted within the scope of their duties and in accordance with the
reasonableness of each situation.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This dissertation examines the interplay between police culture, police messaging
during communications to responding officers, and quick decisions by officer which lead
to lethal force during encounters when people exhibit behaviors attributed to mental
illness. Four primary concepts served as analytical foundations to examine the
interaction between the behavioral themes revealed in this study. Each concept
contributes to understanding how police officers can interpret abnormal behaviors under
stress during critical incidents.
The study also uses other academic references to strengthen observations and
policy implications. Police decisions to use lethal force are made quickly, under duress,
are influenced by local police culture, and include public stigma concerning mental
illness and associated behaviors. The use of supporting past studies encourages an
examination of how these phenomena interact and suggests modifications in policy and
training that can encourage less lethal conclusions to some lethal force incidents.
The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge
Written by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of
Reality (1966) examines how knowledge is formed during interactions between groups of
people and objects. The authors examine how meanings are formed during life activities

14

and how people interact to construct a version of reality. This work contributes to a
broad understanding concerning how societies derive meaning from interactions.
Human thought is not immune to the influences of social context, as social
phenomena are constructed through human activity, resulting in interpretations that
people assign to their experiences. Reality is defined as phenomena that is independent
of our volition, and knowledge is the certainty that phenomena are real and possess
specific characteristics. Reality and knowledge relate to certain social contexts which
allow groups of people to make a collective sense of experiences within the accepted
framework of past group experiences.
Distinct groups of people can compose disparate meanings of the same
phenomena due to the different perspectives of their viewpoints. People learn accepted
responses by interacting with members of their group as they construct meaningful
interpretations to different phenomena, then share their interpretations of events with
each other. Participation in the sharing of joint meanings allows members to formulate
appropriate responses during situations involving other people or situations in the future.
Thus, when law enforcement agents participate in the experiences of other officers that
have been involved in critical incidents, individual officers benefit by understanding the
context of the situation and the solution rendered. The validity of collective knowledge is
assumed to be appropriate until an officer encounters a situation that cannot be negotiated
using accepted ideas and principles, then the event must be redefined with collective
input from other group members. Shared experiences allow for a continuous interchange
of expressions and potential redefinitions of events to allow members of the group to
reference acceptable resolutions to anticipated future encounters.
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Occupational knowledge is socially distributed, allowing members to fashion their
behavior using shared definitions to provide a stable environment of conduct within the
work group. By sharing core understandings of events during the formation of work
actions, members of an occupation gain a higher knowledge of specific situations
involving their vocation than people not employed in that vocation. Adherence to the
occupational culture can limit choices but provide relief to members from making
complex decisions in new situations by providing references that are accepted by the
occupational group. Vocational groups can affect the distribution of special knowledge
by using specific vocabularies that internalize routine interpretation and standardize
common conduct. Burger and Luckmann further state that internal cooperation allows
members to interact, and to challenge threats to the accepted reality of their work
organization.
Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method
The dynamic role of police culture in officer decision making is examined in
reference to Symbolic Interactionism (1969), by Hubert Blumer, to examine how
individuals establish meaning using three methods: people act towards objects on the
context of what those objects mean to them, shared meaning arises from the social
interaction with members of a group, and meanings are subjected to continuous
interpretative processes that can bring new meanings to the objects. The work by Blumer
allows an understanding of how individuals and groups of people derive understanding
from interactions to form meaning.
Blumer defines objects as physical items, social interactions between people, and
abstract ideas and principles. Explanations and concepts are influenced by social context
as individuals assign meanings to objects via their interpretations during the interaction.
16

The act of living is a shared process as individuals interact with objects, form reactions to
their perceptions, and share those perceptions. Human association is a dynamic influence
in the interpretation of situations as responses are formed using the collective
expectations of a group. As interaction occurs with the object, human life and conduct
are influenced by discussion with others to give structure and consistency to a group.
Examination of the interaction between humans and objects within the context they occur
allows discovery of connected relationships between objects.
Individual meaning is influenced by social interactions with other people and is
based on the totality of the known context and factors of the event. Personal sensations,
feelings, ideas, memories, motives, and attitudes can affect individual interpretations of
objects by using the intrinsic properties of an object to form meanings that are influenced
by cultural norms. As an example, police officers may consider firearms possession by a
private citizen to be inherently dangerous although they experience less alarm during
daily contact with other officers that carry firearms as the other officers are considered
members of their collective. Police officers rely on the past experiences of other officers
to formulate responses when they encounter a novel or uncertain situation and new
concepts allow different interpretations which are communicated to other officers to
allow them to function during newly discovered orientations, thus allowing group
members to share definitions of acceptable reactions to anticipate unknown experiences
in the future.
Self-interaction with objects is influenced by the presence of other people or by a
desire to conform to the perspective of the collective by using the group reference as a
guide. Individual and group conduct allow shared meaning among members in response
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to objects and allow collective responses that contribute to future actions by offering
resolutions without the burden of analyzing different objects involved in every situation.
Meanings can change in a group context with the introduction of new
circumstances or dissatisfaction with old meanings. If new objects are encountered, the
actor responds based on past conceptions and experiences until such reactions fail to
produce desired outcomes. Novel situations allow different formations of meaning and
can change behavioral responses by allowing objects to be redefined into new references.
Using past collective definitions of objects, people can respond to new or altered objects
and prevent stalled responses. Group perspectives therefore are not stable as unforeseen
experiences can alter the collective expectation and affect future member responses.
Meanings arise from continuing interpretive processes as past experiences
influence new definitions and actions. New situations may allow confused interpretations
and actions that deviate from the normal behavior of the group. As an example, the
sound of gunshots during a riot may cause police officers to initiate mitigation techniques
to enhance personal safety but the same sound at a firearms range will not trigger a
similar response as the sound of gunshots are part of the shared training experience of the
police collective. Individuals use interpretation to define personal meaning via a
formative process that allows reactions to proceed in an accepted manner as defined by
the group. Human group life is the process in which these interpretations and actions are
responsively performed in concert with or towards other people or objects. A shared
collective interpretation provides order by determining similar responses to objects, but
groups can assign different meanings to an object while living in close association with
other groups that have opposing views to the same object.
Split-Second Syndrome
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In his observations of individual police officers and their tendency to use firearms
quickly, James Fyfe (1988) stated that policing is a human service that requires officers
to diagnosis problems and prescribe remedies to social problems. Police officers
maintain order in society and their duties include responding to many non-enforcement
actions such as medical emergencies and motor vehicle accidents. Officers must make
quick decisions to formulate appropriate resolutions for each incident and have a great
range of potential dispositions to situations, including deciding which persons formally
enter the legal system or are referred to other specialized agencies. Fyfe stated that police
officers rely on past experiences and meanings to formulate these quick responses,
agreeing with Blumer (1969).
Police officers must make decisions with little time to investigate encounters,
resulting in excessive violence towards people. Fyfe identified two types of excessive
police use of force: extralegal violence is the willful and wrongful use of force by police
officers who deliberately exceed the lawful level of force needed to control a subject, and
unnecessary force occurs when police officers prove incapable of maintaining social
control with appropriate force or resort to excessive force in a quick manner. Extralegal
police violence can be aligned with politically pragmatic issues of police conduct and
occurs at a lower rate than unnecessary force.
Police officers have choices when using force during law enforcement encounters.
Third party reactions can influence the behavior of police officers and subjects, leading to
officers trying to appear humane during their encounter with perceived offenders who
may be embarrassed by their irrational behavior. Officers can lessen the potential of
violence by slowing the pace of encounters to allow the restoration of reason to
encourage nonviolent resolution of the immediate problem, encourage confidence in the
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outcomes suggested by the police officer, make resolutions that are collaborative rather
than coercive, using techniques that manipulate time to avoid violent outcomes unless
lives are endangered, and using privacy when dealing with subjects. Fyfe agreed with
Manning (1988) and noted that the characteristics of police work and police organizations
are major influences of police misconduct which allow officers to use force to bring
perceived offenders into the formal justice system; however, officers can also make
mistaken moral choices to situations which can lead to misconduct and inappropriate use
of force.
Problems exist as the public may not be aware of the different roles of police
officers. Many public contacts that officers initiate are urgent matters that confront
problems as they occur, performed in public with the expectation of appearing to do the
right thing when interacting with people who may not agree with their actions, and
involve stressed or unwilling participants that are victims or offenders. These three
constraints of police and citizen encounters influence use of force by police officers and
can increase the potential for violence. Police officers are unable to select the time,
location, or type of service they will offer, putting limits on their ability to solve
problems or refer subjects to specialized agencies for assistance. The input of policy
makers and police administrators is needed to change the public perception of unrealistic
expectations of police officers during incidents which include use of force. Fyfe stated
that altering police organizational expectations and norms by punishing police agencies,
rather than individual officers, would be the most effective way to change use of force
policies as citizens have little empathy towards perceived criminals who are the victims
of police violence and are not regarded as peers of law abiding members of society.
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The Split Second Syndrome occurs when police officers treat similar
circumstances as alike and quickly utilize past successful techniques in the new
encounter, however no two situations are alike and past resolutions may not be
appropriate in the current circumstances. Police officers make critical decisions under
adverse conditions and cannot consider all factors due to limited time constraints and
information which prevent officers to consider alternative law enforcement actions during
a confrontation and lead to high levels of inappropriate use of force. Decisions
determining the appropriateness of police use of force are accepted using post-event legal
evaluations of the actions of the subject that favor the actions of the responding police
officers. Consideration of the knowledge the officer possessed during the event is the
primary criteria by which officers are judged, making the sole basis of the
appropriateness of the use of force judged by the perceptions of the officer during the
encounter. The contributory actions of the police officer during the encounter are
normally not considered but can result in unnecessary violence that fails to protect human
life. The focus on the factors to use lethal force ignores the totality of the circumstances
of the encounter and results in officers exposing themselves to situations where deadly
force is justified.
Police administrators should afford less attention to the outcomes of lethal force
and more inspection to the responses of police officers to determine if the tactics used
encourage nonviolent outcomes. To avoid the effects of The Split Second Syndrome,
Fyfe suggests that the locations of possible engagements be surveyed to formulate future
plans to encourage nonviolent resolutions. He also recommended that officers should
attempt to gather more information via police communications systems while traveling to
the scene and use the information to plan nonviolent responses. Diagnostic tools to be
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used are tactical knowledge which is the prior knowledge of the actors, the setting of the
incident, and concealment or remaining hidden until the perceived offender is present
with less hazard to the officers and the public.
Symbolic Communication: Signifying Calls and the Police Response
Police communications contribute to police violence when the behaviors of
mental illness are present. Peter Manning wrote Symbolic Communication: Signifying
Calls and the Police Response (1988) after conducting research on two large police
departments, one in America and one in England. Manning found similarities between
how the calls for service were processed as police communications contained limited
information concerning the actual incident when dispatching police officers to respond.
Manning agreed with Fyfe (1988) that the lack of information available to responding
police officers limits their ability to respond with less violence. Additionally, Manning
agreed with Blumer (1969) that meanings arise from police culture as officers analyze
information quickly as they respond to calls for assistance.
Initial calls for assistance from citizens are considered poorly organized by
dispatchers but contain a high level of information that may not be passed to responding
law enforcement officers. After receiving ponderous verbal communications from
reporting parties, dispatchers streamline information into short phrases or codes which
result in limited information being communicated to responding officers.
Communication messages are perceived as a type of summary of the incident and are
made to conform to the known and accepted pragmatic relevance desired by the local
police agency, forcing officers to attempt to make sense of the information as related to
the actual event as they become involved in the responsive effort.
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The primary function of police communication is efficient message interpretation
and transmittal to other employees. The goal of efficient police communication is
defining an object into a known social form to support rational decisions pertaining to the
resolution of the incident. In police organizations, meaning is socially constructed from
message content with input by multiple employees using visual, aural, and written
channels. By using codes to represent situations, members of law enforcement agencies
pattern the flow of information into reduced messages that imply shared interpretations of
specific phrases to give meaning to officers using occupational expressions that remain
unknown to people outside police culture. Calls are converted into incidents using social
reality, tacit knowledge, and references to known types of past experiences that exist in
local police cultures. Police culture is defined as a set of vague and tacit ideas which are
not firmly entrenched and have frequent and acceptable exceptions to behavior. The
culture of a police organization affects the local definition of calls for assistance by the
shared reality of the members of that agency using tacit knowledge of police culture as a
combination of explicit facts and implicit meanings of key words.
Actual events are not observed by police communication personnel but must be
interpreted abstractly to classify calls into categories before assigning officers to respond.
Dispatchers encode the information using implicit understandings of past events and key
words to establish an event type, making each coded message an abbreviated narrative of
the incident. Dispatched messages contain specific contexts or paradigms to attempt to
aid officers during decision making while adhering to organizational and occupational
perspectives, but some codes are too precise to accurately reflect the event.
Image formation is a convenient method to pass information in police
organizations by using past classifications to shape definitions of current incidents to
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allow members to determine meaning. Historical contexts influence the meaning of
police messages and nebulous information can result in multiple image formations by
personnel responding to the same incident. Imprecise coding allows alternative
representations of events to occur, and each alteration can limit or expand the perception
of subsequent potential resolutions considered by responding officers or dispatchers.
Police officers have few restraints on their interpretation of police messages and must
evaluate them within the context of the actual situation as they gain knowledge of the
incident. Not all members of a police organization will have the same interpretation of
problem resolutions as each member senses different aspects of the work environment
and has different methods to resolve incidents.
Police communication can be difficult when interpreting the context of the
incident as conflict can exist between official procedure, applicable legal statutes, local
limits of police action, and the nature of the social events pertinent to the incident. Some
police messages received by officers are far removed from the actual situation as the
social world of the caller is unknown to the responding police officer. Proximal
influences on the meanings of police communication are dynamic and the meaning of
initial police messages remains uncertain until the incident is identified and resolved by
officers after their arrival at the scene.
Police agencies offer high discretion to members responding to calls for
assistance and use locally influenced references for determining meaning during
incidents. Police officers share a collective expression of meanings which have been
framed within the context of previously known experiences in their locality and
profession. The participation in collective experiences allows officers to organize their
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actions to conform to stable group perceptions. When received information is mistrusted
by responding officers, their subsequent actions are guided by local police culture.
SUMMARY
This chapter briefly reviewed the academic literature concerning police and
citizen encounters and revealed that participant behaviors and police responses have few
studies which show the interaction between the noted concepts. The study of the
manifestations of mental illness and associated behaviors by participants in lethal force
situations can offer academic and social benefits by recognizing commonalities to allow
police officers to detect impending violence and take measures to mitigate the violent act
before it occurs. By interrupting the violence before it happens, participants have less
exposure to negative outcomes such as criminal charges, reactionary violence with the
associated risk of injury or death, and social sanctions such as loss of relationships and
employment (Johnson, 2018).
Laboratory experiments have not been able to replicate all the potential elements
or relationships that could affect an officer in a real shooting and, as such, laboratory
studies have no resemblance to actual lethal force encounters (Blair et al. 2011; James,
Vila, & Daratha, 2013). The academic work on police use of lethal force is small when
compared to the studies performed on less critical decision points (Fyfe, 1988). The use
of videos that memorialize citizen and police deaths provides an unobtrusive research
methodology that minimizes or negates modified behavior by the participants when they
are aware of being observed and allows research into a difficult event for academic
investigators to observe personally. Using videos and news media articles as a dataset for
this dissertation allows for behaviors to be examined that have not previously observed in
the academic literature and adds to the academic discussion of police lethal force.
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The results section lists the specific behaviors that contribute to lethal force events
by civilians and police officers both before and during the lethal force event. The
outcomes of the observations will also suggest policy implications and remedies to police
tactics to lessen the possibility of a lethal outcome when encountering persons suffering
from mental illness during an enforcement contact.
The discussion section summarizes and supports the concepts found in the dataset.
Police policy implications suggest that police agencies and their officers can minimize
their exposure to civil liability, criminal culpability, and bodily harm via recognition of
such incidents and proper preparation to mitigate such incidents.
During an incident, the constant evaluations by each participant result in
behaviors that may influence the other participant and the encounter can transform into a
lethal event. Within these interactions of observations comes an intersection of
vulnerabilities that can lead to a violent action in which the actor usually wins over the
reactor (Blair et al., 2011). This study examines a violent form of these intersecting
behavioral vulnerabilities; those associated with mental illness which contribute to the
application of lethal force in police and citizen encounters.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Use of deadly force has been a significant topic of scholarship for decades. Issues
of civil liability and harm to police legitimacy have been associated with fatal police
actions and some police agencies have not publicly shared information concerning lethal
force incidents, further damaging police credibility. Estimates of the nature and extent of
officer-involved lethal incidents have been conflicting, making the circumstances that
contribute to police lethal force incidents nebulous. The use of different variables has
resulted in different conclusions, making policy recommendations difficult for police
administrators to understand or implement. Additionally, use of force issues combine
with mental health concerns in a significant number of encounters to further confound
attempts to lessen deaths due to police actions. Prior studies provide a background for
this dissertation by examining factors present in lethal force situations involving persons
with mental illness.
STUDIES OF SITUATIONAL FACTORS OF THE ENCOUNTER
Past research studies have examined the situational factors of lethal force
encounters. Many theories have risen from these studies but none of the academic efforts
examined the interpersonal behaviors which contributed to these deadly events. This
dissertation observed human behaviors to determine what actions were perceived as
threats by responding police officers during incidents involving mental illness. The
findings will not rely solely on police or journalist reports which may contain bias by the
authors. These observations add to the national discussion of police use of lethal force by
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increasing awareness of irrational behaviors by participants during encounters involving
police officers and the people they serve. The findings of these past studies presented
different perspectives which were influenced by the participants and the circumstances of
the encounters.
To understand why violent encounters occur in policing and discover methods to
mitigate such incidents, Klinger (2005 and 2020) interpreted Perrow’s Accident Theory
and found that tight coupling and interactive complexity contributed to undesirable
outcomes during human interactions in stressful events. Klinger stated that higher
amounts of interactions in an encounter increased the potential for an undesirable
resolution. As the number of interactions increased, humans could not respond to
situational factors with enough time to process information, which led to faulty
sensemaking. Klinger suggested policy improvements by creating cultures in policing
that promoted officer performance during lethal force incidents to reduce the logical
sources of preventable shootings. He recommended the establishment of tactical review
boards to examine encounters in which an officer used force.
Klinger (2005) noted that lethal force incidents may be reduced in numbers when
police officers created or maintained distance from armed citizens to make situations less
complex, but he stated that not all injuries or deaths in police encounters arose from tight
coupling and interactive complexity. Klinger said that police officers are only
responsible for the aspects of an interaction which they can control and behavior by
subjects can force an officer to use lethal force in life threatening situations. Klinger
(2001) noted that police officers may use lethal force against citizens to protect
themselves against threats they reasonably perceived to be present which are later
determined to have not been a danger to the safety of the officers or others. His study
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closely examined human behaviors during police encounters, but his policy implications
were not implemented by any known police departments.
Rojek, Alpert, and Smith (2012) performed a content analysis of the statements of
both police officers and arrestees during 21 incidents in Richland County (SC) which
occurred in 2007. The resulting 45 interviews were accomplished using a written
instrument which encouraged explanations of responses by the participants with the goal
to understand police and citizen encounters from the perspective of each actor in the
encounter. They found that police officers and citizens focused on different issues and
justified their respective behaviors by the identification and maintenance of specific roles.
During encounters, police officers had expectations that citizens would defer to their
commands and allow the officers to dominate the encounter, but citizens possessed
different individual expectations. Each participant failed to understand and accept the
role of the other participant, which led to reduced communication between the parties and
unacceptable behavior. Police officers focused on citizens with aggressive behaviors and
considered the force responses as acceptable whereas the citizens felt the actions were
unjust. Citing a low consistency in qualitative assessments of use of force, the authors
stated that official reports and biased statements overlooked contextual and cultural
implications during the encounters. As a policy recommendation, the researchers
cautioned that such differences would be made known to the public by the arrestees while
the perceptions of the officers would only be made known to other officers, potentially
increasing conflict between the police and citizens. The researchers used examinations of
actual incidents but were limited in that intentional misrepresentation or omissions of
important information during arrest situations may have occurred due to the different
perceptions or unstated goals of the opposing actors. Additionally, police and citizen
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encounters that did not involve arrests were not examined. This dissertation will use
video recordings of actual incidents to reduce participant bias and examine the context of
lethal force events involving the mentally ill, expanding a limitation of the study by
Rojek et. al.
James, Vila, and Daratha (2013) used 60 high definition interactive videos in
1,812 observations of police and military personnel during responses in training
simulators to measure use of force responses. The results were subjected to multi-level
regression analysis and the researchers found that the observed key response variables
were reaction times during lethal force situations and the measurement of observed errors
in judgement. The researchers found participants took longer to shoot Black subjects
than White or Hispanic subjects. In finding bias, the researchers observed that
participating police officers and military members were also less likely to shoot armed
Blacks than other races. They found that lethal force encounters were complex, making
racial bias difficult to determine in simulator exercises that fail to reflect the reality of
actual encounters, a factor that the proposed study seeks to address by including videos of
actual incidents rather than simulated exercises to observe how behaviors contributed to
lethal force incidents. Additionally, James et. al (2013) noted that a single variable could
not be separated from the complex interplay of factors experienced by the officers and the
subjects. The researchers noted the term “deadly mix” (p. 199) had been used to refer to
the interactive combination of the situation, officer, and offender and how they converged
to create a lethal force situation and determined that greater complexity and tighter
coupling of factors increased the difficulty of the situation and the potential of a lethal
outcome during a critical incident. Limitations included the accuracy and completeness
of the information as relayed by participants and the potential distortion of perceptual
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memory during stressful events. The dataset used in this dissertation will minimize
memory distortion by not relying on post event recollections of lethal force incidents. A
further limitation of the study by James et. al may have been bias by participants that
were aware they were being evaluated by observers. The authors recommended that
policy makers examine if bias is the result of administrative measures during training
using scenarios. The findings by James et. al relate to the current study in that short time
frames were observed when factors converge quickly as police officers made decisions
during lethal force incidents.
In his meta-analysis of use of force studies, Bolger (2015) found that offense
seriousness, suspect resistance, arrest, conflict, the number of officers, suspect race,
suspect sex, suspect demeanor, suspect intoxication, and officer sex were significantly
correlated to levels of force throughout the studies he examined. Bolger’s factors can
also be distilled into James et. al (2013) observation of lethal force incidents originated
from a convergence of factors introduced by the officer, the suspect, and the
circumstances of the encounter. Bolger agreed with that conclusion by listing the
encounter characteristics, suspect characteristics, and officer characteristics as significant
predictors of the aggregate domain effect in police encounters and use of force. He used
data collected using systematic social observation methods and may have been influenced
by observer or participant bias and, hence, may not be accurate. This dissertation acts
upon Bolger’s call for future research on making decisions to use force by examining the
focus on characteristics of irrational behavior and mental illness during lethal force
encounters.
Researchers in Sweden stated that sequences of events during police shootings
occurred at a rapid pace, placing the officer at a disadvantage when making lethal force
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decisions as disrupted perceptive information confounded rational analysis by the officer.
In their content analysis of 112 shooting events involving Swedish police officers from
1984 to 2012, Petersson, Bertilsson, Fredrikson, Magnusson, and Fransson (2017)
interviewed 120 officers involved in the lethal force incidents and found that initial
responding officers discharged their weapons during 80% of the cases they examined.
The officers were not able to predict or prevent the sudden threats they encountered and
92% of the lethal force events were concluded within 60 seconds with 39% of those
events concluded within 3 seconds of the threat identification. The researchers found that
stress made a rational analysis of the events difficult as existing legal framework and
policies were unclear and led officers to initiate control efforts by interpreting the event
as it occurred. They stated the human subconscious required time to evaluate an incident
and the behaviors associated with the people in the encounter combined with
psychological stress to increase the time used to process information for potential
resolutions. Although they advocated training to aid officers to respond to factors
common in the examined incidents, they noted that the short time frame may negate such
training as the quick pace of lethal force events precluded the use of most de-escalation
techniques. The researchers also noted the importance to include realistic factors in
training sessions to properly prepare officers and called for better police policies for
guidance in lethal force encounters. This study was limited to Swedish police officers
and may not relate to officers in other countries. The use of interviews of responding
officers to gather information may have displayed bias to support the actions of the
officer during the encounter as the deceased participant could not provide information.
The current study will expand upon the work of Petersson et.al (2017) by discussing
methods to make additional information about mental illness available to responding
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officers before the officers arrive at the scene and will examine factors related to the
convergence of encounters during lethal force encounters.
The Use of Body Worn Cameras
Videos which result from the use of body worn or vehicle mounted cameras have
provided challenges when performing academic studies. Distance distortion, a lack of
context concerning the encounter before the camera was activated, and potential bias
when using official reports or news media articles may present inaccurate information
used during academic analysis. Multiple camera viewpoints can alleviate some concerns,
but researchers should be cautious of studies that used body worn or vehicle mounted
cameras in their studies without examining other informational sources.
White (2014) reviewed 5 studies for a U.S. Department of Justice examination of
body worn cameras. He concluded there was a lack of research to support or refute
claims of effectiveness or problems with the devices. He noted that police body worn
cameras presented the benefits of perceptions of increased transparency, improved
evidence gathering capabilities, and the potential to use the recordings to provide realistic
training opportunities for police officers. Among the perceived problems were privacy
concerns, health effects from wearing the devices, an increased amount of training and
policy development, and the substantial cost and logistics of operating the cameras and
storing the videos. White called for additional independent research on the equipment
and urged law enforcement agencies to implement careful guidelines and policies when
deploying body worn cameras. White reviewed five studies which were among the first
to look at body worn cameras, making his observations preliminary in the continuing
research of the devices. The proposed study will expand White’s study by including
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representations from additional types of cameras to augment videos from officer worn
body cameras.
Ariel, Farrar, and Sutherland (2015) performed a time series study of the use of
police body worn cameras in a randomized controlled trial with 1,000 officer shifts using
members of the Rialto (CA) Police Department over a 12 month period. They found that
complaints against officers were 80% less when body cameras were present and
suggested that self-consciousness increased when officers and participants thought they
were being observed as the cameras acted as neutral witnesses to record behavior. Policy
implications cited were that use of force incidents were reduced when body cameras were
used, resulting in improved police relationships with the community. Limitations cited
included the inability of computer software to measure police use of force and the factors
that contribute to it, the potential of bias in that participants knew they were being
observed, the unknown factors of how behaviors of the citizens influenced officer
responses, and the presence of alcohol in over half of the cases studied. This dissertation
will include observations during incidents when body worn cameras were not present but
the encounter was recorded by other types of cameras.
Jennings, Lynch, and Fridell (2015) performed a randomized experiment using 46
Orlando (FL) police officers who used body worn cameras and compared their use of
force responses to 43 officers that did not wear the device. They noted a 53.4% decrease
in use of force responses by officers during public encounters and a 65.4% reduction in
citizen complaints in the interactions when officers wore cameras. The experiment also
included surveys of the police officers and associated data supplied by the police
department. The researchers stated that body worn cameras may reduce an array of
negative outcomes that result from police and citizen encounters by improving behavior
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among participants when they realized their actions were recorded and available for
review. Cameras, and the videos that result from their use, showed how use of force
situations arose during civilian contacts and clarified situational issues without the use of
participant narratives which may cloud or attempt to hide factors. Policy implications
included the recommendation that body worn cameras improved evidence collection and
report writing while promoting better general behavior from both police officers and the
public. As only one police department was used, the study cannot be generalized and the
observation that improved behavior cannot be attributed to the camera solely as the
improved behavior of the officer may have elicited amicable behavior from the citizen.
The proposed study will expand this work and examine manifestations of mental illness
and acts of aggression during lethal force encounters that were video recorded to
determine actions that were considered as dangerous by police officers.
Excessive training in body worn camera analysis led to a distortion of distance
perception in trained individuals. Specifically, the research of Boivin, Gendron, Faubert,
and Poulin (2017) compared examinations by civilian and police observers and revealed
that police officers with more applicable training than civilians misjudged the actual
distance between offenders and officers when viewing videotapes, leading to incorrect
judgements concerning the appropriateness of force in critical situations. This inaccurate
judgment was due to the fisheye lenses used in body worn cameras which offer a wider
range of view but distort perceptions of distance to viewers. Boivin et. al used college
undergraduate students and police officer cadets to determine how a point of physical
view influenced perception by comparing the perspectives of body worn cameras with
other cameras mounted at a higher view. The results revealed that the college students
did not have camera bias, but the police cadets exhibited significant bias between the two
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perspectives and misjudged distances. The researchers recommended caution when
evaluating video recordings made by police officers for the appropriateness of their
actions due to distorted distance perceptions. The exercise used scenarios, not recordings
of actual police and citizen encounters, and did not include many factors related to the
physical conditions present during actual police shootings, including poor lighting
conditions, and inclement weather; factors which will be present in the videos reviewed
in this dissertation.
Zimring (2017) found that surveillance cameras have provided 7% of known
videos, police body cameras have accounted for 6%, police dash cams have captured
4.5%, and cameras operated by private citizens compose 2.5% of known recordings. He
stated that each new recording of police and citizen encounters make circumstances
clearer while discounting or verifying allegations of mistreatment during these
interactions. Police cameras merited attention as new cases appeared regularly and gave
attention to police and public conduct during encounters by the photographic evidence
they yield. The use of police cameras is a changing technology, but further innovations
may lower the costs of recording technology and provide a valuable tool to police
administrators. Zimring stated video reviews guided the evaluations of police shootings
and can suggest changes to training and policies to reduce police use of lethal force. To
expand on the observation by Zimring, this dissertation will use 129 incidents that were
recorded by dash mounted cameras, body worn cameras, and cameras other than those
used by police departments. Some incidents were recorded by multiple types of cameras,
which allowed for different perspectives to be examined.
Race
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Issues of race during police encounters with the mentally ill have not received
academic attention and questions exists concerning the role of race during lethal police
encounter. This dissertation will address this academic shortcoming by examining
behaviors related to mental health issues as well as the race of citizens involved in deadly
encounters with police officers.
James, James, and Vila (2016) examined racial bias in video based scenarios
using police officers from the Spokane (WA) Police Department and civilians as a
control group. They found that police officers were less likely to shoot or were slower to
shoot Blacks as opposed to Whites in similar scenarios, challenging racial bias in
policing. The study was not generalizable as only officers from a single department were
used in the study, which used specially designed scenarios to test bias but did not include
many of the factors found in actual police lethal force incidents, including the effects of
mental illness. The current study will research such encounters.
Nix, Campbell, Byers, and Alpert (2016) used journalistic databases and
multivariate regression models and found that implicit bias existed during threat
perception in police officers as non-White persons were more likely to be subjected to
lethal force by police officers than White subjects, Black civilians were more than twice
as likely as White subjects to have been unarmed during the confrontations, and that
members of racial minorities were less likely to have attacked an officer when compared
to White subjects. The study called for a national database to study use of force events
but did not use available videos to examine the conclusions of threat perception failures
in police officers. Other limitations include the use of data collected by journalists, the
use of national level data that can introduce aggregate bias and not be representative of a
police jurisdiction, and data based only on the deaths of citizens which is a rare event in
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policing. The effort did not study the contributions of mental illness to lethal force
incidents, nor did it define the concept of threat perception to measure such reactions by
police officers.
Klinger and Slocum (2017), in a policy essay concerning the use of journalistic
data, stated that the study by Nix et. al had several issues including the issue of threat
perception which did not identify the threats as interpreted by officers and that not all
issues fit into a single category during complex social interactions. Klinger and Slocum
stated that new measurements of social phenomena should be thoroughly vetted by
researchers and lethal force studies should be done with care and diligence due to
profound implications to officers and citizens when suggesting policy improvements.
The current study will examine video evidence to identify threats which contributed to
lethal force by police officers and add to the national discussion of the police use of lethal
force during encounters with the mentally ill while noting the race of civilians during
these encounters.
Fyfe (1988), in a research article, noted that racial disparities in policing
paralleled those found in other social phenomena such as life expectancy, rates of
incarceration, unemployment, infant mortality, levels of income, educational level, and
socioeconomic status. Fyfe stated his opinion:
In short, as long as some American neighborhoods are perceived realistically as
dangerous places that should be avoided whenever possible, we should be neither
surprised nor damning if we find that police administrators may take the same
considerations into account when judging the actions of officers who are not free
to avoid dangerous neighborhoods and who shot occasionally at the people who
live in them…. This effect, however, may have less connection with arbitrariness
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on the part of the police than with the fact that the police work in a society that
itself is so arbitrary regarding issues of race (p. 194).
Prior academic studies have not examined issues of race in individuals who suffer
mental illness that are killed during police encounters. This dissertation will examine the
race of persons who exhibited erratic behavior during lethal force events.
In summary, studies which examined the situational factors of police and public
encounters relate to this dissertation by noting the perceptions of police officers which
contribute to inaccurate decisions during encounters with the mentally ill. Additionally,
these studies revealed that police officers display bias towards persons with mental illness
during stressful encounters which may contribute to encounters becoming lethal.
STUDIES OF THE POLICE ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS OF THE ENCOUNTER
Other studies have examined the relationship between police organizational
factors and use of force by officers. Among the issues studied were the effects of police
culture, perceived risk, and police legitimacy. None of these studies examined video
recordings of incidents but relied on official reports and the opinions of the participants,
which may be biased. The proposed study will examine videotaped lethal force incidents
to minimize such bias by allowing observational studies of police lethal force events
related to mental illness and organizational factors.
Alpert and Macdonald (2001) examined police use of force as a function of
organizational characteristics using data from 265 police agencies in 1996. Using a
multivariate model, the researchers determined that there was not a strong correlation
between reported police use of force and agency related characteristics. Policy
recommendations included their finding that police agencies that used force response data
for a specific purpose, or had supervisors complete use of force reports, had fewer use of
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force incidents when compared to other agencies. The researchers stated that police use
of force was related to area characteristics, particularly when the violent crime rate was
elevated. While the study found that agencies with higher levels of accountability appear
to discourage officers from using force, the authors conceded that requiring supervisory
accountability may lead to inaccurate reporting of use of force incidents to police
administrators. Alpert and Macdonald used many police agencies to determine that
agency characteristics had little effect on reported use of force but failed to examine the
behavioral factors present when lethal force was used by officers which can allow for
new perspectives relating to this critical issue. Nearly half of the police agencies were in
the southeast region of the United States; hence the results may not be generalizable to
the rest of the country, but this dissertation included incidents which occurred throughout
the United States. Persons with mental illness were known to reside or frequent areas
where high crime rates exist, and this dissertation will examine how the behaviors
associated with mental illness contribute to lethal force incidents.
Lersch and Mieczkowski (2005) performed an assessment of previous studies of
violent police behavior and found a lack of national studies on the subject. Past academic
efforts have been accomplished via observational studies, a review of citizen complaints,
the use of surveys, and reviews use of force reports submitted by police officers. They
stated their effort was limited in that use of force events were rare in policing and police
cultures are isolated from, and often in conflict with, the general community. Police
cultures promoted reliance as officers provided each other protection in dangerous
situations and they viewed society as not holding favorable opinions for their efforts or
occupation. Policy considerations included the recognition that police officers lacked
direct supervision, which allowed the officers great discretion when making decisions.
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Limitations included that policing is a difficult profession with opposing opinions of
proper confrontational situation management between different police officers and
between officers and the public who constantly questioned the responses of officers. The
researchers stated that risk was also elevated when competent or aggressive police
officers exposed themselves to more threats than less aggressive officers. Due to this
variation of risk exposure, more aggressive officers experienced more negative
consequences than meeker officers that perform their duties in a milder manner. The
dissertation will expand upon the notation of risk during police encounters by
illuminating abnormal behavior which was perceived by officers as threatening and
suggest procedures to lessen bias by officers.
One study cited the need for fresh perspectives to improve traditional enforcement
practices and change police culture, to which this dissertation will aid by identifying
actual behaviors which elicited police officers to respond with lethal force in some
encounters. Micucci and Gromme (2005) used data collected from police officers to
examine police excessive force and found that it undermined police legitimacy.
Minorities perceived police excessive force as supporting political and economic
disadvantages without police administrators supervising and disciplining officers.
Micucci and Gromme found that novice police officers, highly experienced officers, and
supervisors were more likely to view excessive force as a serious matter in policing.
Limitations to their study included no method to verify the responses of participating
police officers, the use of police officers in one section of the country, the declination of
some police departments to participate, and potential understatement due to selfreporting. Policy recommendations included the recognition that police subcultures share
socializations and experiences which increase the perception of risk and the authors
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called for better recruitment and training to strengthen community relations. This
dissertation will examine how police officers share perceptions of risk and the subsequent
police actions during encounters with people who exhibit behavior that was interpreted as
threatening to the officer(s) or others present.
Zimring (2017) analyzed police use of lethal force using data from federal and
state records, crowdsourced research, and media articles. The data sets used by Zimring
encompass the years of 1976 to 2015, although not all observations were inclusive of
those 39 years of observations. He concluded that police use of lethal force is a serious
national problem in the United States as widespread firearms ownership increased the
potential for law enforcement officers to be exposed to encounters that threaten their lives
or the lives of citizens. Zimring also stated that police use of lethal force can be
controlled without major changes to police performance by training officers in specific
mitigating techniques to provide alternatives for non-lethal resolutions. Potentially safer
procedures and tactics can minimize deaths during future incidents if encouraged by local
police managers. Specific policies and procedures that favor non-lethal resolutions may
be more effective than general police reform to reduce the number of people killed by
police. This dissertation will support the use of available equipment and tactics to subdue
suspects which exhibit erratic behavior, making incidents safer for the civilians and
police officers, expanding on the policy recommendations made by Zimring.
Fyfe (1988) wrote an academic essay which reviewed lethal force studies that
were associated with the apprehension of non-violent felony suspects. Unlike the sister
agencies of the criminal justice system, police officers must meet the offenders in the
street and during circumstances that are uncontrolled and hiding potential dangers.
Goldstein (1977) stated that, if viewed in a broad context, the police function by making
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diagnostic decisions of potential actions that are appropriate in each case as policing is a
form of government service which contains several constraints that obstruct positive
public relations. Fyfe stated that the “rules and regulations” that govern police use of
force are “too vague to be regarded as a comprehensive set of operational guidelines” (p.
171) to influence an officer’s decision to use lethal force. He concluded that race and
areas with high crime rates influenced police officers to use excessive force to ensure
their safety and stated that police administrators displayed variations in accommodating
the use of force by police officers in those areas. He recommended that additional
training would improve police officer performance during citizen encounters but
recognized qualitative differences existed in different police jurisdictions. His study was
limited by only using data associated with incidents in which a person was killed by
police. Fyfe did not use those incidents in which lethal force was implied but not actually
used or those encounters in which a person was wounded and did not die because of the
police action.
Fyfe (2015) expanded upon Goldstein by illustrating that the police-offender
interaction is normally urgent, involuntary, and public, making diagnostic decisions
difficult with unwilling offenders. This dissertation will expand the observations made
by Fyfe and Goldstein by noting the convergence of factors which contribute to the
difficulty of making decisions during police encounters involving shared police
perspectives. Fyfe recommended the establishment of a national deadly force database to
allow critical academic studies on variables which contributed to police lethal force
incidents. He observed that until a new breed of police executives and police chiefs can
change the unrealistic public perceptions of law enforcement officers, incidents of
excessive use of force will continue to plague the profession. The unnecessary episodes
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of violence will remain until police officers are taught to analyze confrontations to
discover better ways to approach aggressive offenders. The dissertation will expand
upon Fyfe’s efforts by examining police lethal force encounters, including the presence
of mental illness and the influence of police culture.
In summary, studies of the organizational factors present in police and citizen
encounters have revealed that high crime areas were prominent in use of force situations,
but the studies failed to examine the behaviors related to mental illness that were
interpreted as dangerous by police officers. Inappropriate use of force can reduce police
legitimacy during these public and urgent interactions. This dissertation will identify
those behaviors and examine how police officers share representations among themselves
to construct bias towards the mentally ill.
STUDIES OF MENTAL ILLNESS INTERACTIONS INVOLVING POLICE
OFFICERS
Some studies have examined the interaction between police officers and the
mentally ill or investigated how stigma can affect public service organizations, including
police departments. They found a lack of knowledge, training, and resources available to
police officers to use when encountering a person will mental illness. Some studies noted
a lack of cooperation between police officers and mental health professionals, although
officers were often the first contact with an individual during a mental health crisis. This
dissertation will expand the discussion of police encounters with people in crisis by
identifying behaviors which influenced officers to make lethal force decisions. Policy
discussions will be expanded by examining situational contexts of the behaviors
exhibited by the mentally ill during encounters; behaviors perceived by police officers as
dangerous.
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Fry, Riordan, and Geanellos (2002) performed a survey of 131 police officers in
Sydney, Australia, to discover issues during interactions between the mentally ill and
officers and to explore the relationships between the police and mental health providers.
The authors found confusion among officers concerning their expected performance
when dealing with the mentally ill. Although the officers acknowledge that they were the
first contact for situations involving the mentally ill, they did not feel that such efforts
were the responsibility of law enforcement professionals. The officers felt they were not
supported or prepared as they possessed inadequate training and resources to properly
manage such encounters which included actions interpreted as threatening and dangerous
whereas mental health professionals found the same behaviors as requiring attention.
The responding police officers stated that interactions with the mentally ill took a
minimum of 10% or more of their duty time and noted a lack of communication with
mental health providers. Policy concerns included a better relationship between mental
health providers and police officers and a need for further training for officers to enhance
skills when interacting with the mentally ill. This study was limited by using only
officers from Sydney but provided information for that specific area and expressed the
opinions of police officers that interacted with people who suffered with mental illness.
The proposed study will expand the academic discussion by allowing the examination of
behaviors of the mentally ill and police officers during critical incidents.
Cooper, McLearen, and Zapf (2004) surveyed 92 officers from a single
department in Canada to examine police decisions when arresting or committing mentally
ill subjects. The officers completed questionnaires concerning their attitudes about
mental illness and responded to a vignette that required them to formulate a conclusion
during an interaction with a mentally ill person. The authors found that the officers
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realized that dealing with the mentally ill was their responsibility and desired more
training but were frustrated in their performance, citing a lack of cooperation between
mental health providers and law enforcement. The study concluded that no racial bias
was discovered during the decision making process, but Whites were more apt to be
committed which resulted in less mental health resource available for minorities, who
were incarcerated at a high rate. Policy implications included that police departments did
not provide clear guidelines for officers to follow in interactions with the mentally ill and
officers experienced negative results when attempting to seek specialized help for such
subjects. This study was limited to a single police department in Canada with a small
sample size that was skewed towards White males and was not generalizable. The
findings of this study relate to the dissertation by noting that levels of training are not
sufficient to decrease lethal force incidents but displayed strength by identifying
weaknesses when officers interact with the mentally ill.
In a study for the U.S. Department of Justice, Cordner (2000) performed a survey
which examined 22 potential responses for police officers to use during encounters with
persons who were mentally ill. The survey revealed that police officers were dissatisfied
with law enforcement training techniques which the officers described as inadequate and
not successful during encounters with people suffering from mental illness. Most officers
believed that persons displaying behaviors related to mental illness presented a high risk
to officer safety and made protective considerations a priority when dealing with the
mentally ill. The study, which encompassed 3 cities, found that 92% of patrol officers
had at least one encounter with a mentally ill person during the previous month with
some officers reporting as many as 6 encounters per month. Cordner stated that
traditional police responses during encounters with the mentally ill were not effective and
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sometimes resulted in tragic consequences. Often officers were not aware that subjects
were mentally ill until after the incident, and encounters raised tensions when the
individuals did not cooperate, leading officers to believe that the mentally ill were more
dangerous than normal cooperating subjects and limited their response to fewer options
during such situations. The dissertation will identify specific actions that were
interpreted as dangerous by police officers and expand the finding by Cordner. He stated
that encounters were dangerous for the persons suffering from mental illness as they were
four times more likely to be killed by police officers. Policy concerns included more
training for police officers for use in encounters with the mentally ill, having a call
classification to notify officers that a person is exhibiting behaviors associated with
mental illness, the need for police departments and mental health providers to share
information, and deploying mental health providers to respond with police officers during
calls involving the mentally ill. Cordner surveyed police officers that had been involved
in encounters with the mentally ill but was limited as the sample set was derived using
only 3 cities which limited the generalization to other areas. The dissertation will explore
methods to alert responding police officers to irrational behavior.
A survey of 126 officers in northern Indiana was done by Wells and Schafer
(2006) to determine the perceptions of police officers, state troopers, and sheriff’s
deputies related to their contacts with the mentally ill. The results indicated that officers
felt their training was not sufficient when compared to the many challenges of such
interactions. The officers were not satisfied with traditional outcomes and felt too many
persons with mental illness were incarcerated in conditions where mental health
assistance was not available. Seventy nine percent of the officers indicated that they
would prefer taking a person in crisis to a mental health facility rather than a jail although
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less than 20% felt that such assistance was easily accomplished. Most of the officers
desired additional training as they were not satisfied with existing mitigation techniques
when interacting with the mentally ill. Other policy considerations were the
encouragement of using community-based treatment programs for the mentally ill with
improved communication between the police and mental health providers. The study
used the opinions of officers who interacted with the mentally ill but was focused on one
county, making the result potentially not generalizable to other communities with
differing levels of community support and treatment programs.
Morabito (2007) stated that police officers are the gatekeepers to the criminal
justice system, and little is known about how officers interact with the public. He
referenced three contexts that informed the decision by officers to arrest an individual,
the manipulative context which used considerations of community safety, the temporal
context which included the character and mindset of the involved officer, and the scenic
context which included features of the community. This dissertation will add to his
observations by examining the behaviors of citizens with mental illness that contribute to
lethal force encounters. Policy implications included that arrests occurred due to social
assistance not being available and stigma of mental illness can lead to less access to
social service, employment, and support networks. The limitation of this article was the
lack of observable evidence presented to support or refute his claims.
Watson, Morabito, Draine, and Ottah (2008) used a literature review and a multilayered conceptual model to measure acceptance and effectiveness of crisis intervention
training (CIT) in police officers and found no evidence that CIT was effective. They
stated officers perceived persons with mental illness as dangerous and individuals with
mental illness were subjected to stigma as having a lessor status within society. The
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study revealed that police officers were often the first criminal justice contact with the
mentally ill and served as evaluators to define appropriate actions to conclude situations.
Officers felt that encounters with the mentally ill increased the possibility of injury to
themselves and the subjects as other citizens were less likely to intervene with persons
displaying symptoms of mental illness and relied on responding police officers to
intercede. This dissertation will examine behaviors that contributed to lethal incidents
involving responding police officers and citizens. Watson et. al stated that delayed
intervention until the situation became a crisis increased the level of force needed by
officers to control mentally ill subjects. Disadvantaged neighborhoods had fewer
resources to seek assistance for the mentally ill, which resulted in calls for service to
police officers rather than mental health treatment. The authors felt that police
departments needed officers to adopt positive attitudes when interacting with the
mentally ill and an agency champion was needed to promote changes in policies and
procedures. Partnerships with local mental health providers and community assistance
groups to divert subjects from the criminal justice systems into a mental health system to
provide treatment were suggested policy improvements. Limitations included the use of
research performed by others which may have reflected bias into their study.
Morabito and Socia (2015) performed a statistical analysis of 6,131 use of force
reports submitted by officers of the Portland (OR) Police Bureau from 2008 to 2011 and
attempted to find correlations between participant injury and police officer perceptions of
danger in behaviors related to mental illness. The study found that subjects experienced
injury in 19.0% of the encounters while officers were injured in 7.4% of the cases. Police
officers recognized mental illness in 6% of the cases although people with mental illness
were no more likely to be injured than those without mental illness, suggesting the mental
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illness does not represent a danger to police officers. The perception of danger arose
from the officers who were not clinicians and may not have been able to recognize
symptoms of mental illness. Policy suggestions included the recognition that the
perception of danger contributed to unnecessary stigma which can prevent people who
suffer from mental illness to seek treatment. Limitations included the recognition that
actions of police officers are based on perceptual cues they recognize during an
encounter, all of the officers had completed crisis intervention training and may have
been more cognizant of the signs and bias of mental illness, the data used did not supply
the context of each encounter, and the study was limited to one city. This dissertation
will identify behaviors that were defined as dangerous during police encounters that
resulted in a lethal force incident including the mentally ill from many areas by
examining the actions of the participants during recorded lethal force events.
Miller (2015), in an essay that reviewed previous studies of police use of force,
stated that the use of lethal force is a rare event during police encounters and estimated
that 360 deaths of civilians occurred per year. He found that subjects that present a high
level of agitation, displayed impaired judgement, and exhibited a lack of self-control
resulted in more lethal force incidents than calmer individuals. Miller stated that police
officers are expected to react to imminent and credible threats and subjects that
demonstrated higher perceived levels of danger were more likely to be met with higher
levels of force, including lethal force. He suggested that the level of force used by police
officers should be proportional to the danger presented by the subject with the purpose of
securing the individual for further processing by the criminal justice system. Miller
observed that mental illness was a main contributor to lethal force incidents which may
have been avoided if the mental condition of the subject was known before officers
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interacted with them. He found that 60 police shootings per year were the result of
suicide by cop events in which subjects had a history of suicide attempts and mental
illness and were concluded within 10 minutes after the arrival of officers. Miller stated
police officers favored priority incidents that contain potential active intervention as a
resolution to reduce the time span of the encounter and officers used excessive force
when their interpretation of an encounter was viewed as life-threatening. Agitated
subjects required more physical restraint than average citizens as aggressive acts
motivated by-standers and family members to call the police with the expectation they
will control the person to preserve public safety. A lack of specialized training resulted
in lethal force being used against the mentally ill when officers interacted with people
due to other causes, including homelessness, substance abuse, and joblessness.
Suggestions for policy implications included the recognition that officer attitudes,
demographics, personalities, and assignments affect the level of force used against
citizens. Higher educational levels of officers, an increase in mental health responses
coupled with verbal crisis intervention techniques, and stronger efforts at community
relationships could lead to a lessor number of lethal force incidents. Miller concluded
that there is no evidence that police officers systematically target members of an ethnic
group for more forceful confrontations, including lethal force incidents but also stated
that some police officers suffered from personality disorders that included dysfunctional
traits that led to abusive behavior, particularly when threats to their authority were
perceived. Policy implications included the use of transparency to encourage legitimacy
via full public disclosure concerning police use of lethal force. Miller stated that conflict
management could improve the communication skills used by police officers and become
the primary tool for controlling violent and irrational citizens using role-playing training
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scenarios to practice mitigating techniques. Miller used studies performed by other
researchers which may have contained bias, but his effort was an extensive review of
such research although his estimate of annual deaths due to police actions appeared
conservative. The proposed study will expand upon the observations made by Miller by
identifying behaviors that contribute to lethal force being used during encounters with the
mentally ill, including actions by police officers.
A study by DeGue, Fowler, and Calkins (2016) used data from the National
Violent Death Reporting System kept by the U.S. Center for Disease Control in 812 cases
from 17 states and found that Whites were more likely than Blacks or Hispanics to be
killed during encounters with police officers in mental health or substance abuse
situations, although minorities were likely to be killed at a higher rate than their
representation in the general population. The research revealed that 20% of the deceased
subjects had been hospitalized for mental illness or were detained by police officers in the
four months prior to their deaths. The researchers estimated between 25% and 50% of
fatal encounters in law enforcement incidents involve civilians with mental illness.
Observations concerning policy recommendations included improved training for police
officers to lower the rate of lethal force using de-escalation techniques, training to
recognize implicit bias, the increased use of chemical sprays or conducted energy
weapons during encounters, and the recognition of mental health issues during calls for
service. Limitations of this study included that 53% of the cases lacked information to be
categorized, the data set was not nationally represented, the results may not be
generalizable as only successful lethal force events were considered, and events that were
concluded with non-lethal means were excluded. The data relied on the input by police
officers and medical examiners which made data validation difficult. The dissertation
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will examine actions made by police officers during encounters with the mentally ill by
observing the incident rather than relying solely on reports for information.
An exploratory descriptive study of police contacts with the mentally ill in
Maryland by Goldberg, White, and Weisburd (2019) used longitudinal data to study 449
street segments to examine multistage clustered samples of micro level crime levels using
data gathered by the Baltimore County Police Department. Using 3,139 surveys during a
census of the area, the authors discovered that persons with mental illness displayed a
high level of fear and a low level of trust of police officers. The study also found that
persons with mental illness had negative perceptions about police legitimacy, making
them apprehensive about cooperating with the police. Additionally, 71.30% of citizens
with post-traumatic stress syndrome or depression had annual incomes of under
$25,000.00 which made mental health costs prohibitively high for low wage earners. The
citizens with mental illness lived in marginal areas where they were more likely to
encounter police officers as their first contact during mental health episodes. Fifty one
percent of those suffering from mental illness were not employed, felt less safe in their
living conditions, and had a higher fear of becoming victims of a crime. Police officers
viewed mentally ill subjects as dangerous, particularly if they did not recognize a mental
health event or were not properly trained to interact with people experiencing a personal
crisis. Although pertinent to the Baltimore area, it is unknown if the findings of this
study are applicable to other jurisdictions. The dissertation will expand upon the findings
of the Goldberg, White, and Weisburd by displaying actual behaviors of police officers
and subjects which exhibit erratic behavior that were perceived as threats during lethal
force encounters.

53

In summary, studies that examined mental illness during police encounters with
citizens add to this dissertation by noting that inadequate agency guidance and training
hamper police officers, who recognize limitations when responding to incidents involving
persons who have experienced a mental health crisis. The studies also illustrate how
officers perceive threats from the mentally ill and use enhanced officer safety
considerations during interactions with them. Importantly, the studies reveal that mental
illness is a factor in many lethal force events involving police officers.
STUDIES OF VICTIM PRECIPITATED HOMICIDES OR “SUICIDE BY COP”
Studies of victim precipitated homicides, or suicide by cop, will add to the
dissertation by examining participant behaviors which contributed to police lethal force
incidents. Many of these studies noted that mental illness was present in the deceased
after the incident occurred but did not examine behaviors that contributed to the deadly
police response. The proposed study will increase the knowledge of suicide by cop
incidents to allow new perspectives and policies for officers by examining the interaction
between irrational behavior and perceived threats during encounters with the mentally ill.
Homant and Kennedy (2000) performed a content analysis of 23 cases of suicide
by cop and the effectiveness of force options that were not intended to be lethal. The
study reviewed official reports, court documents, and newspaper accounts of those cases
in which the subjects had been exposed to police gunfire after a less lethal force option
was attempted. They found that 31% of the events included known prior planning and
57% included examples of irrational behavior by the deceased individuals. The authors
found that force options not intended to be lethal were successful if the subject was not
armed and recommended additional research on the subject which this dissertation offers
using content analysis to add to their study. The study by Homant and Kennedy was
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limited by using only cases that resulted in lethal force and the authors admitted that no
causal inferences could be made from their study with certainty.
Homant, Kennedy, and Hupp (2000) reviewed 123 incidents of suicide by cop
from reports of judicial sources and academic studies. They found that 22% of the
reviewed cases had notations of mental illness and 27% had planned their suicide, which
led the the researchers to state that emotional inability to kill oneself was a primary factor
in these incidents. Factors which contributed to suicide by cop incidents included risk
taking, aggressiveness, manipulation, and intentionality. The strongest correlation was
the perceived danger of the subjects when they presented themselves to police officers,
although the actual danger could not be determined until the incidents ended. The
researchers stated that the information was not useful as policy recommendations as
suicide by cop events were unpredictably dangerous events that required caution. The
study was limited in that the sources used were subjective recollections of surviving
police officers as the deceased persons could not be interviewed and no video recordings
of these events were used. This dissertation will expand upon this effort by examining
video recording of suicide by cop encounters to identify actions that officers perceived as
dangerous.
Klinger (2001) stated that many studies were not able to determine intent in
suicide by cop cases, making it difficult to measure the number of persons who elicit
police officers to kill them. He stated that suicidal intent could be used as a foundation to
understand interpersonal violence, but police officers used lethal force when they have a
reasonable perception of a threat, even if the threat was subsequently determined to have
not been present. Mistaken impressions of imminent peril occurred when officers could
not ascertain if the threat is real. The dissertation will examine those actions which
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elicited lethal force by officers and expand the observations made by Klinger. The article
performed a critical review of suicide by cop research but was limited in that intent is
difficult to determine when the subject is deceased and cannot be interviewed. No videos
were used to discover the context of the encounter and no policy implications were given
in the article.
In a study funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Pinizzotto, Davis, and Miller
(2006) examined 40 incidents in a content analysis of felonious assaults on police
officers. The researchers interviewed 50 officers, 43 offenders, and reviewed the official
reports associated with each incident. Among their findings were that suicide by cop
incidents were misunderstood by law enforcement agencies as no clear or accepted
definition existed. The researchers also found a large discrepancy between how police
officers and offenders perceived a situation when danger was interpreted by the officer.
Policy implications include the use of realistic training scenarios to foster officer
awareness during encounters and improved relationships with the media. This
examination had strength by using an in-depth analysis of actual police shootings, rather
than summaries. The study had a potential dataset of over 800 incidents but the use of
only 40 incidents in the study, without the use of videos to validate information,
decreased the ability to generalize their work. Their finding that the formation of
perceptions of danger by officers differs from the intent of involved citizens in use of
force incidents will inform the discussion of how police officers perceive some actions of
persons suffering from mental illness. These observations will assist in policy changes
that may lead to non-lethal conclusions during police encounters with the mentally ill.
Mohandie, Meloy, and Collins (2009) performed a content analysis by reviewing
officer involved shooting files from eight police departments from 1998 to 2006 and
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noted that missing mental health history remained common in criminal justice reports.
Their study examined incident characteristics, subject data, and situational outcomes.
The researchers defined suicide by cop incidents as when a subject engaged in behaviors
that caused a lethal force response by police officers. They found the subjects exhibited
spontaneous verbal and behavioral indicators that posed a significant threat of violence
towards the officers and others before and during the event. The dissertation will
examine the spontaneous behaviors of the participants during lethal force encounters,
including potential suicide by cop incidents. Mohandie et. al stated that encounters with
an armed and suicidal person elevated safety concerns for the safety of officers and
civilians present and 62% of suicide by cop subjects had confirmed or probable mental
illness with 48% suffering from depression or another mood disorder. Twenty one
percent had prior hospitalizations for mental health reasons and 81% of the lethal events
were unplanned and spontaneous. Suicidal communication occurred in 87% of the cases,
98% of the cases displayed a behavioral threat with 90% of the threats directed to
responding officers. Eighty percent of suicide by cop subjects were armed with actual
weapons while an additional 19% possessed simulated weapons. Policy implications
included that officer perceptions of danger may not have represented actual danger and
there was a moderate chance of injury to officers or others during these encounters. This
study examined actual encounters but was limited as the archival data consisted of the
memorialized recollections of the officers which could represent bias in their favor.
Potential sampling bias could have been present as non-lethal attempts were not included
in the study.
Lord and Sloop (2010) reviewed 356 cases of suicide by cop contained in the
Hostage Barricade Data System maintained by the U.S. Department of Justice and
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developed a decision tree to define suicidal intentions using observable acts. Their model
predicted 97.9% of cases that would be classified as suicide by cop using the indicators of
communicated intent, acts of nonverbal intent, and deliberate contact with police officers.
The researchers also used a content analysis of the comments of the involved police
officers. They found that 46.8% of the reviewed suicide by cop cases had a history of
mental illness and other aspects included associated criminal activity, an unwillingness to
surrender, and possession of a weapon. Collaboration between mental health providers
and police departments to preserve life in suicide by cop encounters was the primary
policy suggestion. The study was limited by using only police officer comments in their
analysis which may have contained bias to favor the actions of the police.
In a later study, Lord (2012) used the decision model to review 12,550 incidents
in the National Violent Death Reporting System and found that multiple points of data
should be used to classify suicide by cop as it was unlikely that researchers could
establish intent with minimal evidence. She included personal characteristics and the
situation of a domestic dispute in progress in this later study. Lord found that irrational
thought was not a contributing factor in suicide by cop events. Her study was limited in
that only 17 states participated in the National Violent Death Reporting System and the
database was dependent upon death certificates, medical examiner reports, and police
reports of investigation; many of which are the interpretations of individuals as no
standard exists among states concerning death records. Lord’s study was limited to post
event evaluations of converging factors which hasten decision making whereas the
dissertation will examine the actual events as they occurred during a lethal force
encounter with the mentally ill using videos of the incidents.
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Kesic, Thomas, and Ogloff (2012) analyzed factors while reviewing 45 coroner
investigations of police shootings from 1980 to 2008 in Victoria, Australia. Using
official data, they examined contributory factors during lethal encounters. They found
that deaths occurred during arrests made in unplanned police operations that were short in
duration and planned by the deceased to encourage police involvement. Citing a lack of
prior academic investigations into the behavior of the deceased and the mental health
behaviors in lethal force incidents, they stated that 33% of the cases were classified as
suicide by cop, 57.8% of the cases involved prior mental illness, and 80% of the involved
subjects had a history of violence. Policy suggestions included the need for additional
police training to use in encounters with the mentally ill and police partnerships with
mental health providers to encourage peaceful resolutions. Actual incidents were
examined in this study, but limitations included a wide variation of the quality and depth
of the available information and the use of cases only from Australia, limiting the
generalization of their findings. The dissertation will add to the work of Kesic et. al by
examining video recorded behaviors exhibited during police encounters with the mentally
ill.
Patton and Fremouw (2016) performed a critical literature review of academic
publications from 1994 to 2014 to examine individual characteristics, situational
variables, and legal interventions in suicide by cop incidents. They found that many
encounters were unplanned domestic matters or interpersonal disputes where police
officers had threatened to arrest one or more of the participants. The events were short in
duration, lacked a clear intent, and some participants had significant mental health issues
that caused an inability for the subject to process information during an interpersonal
crisis. Policy considerations included that the high lethality of these events, coupled with
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the rapid development of danger and the lack of known suicidal intent, precluded the use
of many interventions not intended to be lethal. They also noted that different codes were
used in different reports, making analysis difficult, and called for additional studies of
suicide by cop incidents. This study recognized the inability of persons with mental
illness to process information and the use of police weapons not intended to be lethal, but
the limitations included the use of different definitions throughout the reviewed literature
evaluations. This dissertation will make direct observations of lethal force events
involving the mentally ill and not rely solely on reports.
Jordan, Panza, and Dempsey (2020) reviewed police reports submitted by the
Mental Evaluation Unit of the Los Angeles Police Department to perform a retrospective
review of 419 suicide by cop incidents. The researchers examined verbal expressions of
a desire to be killed by a police officer or displays of aggressive behaviors that
encouraged a police officer to take the life of the subject. They found that 371 incidents
(89%) involved subjects that verbally communicated suicidal intentions prior to the
encounter and 256 incidents (61%) displayed threatening behavior. One hundred and
fifty nine subjects (38%) verbally communicated their suicidal intentions before the
incident occurred and 279 (67%) had prior confirmed or suspected mental illness. The
study revealed no demographic variables associated with the suicide by cop cases. Their
policy recommendations included that suicide by cop encounters had a high number of
participants who suffered from mental illness and the Mental Evaluation Unit allowed
officers to resolve cases favoring mental health care rather than incarceration.
Limitations include the uncertainty that the officers in the specialized unit had received
training to accurately identify mental health issues and the use of information recorded by
police officers instead of professional mental health providers. The dissertation will add
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to these findings by including an examination of the behaviors which contribute to lethal
force incidents using video recordings of the encounters.
In summary, studies which examined victim precipitated homicides aid this
dissertation by revealing estimates of the presence of mental illness ranging from 22% to
67% during fatal police shootings in suicide by cop incidents. Officers interpreted
behavior from these individuals as imminent peril and responded with lethal force. These
studies also note that mental health history is missing in many police reports, resulting in
inaccurate data and studies. The dissertation will note which behaviors are interpreted by
police officers as perilous.
STUDIES OF STIGMA ASSOCIATED WITH MENTAL ILLNESS
This dissertation will support that stigma related to mental illness is present in
society and the police agencies that represent it. Previous studies examined stigma and
how the mentally ill interact with police officers and this study will examine how the
perception of stigma endures in police cultures.
Knifton et al. (2010) interviewed 257 members of minority communities in
Scotland using questionnaires completed before and after their participation in a
workshop which discussed stigma and discrimination towards people suffering from
mental illness. The researchers discovered that significant stigma and shame existed in
the public perception of mental illness and inaccurate knowledge led to individuals being
subjected to discrimination. They further stated that stigma and discrimination varied
between communities and when the stigma of mental illness interacted with police
culture, the perceptions of danger were enhanced. The workshops changed the
perceptions of 78% of the participants by reducing stigma after completion of the
informational meetings. Policy recommendations included the sponsorship of
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community approaches and initiatives to improve public understanding of mental illness.
The study was limited in that members of minority communities or common interest
groups may share similar views of mental health issues and the results may contain bias
in a manner that is accepted by that community. This dissertation contributes to the
current effort by recognizing the actions that officers define as dangerous in encounters
which can lead to stigma.
Smith & Cashwell (2010) surveyed mental health providers and non-mental
health providers to examine stigma attached to the mentally ill. The 188 surveys were
accomplished via mail and revealed that mental health training, education, and
interactions with affected people led to an increase in positive attitudes concerning
mental illness. The general population viewed people with mental illness as dangerous,
to be avoided, and responsible for their own illnesses. Non-mental health professionals
felt that mental illness was associated with secrecy, shame, poor social adaptations, and
low self-esteem. The authors suggested that multiple surveys performed before, during,
and after training to provide mental health awareness would provide a better assessment
of mental health acceptance among professionals. This study was limited in that mental
health professionals may have already possessed a low stigma of persons suffering from
mental illness and that the mailed surveys may not have provided confidentiality for
participants.
Dorner and Mittendorger-Rutz (2017) examined 66,097 individuals with common
mental disorders in Sweden using data from three government agencies and found that
socioeconomic inequalities resulted in differential care and mental health development
among people with common mental disorders. They noted that marginalized people
received a different level of mental health treatment than more affluent people. Using
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multivariate analysis, the researchers found that different mental health treatments or
diagnosis interacted with differing educational levels, which led to stigma. Specifically,
mentally ill persons with lower levels of education received higher levels of mental
health treatment while people with higher levels of education received diagnosis relating
to stress but people with lower levels of education received classifications of depression
or anxiety disorders. Persons with lower socioeconomic status received more medication
than others and stigma was more pronounced in people receiving medications than others
who received psychotherapy alone. Policy implications included noting the associations
of stigma with medication and that stress related illness were more socially acceptable
than other common mental disorders. This study had a high cohort of study participants
with detailed information but used education as a proxy for socioeconomic status and did
not include occupations or income as variables. This dissertation will expand the
observations of Dorner and Mittendorger-Rutz by noting the interactions between police
officers and the mentally ill.
Huggett et. al (2018) performed a thematic analysis to investigate experiences of
the stigma of mental illness using 26 participants recruited from a mental health charity in
northwest England. Two focus groups were formed from the users of the services
provided by the charity. The participants stated that labels of mental illness had profound
effects on their daily lives although the mentally ill developed resilience towards the
stigma with repeated exposure and peer support. They also stated that stigma related to
mental illness was reflected within a society, and the institutions which represent it, as
people learned stigma during early socialization. The focus groups also stated that
persons suffering from mental crises were perceived as unpredictable, violent, and
dangerous throughout the general population and institutional stigma appeared to affect
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organizations and their policies, procedures, and culture. Stigma also influenced
components of the criminal justice system and the persons working within them, resulting
in inappropriate use of police force during contacts with the public. The limitations of
the study included the dominance of eight participants during group discussions and the
participants volunteered for mental health treatment and were not remanded by a court
for compulsory participation and therefore may have been more aware of the effects of
stigma related to mental illness.
In summary, studies which examined stigma associated with mental illness will
add to this dissertation by showing how stigma is reflected in both society and the police.
Stigma is learned during socialization and is dangerous for people who suffer from
mental illness, particularly during encounters with police officers. This dissertation will
explore how stigma is passed to new officers.
STUDIES CITING PROBLEMS WITH DATABASES
Some studies stated that caution should be used when using assorted databases to
examine police lethal force incidents. This dissertation will illuminate the behavioral
cues which contributed to the police lethal force incidents by using video recordings
released to the public. However, the views are limited due to the released recordings
showing the aspect of the camera bearer. This dissertation acknowledges that
deficiencies in databases exist and acknowledges those limitations.
Klinger (2012) compared data from the National Vital Statistics Program, the
Supplementary Homicide Report System, and the Death in Custody Program. He found
that the databases contained inaccurate numbers and invalid data as differences in how
police departments reported lethal force incidents to these national databases. These
differences led to the inability to track lethal force at the national level as the data
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collection systems did not contain accurate information. Klinger stated that researchers
use this flawed data when it is favorable to their studies, but it should not be used to
explain variations in violent police behavior. Additionally, the existing data omitted all
in-custody deaths and did not provide a measure of police intent to use lethal force which
did not result in a death. As the data used information reported from police departments,
the aggregate use of such data resulted in low estimates of police use of lethal force
within the national databases, which made studies that used this information invalid. An
additional limitation was that police records may be biased to exonerate officer behavior.
Klinger, Rosenfeld, Isom, and Deckard (2015) focused on the macro level of
lethal force events in a study of 230 police shootings in St. Louis (MO) neighborhoods to
determine if demographic and socioeconomic characteristics played a role in such
incidents. They found that such factors were not a significant predictor of lethal force
events but suggested the role of gun violence and perceived threats as a major
contributing factor. Multivariate analysis showed that crime is the major factor in police
shootings. Klinger et. al further stated that current data is flawed and does not permit a
sound assessment of the “social determinants of the use of deadly force by police” (p.
194) and cannot serve as a reliable guide for evaluating or improving police policy. The
study relied on police data and did not use videos to confirm the validity of the
information contained in the police reports used in the work. Policy recommendations
included the establishment of a national database with street-level measures that will
allow for more accurate policy proposals and improved training tactics. This dissertation
will examine the “social determinants” referenced by Klinger by using observational
studies of lethal force encounter with the mentally ill.
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Using data from the National Violent Death Reporting System to examine suicide
by cop encounters, Lord (2014) discovered that there was not an accepted model or
definition of police use of force incidents. Using multinomial logistic regression, she
found that the officer’s perception of threat led to the force response using the
experiences, beliefs, and values of the involved officers. The National Violent Death
Reporting System data relied on reports submitted by police departments and did not
contain data relating to mental illness. Intent and a history of suicide were not significant
in her analysis. The study was also limited in that the actual causative reasons or
behaviors which influenced officers to use lethal force were not examined but such
observations will be made in this dissertation.
Koper (2016) stated that a lack of transparency and limited public data hindered
efforts to study deadly force. He viewed police use of lethal force as controversial and
socially disruptive as gun violence polarized relations between police officers and
residents of high crime areas. Gun violence accounted for most police officer deaths and
resulted in a militarization of police departments with increased hostility between the
public and the officers. Koper stated that the ability to study existing databases was
impeded by a lack of transparency and missing data which led to undercounting police
lethal force incidents by as much as half, hindering the development of evidence-based
practices and policies. Police legitimacy was weakened when officers were not held
responsible for their use of lethal force in marginalized communities. His policy
recommendations included the need for strategies that include community input for
improved training and policies with increased openness about use of force incidents.
Koper suggested that transparent national databases may build trust with communities
and mitigate public outcry when lethal force is used.
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Williams, Bowman, and Jung (2016), in an article on policy, examined police
lethal force incidents by comparing databases from The Washington Post, The Guardian,
and The Wall Street Journal to available federal databases and found that the data kept by
the U.S. government was incomplete and unreliable. Individual police agency data was
not consistently available and may be removed from public scrutiny due to law, security
threats, political concerns, or civil liability. Additionally, some police departments did
not submit pertinent information to the federal government as no sanctions existed to
compel such reporting. The researchers estimated only 50% of justified homicides by
police officers were reported, making statistical correlation questionable. The authors
stated open source datasets of the newspapers contained more accurate data. Policy
suggestions included having a university to collect data using grants to fund their efforts.
Limitations included the study only using lethal force caused by firearms and the use of
data that was submitted by police departments or journalists, which could contain bias.
This dissertation acknowledges that inaccurate and missing data can lead to
inaccurate studies, but the behaviors associated with mental illness, which are interpreted
as dangerous by police officers, has received little attention by prior studies.
In conclusion, this dissertation will add to these past studies by examining the
causative behaviors which influenced police officers to use lethal force during encounters
involving mental illness. Observations of lethal force incidents will lessen participant
bias and define contributory actions that traditional datasets have not recorded, allowing
new perspectives into police lethal force incidents and encounters with people who suffer
from mental illness.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is an exploratory multiple case study using descriptive content
analysis to interpret police officer and citizen behaviors during lethal force events. In
2016, there were approximately 1,000 publicly recorded deaths of civilians by American
police officers and the goal of this study is to recognize if lethal police encounters with
citizens involve behaviors associated with mental illness. Using videos and news stories
in the public domain, I focus on the examination and interpretation of these incidents
using post-event observations and content analysis of videos and news media articles to
explore behaviors related to mental illness during police lethal force encounters in 2016.
Using post-event observational study of videos, with the absence of a researcher in the
field during the confrontation, should negate most observational bias which could be
exhibited by the participants. By utilizing videos and news media articles, this research
will not rely entirely on the recollections of the surviving police officers or civilian
witnesses, who may offer different accounts of the same confrontation.
Past research has used several study methods, such as observational studies,
citizen complaints, surveys, and official police reports; but the actual number of violent
encounters and the causes of these uncommon events remain ambiguous by relying on
post-event participant and witness statements (Lersch & Mieczhowski, 2005). Until
recently, police have rarely been asked to respond publicly about their use of lethal force,
and few academic scholars have persuaded the police to communicate more about this
infrequent event. Much is not known about police shootings, making deadly force a
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nebulous subject that deserves additional in-depth examination than it has historically
received (Fyfe, 1988). This dissertation provides an examination of how the behaviors
associated with mental illness can influence police lethal force events.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Qualitative analysis is used to make sense of large amounts of data by identifying
significant observations and making a framework for communicating the information
revealed from the data. Analysis is accomplished to make the findings relate to the
differences and similarities of the cases. Interpreting causes, consequences, and
relationships of the cases results in insights about the processes being examined.
(Bloomberg & Volpe, 2016). By using qualitative content analysis, this study presents a
more complete construct of how participant behaviors interconnect and contribute to
police lethal force incidents involving mental illness.
Content Analysis
The use of recordings and videos enhance the data gathering process in
unobtrusive research. Hagan (2014) stated that content analysis allows for the systematic
classification and study of mass media whereas secondary analysis of materials allows
the reanalysis of data which was previously gathered for other purposes and can be used
to address research issues in criminology and criminal justice. Hagan further noted that
the “computer revolution and internet” (p. 215) have made new information in the public
domain available for research.
Participants may react to stressful events by offering prejudiced recollections in
events which are examined by researchers. An advantage to the use of unobtrusive
measures is the nonreactivity of the subjects being studied, making them unhampered by
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the reactive effects of knowingly being watched. Nonreactive measures also avoid an
overreliance on attitudinal data or the verbal descriptions by participants about their
behavior (Hagan, 2014). By using content analysis to examine the incidents included in
this study, this dissertation will allow an unobtrusive appraisal of lethal force events.
Content analysis offers an excellent technique in comparative and historical
studies to discern trends in phenomena. The basic procedure in content analysis allows
the selection of categories and subjects to be examined, the establishment of rigorous
criteria for inclusion to ensure that the study can be replicated by others, assignment of
the material into a preestablished classification scheme, and analyzation of the results
(Hagan, 2014).
Content analysis is a qualitative research method described by Neuman and
Wiegand (2000) as a technique for examining information or content in written or
symbolic material. The technique allows a researcher to discover features in large
amounts of material that might otherwise be unnoticed or undiscovered and is used for
exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive research. This research method is desirable for
examining videotapes and associated news media articles to discover potentially
recognizable commonalities during police lethal force encounters with the mentally ill.
The use of content analysis allows for a more complete examination of the information
available in this study by presenting a more complete construct of how participant
behaviors contribute to police lethal force incidents.
Most of the academic literature offers vague and sometimes conflicting reasons
for police use of lethal force as past researchers did not use the unobtrusive method of
video review and news media content analysis to discover if any causal factors of
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behavior existed during fatal encounters involving police officers. In past studies
investigators relied on participant based post-incident reports, debriefing interviews, or
newspaper accounts that can offer skewed recollections of events. Direct observation of
the videos of shooting incidents should minimize, if not negate, bias as reflected by the
participants and observers of the events.
Facts can remain hidden from researchers when specific phenomena are measured
outside the context in which they have occurred, but unobtrusive measures allow
researchers to observe activity that can remain unknown using other research methods.
The examination of mental illness and how it influences the perception of dangerousness
by police officers has remained hidden from researchers. This study contributes to the
academic discussion of police use of lethal force. Berg (2007) stated that unobtrusive
research strategies gain information from various traces or records created or left by
humans, whether intended or inadvertent, and allow for the study of subjects that
otherwise may be difficult or impossible to study without using such measures. This
dissertation includes all available news media articles and video recordings of each case
posted to the public domain. The goal of this research is to illuminate behaviors related
to mental illness during lethal police encounters, which are difficult to examine. Berg
stated that “sensemaking” (p. 285) occurs when people make sense of the stimuli they
encounter and how they perceive and interpret information and interact with others. The
extensive study of many instrumental cases can contribute to a better understanding of
theory in a broader context involving police encounters with the mentally ill.
The use of videos in this study has possible limitations. Visibilities can be limited
due to environmental conditions such as weather or poor ambient lighting. The hands of
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police officers can obstruct the view of the body worn camera when the officer is holding
a firearm and the video can be obscured when an officer is running. Incidents in which
police officers deliberately deactivated a body camera were not used or found in the data
used in this dissertation. In two cases, body worn cameras were torn off the body of the
officer, but other body worn cameras recorded the event.
Grounded Theory
Qualitative research design is enlightened through a positivist approach to
research by using an inductive reasoning model. Inductive reasoning allows meaning to
arise from the data through constant comparative analysis during the data collection
process and allows a constructive focus to research that permits an understanding of how
facts are created and how the meaning behind reality is constructed and interpreted (Boeri
& Lamonica, 2015).
Grounded theory uses inductive reasoning to allow research observations to
produce explanations from the information being studied via interpretation of the data to
inform the researcher about the phenomenon being studied. Berg (2007) states that
grounded theory has three major strengths: it allows creative insights to arise from the
examination of contradictory or paradoxical evidence with less research bias than theory
built from incremental deduction, as an emergent theory it is likely to be testable with
constructs that can be measured, and the resultant theory may be more empirically valid
due to the implicit comparison and questioning of the data from the onset of the study.
The use of grounded theory in this dissertation will illuminate behaviors associated with
mental illness that police officers perceive as dangerous.
Generalizability and Representation
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Generalizability is the ability to transfer study findings from the study population
group to an entire population and is rarely claimed in qualitative studies. Qualitative
research is not normally generalizable in the sense of statistical representativeness, but it
enables a researcher to produce generalizable theories via detailed observations with an
in-depth familiarity with a group of people in a specific setting (Remler & Van Ryzin,
2011).

One strategy is to determine if the data is accurately represented with reflexivity,

which refers to the researcher’s introspection and reflection of his or her own values,
norms, beliefs, position of power, and privilege (Tarr, 2004; Castagno, 2012; Reimer,
2012; Boeri & Lamonica, 2015). A second strategy involves using participant or
community consultants to assist in interpretation of the data and involves community
members and researchers in all aspects of the research process. The third strategy
involves defining representativeness in qualitative studies as a reference to the
completeness and appropriateness of the sampling design (Israel, Schulz, Parker, &
Becker, 2001). Generalization will be limited in this dissertation. All available incidents
were used to ensure completeness in the research design but not all incidents were
accessible as they were not posted to the public domain. Due to time restrictions and
academic limitations of writing a dissertation, the first two strategies were not used.
Representation is the ability of the study findings to represent data accurately and
is evaluated in one of three methods. Replication, one of these methods, can allow other
researchers to acknowledge or contest the conclusion of a study (Boeri & Lamonica,
2015). By using content analysis of existing videos of events that have been released into
the public domain, a qualitative investigation was possible for a more intensive
exploratory research of the phenomena of police use of lethal force during incidents
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which display abnormal behavior related to mental illness. The ability to reproduce this
study and findings is made easier as the videos and news media stories remain available
for public review to allow independent researchers to determine if the designated
population sample appears representative and if the conclusions of this study are credible.
DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES AND ANALYSIS
Research into the role of mental illness in fatal encounters involving police
officers will add to the national discussion concerning the causes of police use of force.
Currently, academic research that examines the behaviors of participants during lethal
force encounters involving police officers and the mentally ill is limited. This study will
expand this research by investigating such interactions in video recorded lethal force
encounters which occurred in 2016.
Sample
Study samples can be obtained using two methods. Probability samples use
strictly structured, predetermined, and inflexible sampling methods to ensure that every
individual in the sample population has an equal chance to be included in the study.
Nonprobability samples do not require a list of all possible cases in the population from
which to draw a representative sample, nor do such studies claim to produce findings that
are normally generalizable to all the population. Nonprobability samples use a variety of
flexible sample designs which are informed by the research and lead to sampling designs
that are not predetermined and subject to change as the researcher learns more about the
targeted population (Boeri & Lamonica, 2015).
Neuman (2006) stated that purposive samples, a type of nonprobability sample,
are used to obtain all possible cases that meet prespecified criteria and are used in
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exploratory research for extensive investigations. Cases are selected that are informative
and can be used to study populations that are difficult to study. The sample used in this
study is a purposive sample in which the incidents met the criteria of deaths of civilians
by police officers that were videotaped and available in the public domain. No
permission or confidentiality is needed for this historical research study as the
information is available to the public via the internet.
A review of all the known and available recorded police shooting incidents in
2016 will allow causative factors to be examined to understand the phenomenon of lethal
force during encounters with the mentally ill, which is enigmatic to study. As the
potential for observing one lethal force encounter while conducting research is minimal,
the ability of a researcher to observe personally multiple lethal force encounters is not
possible in a practical manner unless video recordings are used. The mention of mental
illness in the videos and articles posted by media sources will serve as confirmation that
mental illness was a contributing factor in the lethal events.
Many law enforcement agencies located across the United States were included in
this study and no specific geographical region or population size was purposely excluded.
A small number of police organizations had more than one entry for the dataset which
resulted in a civilian death in 2016. With this diverse sample population, the effects of
departmental policy, social class, or local police culture should be diluted during any
decision-making process used by a police officer when deciding to use lethal force.
Determination of the Type of Sample
To study these lethal force incidents, selection criteria for each case in the study
included if the videos of a lethal police encounters in 2016 were subsequently released to
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the public and were comprised of three types of recordings. Official recordings are those
released by police agencies normally in support of their officer’s decisions to use lethal
force and includes body worn or carried cameras and dash mounted cameras from inside
vehicles. Unofficial recordings are those made by citizens who were present at the scene
and includes videos made by cellular telephones and portable computers. Inadvertent
recordings are recordings made by cameras that were deployed for other intended
purposes such as traffic monitoring or building safety. Staged reenactments of shooting
incidents were excluded from this dissertation.
News Media Articles
Police-involved shootings have provoked concerned individuals to demand more
information to determine if police officers are targeting minorities with lethal force
actions when such force was not necessary. Beginning in 2015, domestic and
international newspapers and media companies noted the concern of racial inequity in
police shootings and began to monitor incidents when American law enforcement
officers used lethal force. The Washington Post and The Guardian began tallying and
publicizing the information based on news reports and public records (Banks, Couzens,
Blanton, & Cribb, 2015). Only these two newspapers tallied police lethal force events in
2016.
The Guardian is a British daily newspaper and is part of the Guardian Media
Group and is owned by The Scott Trust. The Guardian's print edition has an average
daily circulation of roughly 162,000 copies in England (Mayhew, 2017). The newspaper
has an online United Kingdom edition as well as two international websites; Guardian
Australia, founded in 2013, and Guardian US, founded in 2011. The newspaper's online
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edition was the fifth most widely read in the world in October 2014, with over 42.6
million readers (Sweeney, 2014). The Guardian database on police lethal force in
America is titled “The Counted” and it displays 1093 deaths of civilians in 2016 by
police officers in the United States. “The Counted” has the years of 2015 and 2016
completed and available (https://www.-theguardian.com/us-news/nginteractive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database). No other years are available. The
presence of video cameras is not noted in “The Counted” but links to local newspapers in
the involved jurisdictions are offered.
The Washington Post is an American newspaper and media corporation owned by
The Washington Post Company with principal operations in newspaper and magazine
publishing, broadcasting, and cable television systems. The daily circulation of The
Washington Post has been estimated at 474,767 per day. The company will not disclose
digital subscription numbers although it will acknowledge that over one million digital
subscriptions exist (retrieved from https://www.-washingtonpost.-com/wp-rv/postcosites/postfram.htm?-noredirect= on June 16, 2018). The Washington Post database, “Fatal
Force,” displays 963 incidents of police shootings in 2016. The website stated that 142
of these incidents involved body worn cameras by officer(s) present at the respective
scenes whereas 821 did not have video available. The Washington Post does not note if
body worn camera video or video from alternative sources was available in the public
domain, nor does it list links to other relevant news media coverage concerning the lethal
incidents or the referenced videos.
In 2015, The Guardian and The Washington Post began efforts to identify and
track the number of police lethal force confrontations but limited their studies
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geographically to the United States. No other newspapers undertook such studies.
Information available on both websites includes the names and demographics of the
individuals killed by police, the location of the incident, the mechanism that caused the
death (firearms, struck by police vehicle, in-custody death), the law enforcement agencies
present, if the deceased person was armed with a weapon, and the status of the
investigation. Both websites included situations in which law enforcement officers
purposely used lethal force to control or stop civilians in addition to accidental deaths.
The Guardian website lists more deaths and has internet links to various United States
newspapers for additional information.
There are no assurances that either of the news media websites are accurate within
their respective data sets. Both websites list two different totals for the total number of
civilians killed in 2016 and both websites rely on data sourcing from private individuals
by requesting information about police use of force that results in deaths for the civilian
involved. These events are then reported to the website. These public-sourced data
summaries were not updated as additional information became available through the local
new sources and, hence, may contain dated and inaccurate information. Local news
organizations appeared to present more timely information. The media articles were
printed and indexed for replication, then coded for variables which are listed on the
coding instrument (see Appendix A on page 172 for the coding insturment).
Videos
The increase in video making and video viewing capability has risen with the
extensive adoption of cameras embedded in cell phones and small portable computers
used by individual members of society. Many people post their personal videos on
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various types of social media for others to view. The ubiquitous nature of the internet
and the ability to view recorded videos via personal computers and smart phones allow
police administrators, activists, and other members of the public to interject their
interpretations of the incident into the public discourse by targeting a wide audience
within their respective communities of interest. With these recordings, unobtrusive
observational studies by academic researchers can be easily performed by the release of
official videos, traffic monitoring videos, location-specific security videos, and videos
made by members of the public.
YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/) is an American video-sharing website
headquartered in San Bruno, California. The service was created in February of 2005 and
Google purchased the site in November 2006 for $1.65 billion and it now operates as one
of Google's subsidiaries. It primarily displays a wide variety of user-generated and
corporate media videos and available content includes video clips, TV show clips, music
videos, short and documentary films, audio recordings, movie trailers and other content
such as video blogging, short original videos, and educational videos. Most of the
content on YouTube has been uploaded by individuals, but media corporations including
CBS, the BBC, Vevo, and Hulu offer some of their material as part of the YouTube
partnership program. Videos deemed potentially offensive are available only to
registered users affirming themselves to be at least 18 years old. As of February 2017,
there were more than 400 hours of varied video content uploaded to YouTube each
minute, and one billion hours of content are watched on YouTube every day. As of
August 2017, the website was ranked as the second-most popular site in the world by
Alexa Internet, a web traffic analysis company (Retrieved from https://www.-
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alexa.com/siteinfo/-youtube.com on March 15, 2018). As a response to uninformed
public opinion, some police administrators and civilian activists use YouTube as a public
conduit to allow nearly every community member to view police videos and evidence
associated with lethal force incidents involving police officers.
The YouTube query function allowed the determination of the existence of videos
in the public domain which were available for use in this study. Using data related to
2016 from both The Washington Post and The Guardian, YouTube was queried to view
video footage of each incident that was available. The cases were included in this project
if sufficient video and news media information was present via the internet. One hundred
and twenty-nine cases that were discovered with video of these incidents in the public
domain. This sample is 11.80% of the reported total of 1093 incidents of The Guardian
and 13.40% of the potential sample population of 963 cases as reported by The
Washington Post.
Selection Criteria
The criteria for an incident to be included in this study was a lethal force incident
had occurred within the United States and resulted in the death of a person due to the
actions of an American police officer in 2016 with a visual recording which was available
to the public. The video had to contain enough information to code and identify common
themes derived from the grounded theory technique of qualitative analysis and allow
replication by other researchers to verify or contest the findings.
Each video was viewed from five to twenty times and if a variable was still in
doubt after the final viewing, it was not included in the coding instrument. If the
confrontation was outside the camera’s view but the audio could allow for an answer on
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the coding instrument, the notation was included. As an example, if the officer told the
offender to keep his or her hands up or in view repeatedly but was out of view, then the
coding instrument for that incident reflected that the subject did not comply with verbal
commands although the researcher could not actually see the referenced hands. Such
observations occurred in three of the examined cases.
Additionally, common behaviors were identified when viewing the incidents.
Previously recorded incidents were re-examined for the newly identified theme. The
factors were recorded on the instrument and were tabulated. Predominate situational
themes related to mental illness were identified and specific examples chosen to
illuminate their roles in this study.
The videos used in this study met the following secondary study inclusion criteria:
1. Either the officer(s) and/or the civilian(s) and their respective actions were
recorded in video or audio partially or fully. Individual personal opinions in
posted videos of the events were omitted from analysis in this study.
2. The spatial position of the participants with respect to each other can be
approximately determined. The current generation of body-worn cameras use
fisheye lenses that make precise measurements difficult to determine.
3. Weapons or hand implements held by participants can be identified and/or
placement of the hands can be noted.
4. Body movements and/or verbal comments of most participants can be
observed or heard.
Once a case was determined to be eligible for inclusion into this study, imbedded
hyperlinks to local American newspapers were followed from The Guardian website,
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“The Counted.” Three hundred and seventy-seven news media articles and 586 videos
with over 75 hours of observable behavior were found. The information in these articles
and videos are included in this study to give a more complete understanding of the
incidents and contribute additional information concerning the circumstances of the
events. After reviewing half of the sample set, a coding sheet was developed to note
commonalities and items that relate to this dissertation. Please see Appendix A for a
representation of the coding sheet.
Statistical Test
A chi square crosstabulation test will be used in this study. Chi square
crosstabulations are used to compare two or more levels of categorical variables to
determine if they are related. The nominal levels of known mental illness will be
compared to those actions designated as erratic behavior, which occurs before police
officers arrive at the scene of a lethal encounter and include incidents such as smelling
stranger’s hair or telling others that they wish to die. Adverse behavioral reactions,
which occur after the arrival of officers and may promote the use of deadly force by the
officers, included police officers placing themselves into the paths of fleeing cars before
using lethal force or subjects that use non-functioning models of firearms or knives to
threaten responding officers. By observing if these conditions are present, the discussion
of mental illness during police lethal encounters will be expanded to determine if the
noted behaviors are associated through the lens of emotion dysregulation.
HYPOTHESIS
A hypothesis is a proposition or tentative statement of causal relationship between
two variables and can be expressed as an expected outcome when examining the
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variables. Researchers test a hypothesis to answer a research question or provide
empirical support for a theory (Neuman & Wiegand, 2000). The hypothesis for this
dissertation is “Does behaviors related to mental illness contribute to fatal police
encounters?” Research themes of erratic behavior and adverse behavioral reactions will
be compared to ascertain if they are associated with mental illness and how police
officers may have been influenced by stigma during these encounters. Additionally, I will
examine emotion dysregulation in respect to the incidents in which mental illness was not
noted.
The use of two variables to measure the influence of a factor will increase the
reliability that the noted factor effects the outcome (Neuman & Wiegand, 2000). The
first variable to be examined will be erratic behavior which is behavior is commonly
considered not appropriate for the social interaction and occurs before the arrival of
police officers. This includes behaviors such as urinating on oneself while brandishing a
knife or sitting inside a vehicle in a fast food parking lot with a shotgun in your lap.
Erratic behavior may have been the primary factor for police officers to respond to the
scene. The second variable will be adverse behavioral reactions and is behavior that is
not appropriate for the police and citizen encounter and occurs after the arrival of
officers. Adverse behavioral reactions can be the behavior that elicits a lethal force
response from the officers and may be present in either the civilians or the police officers.
Adverse behavioral reactions include answering a known police tactical team at the front
door and shooting one of the uniformed officers or shooting a woman who is holding
manicure scissors.
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Using two variables of mental illness increases the reliability that the observed
effects of erratic behavior and adverse behavioral reaction influences the responses of
police officers during the encounters. The two variables will support the hypothesis as
convergent validity as each variable examines mental illness (Neuman & Wiegand,
2000).
The Instrument
Each case was recorded using an instrument which included five pages of
information. A copy of the recording instrument is attached in Appendix A on page 172.
Each case was coded, and observations were derived from repeating themes among the
data. The recorded data included a summary of the event, the date of occurrence, the law
enforcement agency involved, the name of the individual killed, how the incident evolved
into a lethal force situation, the number of seconds an officer is at the location until a
weapon is discharged, the actions of the officer and the subject, the physical proximity of
the participants, if the subject fled from or advanced towards the officer, and information
concerning the actual recording of each incident. Video variables in the coding
instrument included time of day, lighting, location, scene, type of interaction, initiating
incident, number of officers responding, gender of the subject and officer (if known), the
behavior of each subject, and evidence of mental illness.
THREATS TO VALIDITY
Replication of findings can show reliability in qualitative research as the sampling
design provides techniques to produce the same or similar samples. However, findings
will depend on the type of analysis used and may not be replicable (Boeri & Lamonica,
2015). Krathwohl and Smith (2005) noted that qualitative sampling allows a researcher
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to choose a sample population that allows the ability to derive the most information for
the study. The participants involved in multiple police lethal force incidents involving
mental illness comprise a challenging population to examine.
Most of the videos remain in the public domain in YouTube and are available for
duplication by other researchers. Due to the ephemeral nature to the internet, a small
number of videos had been removed after the initial press release or adjudication of the
case, possibly in respect to surviving family members, but the sequence of events remains
available in other video segments associated with each incident.
Inaccurate public data may lead citizens to believe that American police officers
use lethal force without due consideration as a normal part of a daily duty shift. Past
research has revealed that there is a very low probability of lethal force situations
occurring, but every police shooting receives extensive media coverage whereas every
law enforcement contact does not receive such comprehensive coverage. Police
administrators and public special interest groups may not post information or videos on
their websites that are contrary to their viewpoints. However, the opposing faction will
post such videotapes if it supports their viewpoint. The relative freedom of the internet
allows opposing postings and the information included in this study is from opposing
websites to provide a more complete contextual understanding of these encounters for
this dissertation. These contradicting viewpoints may have been present during videos of
specific police lethal encounters that were not posted by any person or group as the
incident did not support their special interest claims but were posted by other people
when the incident supported their particular interest.
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Portions of the information in the websites maintained by The Guardian and The
Washington Post were not current, particularly after a review for case statuses. Many
cases are listed as pending but a review of news articles of the local media outlets
reflected a closed status, meaning that the case has been administratively and/or judicially
adjudicated but not updated on the international media websites. Neither of the large
corporate media outlets continued to investigate individual cases or display the current
statuses concerning the disposition of criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings
related to many of the incidents. Both media outlets appear to have current information if
the proceedings were relatively close in time to the date of the referenced actual incident,
however those cases were not common. Case disposition for civil, criminal, and
administrative proceedings for officer-involved shootings can be lengthy and
unpredictable but many of them were resolved within six months of the initial incident.
News media internet sites in the areas where the lethal force event occurred contained
updated information, allowing their websites to contain accurate data. Those local media
websites were used to provide richer and more accurate information concerning the
incidents examined in this dissertation.
There are significant differences between The Washington Post and The Guardian
websites. The Guardian did not note if video had been released in each incident. The
Washington Post website states that 144 cases involved body-worn cameras by officers,
but no other references were given as to the availability of those videos. The Guardian
lists 1093 incidents and The Washington Post registers 963 incidents in 2016 in which
police officers killed civilians. No explanation exists from either media corporation to
explain the discrepancy between the two figures.
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The Guardian’s “The Counted” and The Washington Post’s “Fatal Force”
websites lacked information to determine why lethal force was introduced into many of
these confrontations, but local media websites contained detailed information. Twentyfour cases listed in “The Counted” and “Fatal Force” internet sites were fact-checked and
an error rate of approximately 34% was discovered in that the sites did not mention that
mental illness had been diagnosed before the shooting but associated local news coverage
mentioned such health conditions in their respective media stories of the events. For this
study, the local news media coverage added more depth of situational context, including
the presence of mental illness in the subjects/.
As no independent government database exists for comparison, there is no way to
ensure that all deaths which recorded eligible lethal force incidents involving police
officers in 2016 were captured by these two databases. Multiple internet queries were
performed for each known shooting incident involving law enforcement officers from
The Guardian and The Washington Post websites in 2016. Queries were performed using
victim’s names, agency names, dates of deaths, and combinations thereof in YouTube to
ascertain if video was publicly available for use in this study. As an additional search
method, the date and law enforcement agency or agencies involved in the incident were
queried via internet search engines to determine if the desired videos were available in
the public domain.
Trends in the dataset were discovered by multiple views of the available
videotapes and review of the associated news media reports. Behaviors of the
participants were noted and grouped by using the presence of mental illness before the
incident, erratic behaviors before the arrival of responding officers, and adverse
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behavioral reactions after the arrival of officers. The three types of information were
compared with each other and associations were discovered.
CONCLUSION
An extensive review of videotaped police lethal force events has revealed a
dataset that has not been the subject of previous research. Examination of this data will
allow academic insights into the role of mental illness in police lethal force incidents and
advance the knowledge of the contributory factors of mental illness which influences
police officers to apply extreme use of force.

88

CHAPTER FOUR
FINDINGS
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation inquiry revealed that behaviors associated with mental illness
contributed to police lethal force incidents during recorded confrontations between
civilians and law enforcement officers in 2016. Examinations of the videos and related
new media articles showed officer and citizen behaviors related to mental illness
influenced how participants react during stressful encounters. The use of grounded
research theory resulted in three research themes including the presence of mental illness
suffered by the citizens, adverse behavioral reactions exhibited by the civilians and police
officers during the encounter, and erratic behavior by the citizen before the arrival of
police officers.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE DATASET
One hundred and twenty-nine (129) cases were determined to be eligible for
inclusion into this study, allowing 586 videos (over 75 hours) and 377 news media
articles to be observed and examined. Multiple police agencies throughout the United
States are represented and each case received regional, national, and international news
coverage. There were many notable cases in this data set. Robert “LeVoy” Finicum
(Case 8) was shot by officers during the illegal occupation of a remote U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Visitor Center in Oregon and resulted in the indictment of a special agent with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation for making false statements during an official
investigation. Jakob Wagner (Case 43) was killed during an attempted mass shooting at
high school prom in Wisconsin. Alton Sterling (Case 72) was shot after mildly resisting
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arrest during a firearms-related call in Louisiana. Philandro Castile (Case 74) was fatally
injured during a pretext traffic stop in Minnesota. Paul O’Neal (Case 82) was killed after
fleeing from a stolen car that had just collided with a marked police patrol unit in
Chicago. Terrence Crutcher’s death (Case 96) occurred after he failed to follow the
verbal commands of a police officer in Oklahoma. Case 97 involved a domestic terrorist
attack when Dahir Adam stabbed multiple victims in a shopping mall in Minnesota
during an incident related to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Case 98 was a causative
point for major urban riots and damage in North Carolina, when Keith Scott was shot in
an apartment complex parking lot by a plainclothes officer.
The data set consisted of incidents that adversely affected individual officers and
their respective law enforcement organizations. The Clinton (North Carolina) Police
Department had to request routine patrol assistance from neighboring state and local law
enforcement agencies after the shooting of John Coffee (Case 57) depleted the small
agency of 7 officers who were placed on administrative leave pending the investigations
of the incident. Officers were killed during encounters with Phillip Ferry (Case 15),
Joseph Moreno (Case 94), and Dontrell Carter (Case 115).
Officers were shot or physically attacked but survived in multiple encounters.
Bruce Kelly, Jr. (Case 11) attacked two officers while he was intoxicated. Ali Yahia
(Case 19) assaulted 3 officers who responded to a 911 call at a motel. Calvin Smith
(Case 21) shot two police officers in a 48 second gunfight with a total of 54 rounds being
fired as the result of a vandalism call. David Mack (Case 35) used a conducted energy
weapon against a deputy during a traffic stop. Laronda Sweatt (Case 37) attacked a
deputy with an ax after injuring another officer during the service of an eviction notice.
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Noel Rodriguez (Case 62) was shot after striking an officer with a “sharp tool.” Miguel
Chavez-Angles (Case 66) attacked an officer and attempted to take her service weapon
during the hijacking of a city bus. Michael Schumacher (Case 70) attempted to stab an
officer with a pitchfork at the front door of a residence. Omer Ismail Ali (Case 86)
returned to a shoplifting crime scene and attacked an officer with a large piece of wood.
Jeffrey Cave (Case 100) shot a SWAT officer during the entry phase of the execution of a
search warrant. Michael Vance, Jr. (Case 109) shot two police officers during a major
multi-day crime spree that included the beheading of his uncle and Facebook live streams
during the event. James Ritchie (Case 113) was an unidentified serial killer that shot an
officer who attempted to question him about an unpaid cab fare. Brent Quinn (Case 123)
shot an officer during a traffic stop to investigate a reported suspicious vehicle. James
Tylka (Case 128) shot a state trooper and waited to ambush rescuing officers and medical
responders before he was killed.
THE ENCOUNTERS
Gender
In 121 of 129 cases (93.80%), the deceased civilian was a male while female
subjects were killed in 8 cases (06.20%). While there were cases in which both males
and females were present, only the males were killed by police officers in these few
incidents. No case represented more than one civilian being killed.
Most of the officers who shot a weapon were male. In 106 of 129 cases (82.17%)
the officers were identified as male while female officers were present or discharged their
weapons in 10 cases (07.75%). However, in 24 cases (18.60%), the gender of the
shooting officers could not be determined.
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Age
The ages of the involved police officers were predominately unknown with 103
cases (79.84%) in which no age was given. In the 26 cases were ages were given, 14
cases (53.85%), the officers were between the ages of 21 and 30 years of age while
officers between 31 and 40 years of age were present in 11 cases (42.31%). Officers
between the ages of 41 to 50 years of age were present in 7 cases (26.92%) and officers
between 51 and 60 years of age were in 1 case (03.85%). Officers of different ages
appeared to discharge their firearms during the same incident in many of the cases, on
and off camera. No officers over 61 years of age were noted in the videos or news media
accounts. The amount of missing data does not allow age to be considered a factor in
fatal police encounters.
In stark contrast, the ages of all involved citizens were noted. Sixty-seven of the
deceased persons (51.94%) were between the ages of 22 and 39 while an additional 39
(30.23%) were between the ages of 40 to 59. Table 1 displays the range of ages of the
deceased civilians.
Table 1. Deceased Civilian Age at Time of Incident
Age in Years Number of Cases Percentage of Cases
14 to 17
5 cases
03.88%
18 to 21
12 cases
09.30%
22 to 29
33 cases
25.58%
30 to 39
34 cases
26.36%
40 to 49
21 cases
16.28%
50 to 59
18 cases
13. 95%
60 to 69
5 cases
03.88%
70 to79
1 case
00.78%

Cameras Present
Multiple types of cameras were used to record the cases examined in this study.
Law enforcement sourced cameras were present in 77 cases (59.69%). The most
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common cameras were dash mounted in patrol cars with 59 cases (45.74%). Body worn
or carried cameras were present in 53 cases (41.09%). Many of the police officers
involved in the study cases used both dash mounted cameras and body worn or carried
cameras. A camera mounted in a conducted energy device recorded 1 incident (00.78%).
There were no police cameras present in 52 cases (40.31%).
Videos made by civilians, cellphone cameras, and other video recording devices,
were present in 20 of the cases (15.50%) and included one dash cam not mounted in a
police vehicle. Business and private residence surveillance cameras were used in 35
cases (27.13%). Multiple camera types were present in 39 cases (30.23%). Several cases
had multiple cameras present, both government and citizen owned. Helicopters,
representing both police and news media, recorded 6 of the cases in the dataset (04.65%).
Table 2 notes the number and type of cameras that recorded the incidents
included in this study and were available in the public internet domain.
Table 2. Cameras Present and Recording at the Scene
Type of Camera
Number of Cases Percentage of Cases
Police Dash Mounted Cameras
59 cases
45.74%
Police Body Worn or Carried Cameras
53 cases
41.09%
Municipal, Business, or Residential Cameras
35 cases
27.13%
Civilian Cameras
20 cases
15.50%
News Media and Police Helicopter Mounted Cameras
6 cases
04.65%
Police Conducted Energy Weapon Mounted Cameras
1 case
00.78%
Unknown Type of Camera
4 cases
03.10%
No Law Enforcement Agency Cameras Present at
52 cases
40.31%
Scene

Law enforcement agencies released video in 115 of 129 cases (89.15%) while
citizens and witnesses released video in 23 cases (17.83%). In one case (00.78%), it was
not determined who released the video. Both law enforcement sources and private
individuals released videos of the same incident in various cases.
Locations and Times of Occurrence
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Urban areas were the location of 71 of 129 cases (55.04%) of the examined events
while rural locations were present in 14 of 129 cases (10.85%). One shooting took place
in a city park (00.78%). The remaining 43 cases (33.33%) occurred in locations that
could not be determined by observing the videos.
Industrial or non-residential areas were identified in 30 of the cases (23.26%).
Residential areas, which include houses, apartments, condominiums, and other places of
residence in both urban and rural areas, were the location of 41 of 129 cases (31.78%)
during the lethal events.
Streets, sidewalks, highways, and parking areas were the location for 96 of the
129 cases (74.42%). These areas were those in which the public use during the normal
course of events for everyday life and included parking areas of residences, stores, and
public right of ways.
Sixty-one of the incidents (47.29%) occurred between 4:00 pm and 11:59 pm.
The remainder of the fatal events occurred throughout the day, but 6 incidents (04.65%)
occurred at unknown times. Table 3 reveals the time of occurrence in 4-hour intervals.
Table 3. Time of Occurrence of the Incidents
Time Occurred
Number of Cases Percentage of Cases
Midnight to 4:00 am.
19 cases
14.73%
4:01 am to 8:00 am.
9 cases.
06.98%
8:01 am to noon.
19 cases
14.73%
12:01 pm to 4:00 pm
15 cases
11.63%
4:01 pm to 8:00 pm
25 cases
19.38%
8:01 pm to 11:59 pm
36 cases
27.91%
Unknown time.
6 cases
04.65%

Type of Incident
Activities generated by police officers and public calls for service as dispatched to
the responding police officers are represented in this category. Incidents such as a “shots
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fired” call or any call that mentioned a firearm were represented in 29 of the 129 cases
(22.48%). Disturbance calls accounted for 19 of the cases (14.73%) and domestic
violence related calls were present in 16 cases (12.40%). These categories accounted for
64 cases (49.61%).
Mental illness was noted as an initial factor requiring police involvement in 11
cases (8.53%), a substantially smaller number as this study found that mental illness was
present in 94 cases (72.87%) after the incident had concluded. Each of the remaining call
categories accounted for 10% or less of these fatal incidents. Table 4 records the type of
initial call or circumstances that initiated the fatal encounter.
Table 4. Type of Incident
Type of Call
Gun or gunshots fired
Disturbance
Domestic Violence
Fugitive or Warrant Service
Armed Robbery
Mental Illness
Stolen Motor Vehicle
Traffic Stops
Driving While Intoxicated or Drugs
Involved
Hostage Situations
Off Duty Responses
Carjacking
Law Enforcement Pursuit
Murder
Request for Assistance
Home Invasion
Trespass
911 Hang Up or 911 Open Line
Shoplifting
Burglary
Serve Eviction Notice
Suspicious Parked Car or Person
Littering
Toll Road Enforcement
High School Prom Security Assignment
Welfare Check
Terrorist Attack

Number of Cases Percentage of Cases
29 cases
22.48%
19 cases
14.73%
16 cases
12.40%
13 cases
10.08%
12 cases
09.30%
11 cases.
08.53%
10 cases
07.75%
9 cases
06.98%
7 cases
05.43%
6 cases
5 cases
4 cases
4 cases
4 cases
3 cases
2 cases
2 cases
2 cases
2 cases
2 cases
2 cases
2 cases
1 case
1 case
1 case
1 case
1 case

Number of Officers Present
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04.65%
03.88%
03.10%
03.10%
03.10%
02.33%
01.55%
01.55%
01.55%
01.55%
01.55%
01.55%
01.55%
00.78%
00.78%
00.78%
00.78%
00.78%

Most of the cases, 86 of 129 (66.67%), had no officers present when the involved
shooting officer arrived at the scene. In 8 cases (06.20%), there was one officer already
present at the scene. In 20 cases (15.50%), there was not enough information available to
determine how many officers were present when shooting officer arrived at the scene.
Table 5 displays the number of officers that were on-scene when the shooting officer
arrived.
Table 5. Number of Officers Present when Shooting Officer Arrives
Number of Officers Present
No Officers Present
1 Officer Present
2 Officers Present
3 Officers Present
4 Officers Present
5 Officers Present
6 or More Officers Present
Unable to Determine Number of Officers
Present

Number of Cases
86 cases.
8 cases
3 cases
3 cases
No cases
1 case
8 cases
20 cases

Percentage
66.67%
06.20%
02.33%
02.33%
00.00%
00.78%
06.20%
15.50%

General Information Concerning the Shooting Officers
In 122 cases (94.57%), the officers were dressed in uniforms or wearing clothing
that identified them as law enforcement agents. Officers in plainclothes were in 14 cases
(10.85%) while 2 cases (01.55%) research was not able to determine what type of
clothing the officer was wearing.
Marked police vehicles were observed in 99 of the 129 cases (76.74%) while
unmarked vehicles were used in 11 cases (08.53%). Law enforcement vehicles were not
observed in 21 of the cases (16.28%) and research was unable to determine if vehicles
were present in 3 cases (02.33%).
At the Scene
The number of officers who eventually discharged a weapon at the scene were
clustered at 1 or 2 officers shooting with 99 of 129 cases (76.75%). In 5 of the cases
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(03.88%), research could not determine how many officers discharged their weapons.
Table 6 presents the number of officers discharging weapons in the events.
Table 6. Number of Officers Firing at the Civilian.
Number of Officers Firing Number of Cases Percentage of Cases
1 Officer Firing
67 cases
51.94%
2 Officers Firing
32 cases
24.81%
3 Officers Firing
11 cases
08.53%
4 Officers Firing
6 cases
04.65%
5 Officers Firing
2 cases
01.55%
6 or More Officers Firing
6 cases
04.66%
Unable to Determine
5 cases
03.88%
Number of Officers Firing

In 67 cases (51.94%), the officers discharged their weapons within 30 seconds of
arriving on the location of the incident. Table 7 displays a summary of the number of
seconds that the shooting officer was on-scene before discharging his or her weapon.
Table 7. Number of Seconds Officer is On-Scene before Shooting
Number of Seconds
0 to 3 Seconds
4 to 10 Seconds
11 to 20 Seconds
21 to 30 Seconds
31 to 40 Seconds
41 to 50 Seconds
51 to 60 Seconds
61 to 120 Seconds
121 to 180 Seconds
181 to 299 Seconds
300+ Seconds
Unknown

Number of Cases Percentage of Cases
8 cases
06.20%
26 cases
20.16%
23 cases
17.83%
10 cases
07.75%
6 cases
04.65%
5 cases
03.88%
5 cases
03.88%
8 cases
06.20%
6 cases
04.65%
7 cases
05.43%
7 cases
05.43%
18 cases
13.95%

Sixty-three cases (48.84%) displayed 5 or more shots being fired. Table 8
discloses the number of shots fired by involved officers during the incidents.
Table 8. Number of Shots Fired by Officers
Number of Shots
Fired by Officers
1 shot
2 shots
3 shots
4 shots
5 shots

Number of Cases Percentage of Cases
11 cases
08.53%
16 cases
12.40%
13 cases
10.08%
9 cases
06.98%
13 cases
10.08%
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6 shots
7+ shots
Unknown
No shots
(Conducted energy
weapon)

11 cases
39 cases
16 cases
1 case

08.53%
30.23%
12.40%
00.78%

Handguns were the predominate law enforcement firearm used in 113 cases
(87.60%) while rifles were used in 20 cases (15.50%). Shotguns were used in 3 cases
(02.33%). In 5 cases (03.88%), the type of firearm could not be identified. Multiple
weapon types were used in several cases. Conducted energy devices, which can shoot
pronged projectiles to complete an electrical circuit, were used in 8 cases (06.20%)
including 1 fatality resulting from the device itself.
Firearms and replica firearms were used in 58 cases (44.96%) by civilians while
knives, other edged weapons, and sharp tools were used in 43 cases (33.33%). Blunt
objects were used by the subjects in 3 cases (02.33%), non-weapons which were
disguised to present as weapons were used in 2 cases (01.55%), and a conducted energy
weapon was used by one civilian against a police officer in one case (00.78%). Civilians
did not possess a weapon in 20 cases (15.50%), and it was not determined if any civilian
weapon was present in 2 cases (01.55%).
MENTAL ILLNESS
The research examined if confirmed mental illness was mentioned in the reviewed
news media articles and videos as being present during the life of the civilians before the
fatal incident. Post-event news conferences, news media reports, comments by family
and friends, and official press briefings by criminal justice agencies and private attorneys
noted that some deceased persons had been diagnosed with a prior mental condition or
stated that a mental illness may have been a contributing behavioral factor during the
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lethal force situation. From a review of the associated on-line news media articles and
videos, the presence of mental illness attributed to the deceased was noted. No mention
of mental illness that was assigned to a law enforcement officer or agent was recorded in
any of the cases. Although there is no way to verify these claims of prior mental illness
or the contribution of the condition to the participant’s state of mind during the incident,
this study will assume such media claims are valid.
Prior mental illness was found in 45 cases (34.88%) while 84 cases (65.12%) did
not reference such mental health conditions. Appendix B on page 185 is a listing of the
cases in which mental illness was referenced in media accounts.
ADVERSE BEHAVIORAL REACTIONS
Adverse behavioral reactions were defined in this study as behaviors exhibited by
civilians or officers which are contrary to the expected behavior exhibited by a typical or
reasonable person or officer in the same or similar situation or circumstance. These
behaviors occurred after the arrival of police offices and contributed to the fatal outcome
of the encounter. Many cases included actions by the subject or the officer performing
extreme acts such as pointing a non-functioning replica firearm at police, requesting
responding law enforcement officers to kill them, or if an officer knowingly placed
herself or himself in front of or inside a fleeing vehicle.
Adverse behavioral reactions which contributed to the event becoming fatal were
observed in 78 of 129 cases (60.47%) solely by the civilian and in 11 cases (08.53%)
only by the responding officers. Both officers and civilians contributed adverse
behavioral reactions in 3 cases (02.33%). Combining all three categories yields that 92
cases (71.32%) displayed identifiable adverse behavioral reactions by the participants.

99

No contributory abnormal behavioral reactions were noted in 35 cases (27.13%) as these
participants appeared to function in the normal roles of offender and officer. In 2 cases
(01.55%), a review of the videos did not allow for a determination of the presence of
adverse behavioral reactions. Appendix C on page 187 is a case listing of the observed
adverse behavioral reactions.
ERRATIC BEHAVIOR
Observations revealed citizens acting in a manner that exhibited erratic behavior
before police officers were summoned to the eventual lethal encounter. Subsequent
exploration of the media articles and videos associated with the incident illuminated how
human behavior before the arrival of law enforcement officers could be predictive of the
event becoming a lethal force event.
In 77 cases (59.69%), the offender exhibited erratic behavior before the arrival of
the law enforcement officers at the scene. In 52 cases (40.31%), such erratic behavior
was not noted. No officers exhibited erratic behavior as this query was limited to the
time before their arrival at the scene. Appendix D on page 190 notes the erratic behavior
that was exhibited by the citizen before police officers arrived as the scene of the fatal
event.
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE RESEARCH THEMES
Sixty cases (46.51%) displayed Adverse Behavioral Actions and Erratic Behavior,
41 cases (31.78%) contained actions that were identified as Adverse Behavioral Actions
and Mental Illness, and 37 cases (28.69%) showed elements of Erratic Behavior and
Mental Illness. All three research themes were present in 35 cases (27.13%) in the
dataset. These interactions occurred during the lethal force event and were done by the
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citizen. The influence of responding police officers was not examined as no information
was available concerning their behavior before the incident or if they had been previously
diagnosed with mental illness. Appendix E on page 192 illustrates the interaction of the
research themes within each case of this study.
A chi square crosstabulation analysis was performed to compare the interaction of
the research themes. A significant relationship was revealed showing X² (1) = 16.38, p =
00.00. Phi showed a strong relationship between adverse behavioral acts and erratic
behaviors in relation to mental illness.
Crosstabulation of Adverse Behavioral Reactions (ABR) and Erratic Behavior (EB)
with Mental Illness (MI)

Mental Illness

ABR & EB

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

Total

Count

34

3

37

% within Mental Illness

40.5%

6.7%

28.7%

Count

50

42

92

% within Mental Illness

59.5%

93.3%

71.3%

Count

84

45

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

% within Mental Illness

100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

Value

Asymptotic
Significance
df (2-sided)

Exact
Significance
(2-sided)

Exact
Significance
(1-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square
16.375ª 1 .000
Continuity Correctionᵇ
14.763
1 .000
Likelihood Ratio
19.188
1 .000
Fisher’s Exact Test
.000
.000
Linear-by-Linear Association 16.248
1 .000
N of Valid Cases
129
ª 0 cells (0.00%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.91.
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ᵇ Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures
Approximate
Value
Significance
Nominal by Nominal

Number of Valid Cases

Phi

.356

.000

Cramer’s V

.356

.000

Contingency Coefficient

.336

.000
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RACE
In examination of the 95 cases that displayed behaviors as noted in the research
themes, Blacks were killed in 46 cases (48.42%) and Whites were killed in 34 cases
(35.70%), Hispanics were killed in 11 cases (11.58%), Asians were killed in 2 cases
(02.11%) and Native Americans were killed in 2 cases (02.11%). Insufficient data was
available to determine the race of the involved police officers in this study. Appendix F
on page 194 displays the ethnicity or race of the civilians in this dataset that displayed
behaviors as defined in the research themes. The high number of male participants is
discussed later as a function of emotion dysregulation.
Race demographics displayed in the U. S. Census Bureau’s 2016 American
Community Survey (p. 32) reveal that Whites composed 66.7% of the population,
Hispanics were 17.7%, Blacks were 12.0%, Asians were 6.6%, and Native Americans
were 3.1% (retrieved from https://census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/workingpapers/2017/-Harth-01.pdf on May 20, 2020). This data represents the nation as a whole
and does not examine racial distribution within police jurisdictions.
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Comparing the data from the 2016 American Community Survey and the findings
from this study, Whites were killed by police officers at a reduced rate than represented
in the national population. Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans were also
represented in the study but with fewer fatalities than their respective population. Blacks
were killed at a substantially higher rate than their representation in the U.S. Census
Bureau study and this finding may be due to the elevated price of obtaining mental health
care as discussed in Chapter 5.
Zimring (2017) found that during criminal justice activities, 41% of Blacks were
killed by police and he noted that number represented a larger proportion when compared
to Whites and Hispanics killed by police. Zimring cautioned that proportional estimates
may be less than aggerate estimates as the Federal Bureau of Investigation oversamples
larger cities that have higher populations of Blacks and more deaths may occur in those
areas than smaller populated areas.
CONCLUSION
The findings of this dissertation indicated a strong relationship of the research
concepts of erratic behavior and abnormal behavioral reactions supporting mental illness
related to both police officers and the subjects of the incidents. Responding police
officers, combined with the information received by police dispatchers, witnesses, and
family members, interpreted the incident to be life threatening and used lethal force to
resolve the incident. By recognizing the identified behaviors and changing police
mindsets, officers may be trained to use alternative methods to resolve incidents
involving persons suffering from mental illness.
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Blacks were killed at a higher rate than other races when compared to national
census data. The aggerate sampling by the U.S. Census Bureau may not be reflective of
the racial composition of individual police jurisdictions and may not be accurate as a
comprehensive explanation of the role of race in police lethal force events.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION
Many examples of behaviors related to mental illness were observed in the police
lethal force incidents examined in this study. These behaviors allowed responding police
officers to quickly misinterpret the actions of the subject as dangerous and resulted in
lethal force events. The ability for police officers to recognize manifestations of mental
illness in the first moments of a critical incident may allow for a comprehensive
understanding of the situation and encourage officers to use non-lethal conclusions.
The proportionality of an officer’s force response should incorporate
reasonableness to the actions of the offender and be necessary for the safety of the public
while adhering to applicable laws and agency guidelines. Such appropriate responses can
enhance police legitimacy and encourage community support during use of force
incidents. In turn, fewer fatalities during police encounters can build trust with
community members. By using resolutions that include mental health concerns, police
officers can employ techniques that are not intended to be lethal.
The principal variation of this study was not dependent on the fatality of the
citizen but upon an examination of the behaviors of the participants before the death
occurred. This study does not determine the legal justification of the use of lethal force
or the individual merits of each shooting incident, as those decisions are the judgements
of local authorities. The unique context of each lethal force event discourages this
researcher from assessments. However, the observations of behaviors in each of these
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cases allow insights into the process of how common behaviors associated with mental
illness contribute to lethal police encounters.
THE ENCOUNTERS
Each encounter examined in this study was unique. Circumstances, locations, and
the participants were different in each incident, but commonalities were found. Some
brief observations concerning the encounters are offered.
Gender
In 121cases (93.80%), male subjects were present in police lethal force incidents
while male police officers were present in 106 cases (82.17%). In 93 cases (72.10%),
male was the gender of both the subjects and the officers in the same incident. Males
were clearly the gender of most participants in this study.
Cohn, Jakupack, Seibert, Hilderbrandt, and Zeichner (2010) found that males who
believe in traditional gender roles are at a higher risk of using violence in response to
actions that threaten masculinity and showed an inability to respond appropriately to
emotional distress.
Zimring (2017) found that males represented 49.2% of the general population but
were noted to be the victims of police shootings in 95% of cases, which is a higher
proportion of gender inequality found in felony arrests or other types of law enforcement
contacts.
Two cases in this study illustrate these observations. LaVoy Finicum, Case 8,
taunted male law enforcement officers to shoot him during the encounter that led to his
death while Case 93 involved the execution of an arrest warrant when the offender, Jesse
Beshaw, fled from Franklin County (VT) Sheriff’s Deputy Nickolas Palmier, then
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verbally challenged the officer to shoot him as he held his hands behind his back and
advanced towards the officer at the end of a foot pursuit. Both cases involved male
subjects issuing taunting challenges directed towards the responding male officers and
appeared to display inappropriate responses to stress, suggesting a nexus to emotion
dysregulation which is discussed later in this chapter.
Age
The ages of the involved police officers were predominately unknown with 103
cases (79.84%) in which no age was given, but the ages of all civilians were noted.
Sixty-seven of the deceased civilians (51.94%) were between the ages of 22 and 39 while
an additional 39 (30.23%) were between the ages of 40 to 59.
Arrests are concentrated in younger age groups but the risk of being killed by a
police officer increased in age groups over twenty and remains a higher risk than arrest
encounters in comparison to other age groups. Although criminal activity peaks in the
late teenage years and arrest rates diminish as a person approaches thirty, the risk of
becoming a victim of a police lethal encounter rises sharply with persons in their twenties
and does not diminish until a person reaches forty years of age (Zimring, 2017).
Individuals between the ages of 22 to 59 accounted for 106 cases (82.17%) of the
cases examined in this study. Although certain individuals may decrease or cease
criminal behavior as they age, mental illness did not appear to lessen with age as 30% of
the cases in this study were between the ages of 40 to 59.
Cameras Present
Multiple types of cameras were used to record the cases examined in this study
with law enforcement sourced cameras present in 77 cases (59.69%). Videos made by
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civilians were present in 20 of the cases (15.50%) and business and private residence
surveillance cameras were used in 35 cases (27.13%). Zimring (2017) stated that
surveillance cameras have provided 7% of known videos, police cameras accounted for
10.50%, cameras operated by private citizens composed 2.5% of known recordings. The
data set used in this dissertation revealed considerably higher instances of each type of
camera that captured video recordings of police lethal encounters.
Police cameras merit attention as new cases appear regularly, giving attention to
police and public conduct during encounters by the photographic evidence they yield.
Each new recording of police and citizen encounters can make situations clearer while
discounting or verifying allegations of mistreatment during these interactions. Video
reviews can guide the reviews of police shootings and suggest changes to training and
policies to reduce police use of lethal force (Zimring, 2017).
Locations and Times of Occurrence
Urban areas were the location of 71 of 129 cases (55.04%) of the examined events
while rural locations were present in 14 of 129 cases (10.85%). The data in this study
suggest that police lethal force events occurred predominately in urban areas. However,
the inability to determine a third of the incident sites from the examined videos makes
this finding unreliable.
Industrial or non-residential areas were identified in 30 of the cases (23.26%) and
residential areas, streets, sidewalks, highways, and parking areas were the stage for 96 of
the 129 cases (74.42%). This finding indicates that police lethal encounters largely
occurred in those areas where people congregate regularly as represented by this
examination.
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Sixty-one of the incidents (47.29%) occurred between 4:00 pm and 11:59 pm.
The time span of 4:00 pm to 11:59 pm is traditionally considered after work hours,
suggesting traditional leisure times are when a large proportion of deaths occurred as
compared to the remaining hours in a day.
Type of Call
Disturbance calls were noted as initial responses in 19 cases (14.73%) and
domestic violence were noted in 16 cases (12.40%) of the cases in this study while a prior
examination by Zimring (2017) revealed that disturbance calls represented 10.8% of calls
while domestic violence was the issue in 12.4% of the incidents. Shots fired and firearms
calls represented 29 cases (22.48%) of the initial responses in this study but Zimring
(2017) noted only 6.8% of calls in his study involved firearms or shots being fired as the
initial notification to responding officers.
This disparity between the current study and Zimring’s efforts may be reflective
of the use of publicly available video versus his observations of all civilians involved in
police lethal force incidents, with and without available video.
SUICIDE BY COP
Eighty-one cases (62.80%) in this study exhibited behaviors by the subject that
elicited the application of lethal force, which has been previously identified as a
component of suicide by cop. Examples include Case 1 when Joshua Sisson held a knife
to his boyfriend’s neck and advanced towards officers in a threatening manner, Case 24
when Kionte Spencer pointed a replica firearm at officers as they responded to a “man
with a gun” call, and Case 30 when Robert Dentmond challenged officers with an assault
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rifle. These adverse behavioral reactions by the subjects resulted in officers using lethal
force as they interpreted the actions to be threats towards themselves or others.
“Suicide by cop” has been observed in police culture since 1958 and it used as a
vocation-specific code phrase to represent a subject precipitated homicide in shooting
incidents involving a police officer (Mohandie et. al, 2009). A detailed definition
remains elusive among researchers. One study suggested that irrational thought was not a
factor (Lord, 2012) while others consider suicidal intent to be a central theme within the
phenomena (Klinger, 2001; Arias et.al, 2008; Lord, 2012, 2104; Jordan, Panza, &
Dempsey, 2020). A notable lack of consistency remains when defining these cases
(Jordan, Panza, & Dempsey, 2020) as many factors have been identified as being present
in subject precipitated suicide and include mental illness (Parent & Verdun-Jones, 1998;
Lord, 2000), being an older White suicidal male with a criminal history (Lord, 2014), and
being a mid-30s male with disrupted relationships and mental health concerns (Jordan,
Panza, & Dempsey, 2020).
Most definitions included verbal or behavioral threats by the individual that
provoke police officers to apply lethal force to protect themselves or others (Lord, 2012).
Other definitions included that the subject had suicidal intent and elicited a police officer
to shoot them (Arias et. al, 2008; Jordan, Panza, & Dempsy, 2020). Mohandie et. al
(2009) defined “suicide by cop” cases as when the subject engages in conduct that
presents actual or apparent risks to others with the intention to cause a lethal force
response by police officers present.
Efforts to identify and study the intent of these incidents have been difficult as the
intent must be distinguished after the death of the subject using indicators that are rarely
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understood. With minimal evidence, proving that a subject’s intent was to die by suicide
is unlikely (Lord, 2012) as interaction with other factors during and before the incident
make these cases difficult to classify as suicide by cop using the assumption that the
person intended to die but caused police officers to perform the actual killing (Lord &
Sloop, 2010).
Klinger (2001) stated that many studies were not able to determine intent in
suicide by cop cases, making the number of persons who elicit police officers to kill them
difficult to estimate. Lord (2014) found that intent was not significant in a multivariate
analysis of suicide by cop events but Mohandie et. al (2009) stated that 38% of subjects
in those cases verbally communicated their suicidal intentions before being killed by
police officers.
McKenzie (2006) noted that subjects involved in suicide by cop events may not
knowingly plan to die during these encounters but factors such as mental illness or
substance abuse can influence actions that are later mistaken for deliberant intent to harm
others. Lord and Sloop (2010) identified verbal communication to signify a desire to die
as evidence of intent and suggested that suicide by cop studies include both verbal and
non-verbal indicators to determine intent. In later studies, Lord (2012, 2014) noted that
mental illness may contribute to these police shootings.
Jordan, Panza, and Dempsey (2020) observed that the victims of suicide by cop
incidents had experienced mental illness, substance abuse, and stressful life events at the
time of their deaths. Homant and Kennedy (2000) stated that 31% of studied incidents
presented known planning to be killed by police officers and 57% of their sample
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possessed irrational and emotionally disturbed behavior which led to suicide by cop
deaths.
THE ANALYTICAL THEMES OF THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM, SYMBOLIC COMMUNICATION, AND
THE SPLIT SECOND SYNDROME
The lethal events in this study were complex incidents that displayed adversarial
actions and reactions by the participants. The interpretation of these actions and reactions
by police officers influenced their decisions to use lethal force. The Social Construction
of Reality (Berger & Luckman, 1966), Symbolic Interactionism (Blumer, 1969),
Symbolic Communication (Manning, 1988), and The Split Second Syndrome (Fyfe,
1988) were used as analytical concepts to understand how personal and professional bias
can influence the actions of participants during lethal police contacts with subjects who
display mental illness.
Context
Human thought and concepts are influenced by social interaction, allowing
context to be shared among police officers via a constant interchange of interpretations of
events. Small groups of individuals may propose a theory, but everyone participates in
defining the concepts by using personal experiences. Unless the interchange is
performed in person, it is possible to misinterpret signals during these shared experiences
(Berger and Luckman, 1966). This misinterpretation becomes critical when responding
police officers are not aware of the presence of mental illness in the subject’s past or are
not aware of the subject’s current behaviors which could suggest mental illness.
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In Case 44, Chandler (AZ) Police Officers Daniel Caldwell and Joshua Parks
were directed to a local Walmart to investigate Mitchell Oakley for loitering. Both
officers may have interpreted the term “loitering” as not dangerous in the context of local
police culture, but Mr. Oakley possessed a firearm and shot at both officers before being
killed. Mr. Oakley had been committed for mental health treatment and released before
the incident. The responding officers were not aware that Mr. Oakley was the subject of
the compliant or that he had been a recent patient in a mental health facility, allowing
them to misinterpret the “loitering” call as not dangerous as they were unaware that Mr.
Oakley possessed a handgun.
Circumstances and behaviors are dependent upon the actors in any given
situation, making police encounters dynamic. Knowledge is socially dispersed during
social interchange between individuals, giving police officers the ability to respond to
people and events in a manner appropriate to their shared context of culture and past
experiences. These culturally shared responses create social order when persons display
conduct and activities which are defined as appropriate by police culture, which uses
continuous input to define context and suggest acceptable police conduct. Repeated
social interaction allows behavior to become predictive, suggesting established and
expected routines during shared encounters (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Blumer, 1969).
Knowledge arises from the position an individual occupies within a social
environment and differs by the degrees of familiarity with each type of incident. As
events occur, the objectivity of thought becomes clearer as different perspectives are
subjectively experienced by a person. Different actions and objects present themselves as
parts of this perceived familiarity by having ritual or shared meanings which are accepted
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by members of a social group (Burger & Luckman, 1966). Knowledge allows events to
be processed into shared categories and become influences to classify future phenomenon
during interactions with other subjects in similar circumstances. When performing an
activity related to policing, this familiarity allows the performance of actions while not
having specific knowledge about the people in the interaction (Manning, 1988).
Interpretation of an experience is accomplished when a police officer assigns
meaning using socially constructed local expressions and contexts to define an incident.
As events are made known to police employees, each person adds or subtracts
information which can change the context and meaning of an event by the officer. Not
all officers may receive identical information of an event and each officer must determine
the context of the given situation with the information received from police dispatchers.
Additional information can change the meaning or significance of a situation and missing
facts must be surmised by responding officers (Manning, 1988). Certain locations can
add to the context of the individual officer by being in a known dangerous neighborhood
or a safer rural area or the subject’s gender or race.
A dynamic encounter with missing information and incomplete knowledge
contributed to a lethal force event in Case 128 when Oregon State Police Trooper Nic
Cederberg attempted to stop James Tylka arising from an “attempt to locate” request
from a police dispatcher center. Trooper Cederberg was unaware that Mr. Tylka was
wanted for killing his estranged wife although the dispatchers knew of the homicide.
Trooper Cederberg would later sue the county, the responsible party for the dispatch
center, after he survived multiple gunshot wounds from Mr. Tylka. Trooper Cederberg
stated that had he known of the prior dangerous actions of Mr. Tylka; he would have
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responded in a safer manner. The trooper believed that insufficient information given to
him led to an incorrect interpretation of the situation and subjected him to violence that
could have been avoided.
Vocabulary associated with police work allows officers to fashion responses that
are acceptable to the shared contexts of the collective and increases the ability to quickly
respond to situations (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Blumer, 1969). The uneven distribution
of information can lead to an incident having more than one potential outcome as each
officer receives only partial information to plan potential outcomes, including
inappropriate resolutions (Manning, 1988).
Case 46 displayed how partial communication can result in lethal force when
Darrell Machemehl robbed a store using a sawed-off shotgun and was fleeing from
responding police officers. The shotgun fell from his vehicle and was recovered by
officers, but the information was not shared with other officers during the pursuit.
Subsequently, Mr. Machemehl was shot by officers as he attempted to retrieve the
missing shotgun. The officer that fired the shot was unaware that the shotgun was in the
custody of other officers and his contextual perception of the actions of Mr. Machemehl
was interpreted to be dangerous based on his limited information of the evolving incident.
Meaning
Key words concerning location, gender, and race are the focus of police messages
and can give associative meaning to expressions, allowing officers to interpret or
misinterpret an event (Manning, 1988). Officers trust each other and give their
resolutions credibility by using shared contexts to provide meaning. Shared meanings
allow police officers to define their experiences with members of their group and allow
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officers to formulate potential responses to mitigate problems while adhering to police
cultural norms (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Blumer, 1969; Fyfe, 1988). Contextual
planning uses past shared experiences to establish meaning to make anticipatory actions
possible once the event is defined by a police officer. The use of shared experiences to
reference current situations allows police officers to link potential unknown factors with
similar past events to determine acceptable resolutions but problems arise when officers
attempt to interpret context within the terms of policing and appropriate legal codes
(Manning, 1988; Fyfe, 1988).
Knowledge is defined as the certainty that phenomena are real and possesses
special characteristics. Reality pertains to phenomena that are independent of the will of
a person but allow different interpretations to arrive at different meanings of an event.
Reality and knowledge interact within situational contexts and can be perceived
separately according to the perspective of the individual. Legitimation in a police culture
occurs when behaviors are explained, justified, and accepted by officers as a vocational
group. The behaviors become institutionalized to allow control and acceptance by
members of the police society, particularly when people lack all possible knowledge
about a situation and rely on shared meanings and stereotypes (Berger & Luckman,
1966).
Officers define meaning by using the total context of a situation and past
influences to make interpretations of an event that are influenced by other members of the
collective (Blumer, 1969). The use of technology in police communications can lead to
fabricated meanings which make true knowledge elusive as police officers misinterpret
certain social processes, which they may not have personally experienced, but can be a

116

false interpretation of the current police call (Manning, 1988; Fyfe, 1988). Meaning is
socially constructed within the confines of a police organization by the interpretation of
their shared experiences using implicit knowledge of key words and the implied content
of messages. Key words, such as “crazy” or “mental patient,” are used by officers to
characterize messages and can be the defining aspect of an incident. As an example, in
Case 38, Luis Gongora was initially described as “crazy” when he was reported walking
down the street with a knife in his hands. Officers arrived at the scene and Mr. Gongora
was shot when he did not comply with verbal commands and advanced towards the
officers while holding the knife.
Critical information to aid in decision-making may not be available to the
officers. As information is transferred between officers, different meanings can occur
which can contextually frame how information is interpreted using key words in police
communications such as “crazy” (Manning, 1988). The descriptive word “crazy”
suggests potential danger and can elicit meanings associated with the stigma of mental
illness. The key phrase of “behavioral crisis” instead of “crazy” could have supplied
responding law enforcement officers with different references to encourage a less than
lethal outcome during the encounter with Mr. Gongora.
Collective definitions are used to fashion acceptable responses by police officers.
Social interaction with other officers can affect how individual officers will respond to
behaviors interpreted as threatening as the previous actions of other officers allow an
individual officer to reference solutions that have been accepted historically and apply
them in current situations (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Blumer, 1969; Fyfe, 1988).
Individual officers are offered great discretion in resolution choice and shared resolutions
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are used in policing as a mode of adaptation to unpredictability to justify swift
termination to events. However, police codes and phrases can limit understanding by not
including pertinent information concerning the circumstances of the event. (Manning,
1988).
Some tactical responses limit the choice of resolutions available to police officers
and discourage the use of force not intended to be lethal. Limited resolution choices were
apparent during Case 83 when Cincinnati (OH) Police Officer Anthony Brucato
responded to a shoplifting call and shot Jawari Porter after he attacked the officer with a
knife while the officer was seated in his police vehicle on a city street and Case 68 when
Boone (IA) Police Sergeant Nathan Kester and Officer Joseph Slight shot Michael
Disbrowe after he pointed a handgun at the officers which was later determined to be a
replica, non-functioning, firearm. In both cases, a review of the totality of the
circumstances after the incident revealed that officers responded in lawful manners
although officers were unaware of the total factors in each incident. Alternative tactical
resolutions using lengthy negotiations may have led to non-lethal conclusions to these
encounters.
Image formation is used by police agencies as a method to provide information by
referencing past events (Manning, 1988). Police training supports image formation as
influences on force responses using the domains of learned values and physical skills
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers,
2011). Image formation may have contributed to lethal outcomes in Case 30 when
Robert Dentmond stated his desire to die while contributing to his own death and Case 57
when John Coffey was observed sitting in a fast food restaurant with a shotgun in his lap.
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Both cases were dispatched with the abbreviated summaries of “suicidal” and “man with
a gun” which contributed to the image formation of a dangerous event and officers could
have referenced prior training events which favored lethal force as a resolution to
preserve officer and public safety.
Police Culture
Police culture has been defined as a set of vague and tacit ideas, not firmly held or
commonly known outside the occupation, that have frequent and acceptable exceptions
that used to mediate different situations and provide meaning to individual officers. The
concept is resistant to understanding by the public and can be guided by values, choices,
and organizational routines that contribute to perceptions by the officer (Manning, 1988).
The use of tacit meanings shared in police culture can offer ambiguity when
deciding resolutions. Officers interpret an event using historical or personal contexts of
shared police knowledge by referencing key words that hold meaning and influence the
outcome of an incident. Such tacit meanings are not traditionally available to the public
but inform police interpretations when an officer references the message using
occupational knowledge using police metaphors and shared signs of communication to
analyze human behavior (Manning, 1988).
Police cultures contribute to the perception of an individual officer by using past
shared group experiences as referenced potential actions or reactions, but deviance can
occur when those accepted realities become separated from the circumstances and the
relevance from which they arose (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Blumer, 1969). Klinger
and Brunson (2009) observed that the actions of police officers can be formulated from
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definitions that do not correspond with objective reality as officers determine responses
using their personal and group interpretations to make sense of situations.
Language allows collective experiences to be shared, validated, and passed within
a police culture, allowing new experiences to increase the collective knowledge of the
group. As a police culture becomes more specialized, additional knowledge is passed to
the officers via language to allow understanding of incidents within the framework of
their beliefs. A local police group can become segmented from other groups by using
language to support collective or specialized belief systems, making the group
inaccessible to challenge by outsiders and allowing a measure of safety and isolation to
officers. Common memory allows the acquisition of role-specific vocabularies that
provide understanding of police culture between officers to support their subjective
reality, and officers reaffirm this understanding of shared experiences to refresh their
shared reality (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Blumer, 1969).
Writing about Case 60 in The Tulsa World, Samantha Vicent of The Tulsa World
stated:
(Wagnor Police Officer) Reynolds can be seen toward the end of Cox’s video
shaking his head multiple times, chugging a Gatorade and asking (Lieutenant)
Cox, “Why didn’t he just stop?” “Well, who knows? We don’t even know why
he’s running,” Cox tells him. “You did exactly what you had to do” (retrieved
from https://www.tulsaworld.com/-news/crimewatch/newly-released-videoshows-man-killed-by-officer-in-wagoner/article-_2e78147a-89db-5bc9-8db0cf54693ed23a.html on May 31, 2017).
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The choice of words used by Lieutenant Cox implies his approval of the
performance of Officer Reynolds during the incident by using the code phrase of “you
did exactly what you had to do” to imply that the resolution supported the subjective and
shared reality of their shared police culture.
Police Dispatch
Police communication has richly contextual meanings derived from local police
culture with implied common understandings that provide expected resolutions to events.
Shared experiences from other officers give context and guidance to individual officers
when responding to future calls or situations. In police culture, the construction of
responses cannot be separated from the context of the evolving situation and the addition
of public information can result in officers continually interpreting a situation as it
progresses. The public can provide additional information which can make police
responses vary. This addition of information renders decision-making into a constant
evaluation of new information rather than a singular set of circumstances (Manning,
1988).
Information is central to the function of a law enforcement organization as police
dispatchers convert a caller’s raw experience into a police code. Every addition to a
police message results in each call becoming a changing stream of subjective police
meanings that offer different implied opinions of the actual incident and facts become
subject to definition by using police culture as a frame of reference. Confusion can
develop as multiple people offer their versions of the initial call, resulting in police
officers attempting to determine the salient facts of the incident as they form a response
(Manning, 1988).
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Stimuli present at the scene influences responding officers when making decisions
but allow little consideration for future implications. These sensory events are analyzed
in terms of knowledge already possessed by the officer, but some police communications
may not accurately reflect the event or the original circumstances which led to the
involvement of officers. Police officers have few restraints on their interpretation of
police messages, and they must evaluate the actual situation as they gain knowledge of
the incident, however not all officers will resolve problems identically as officers may
have contrasting ways to approach incidents (Manning, 1988).
In Case 66, Miguel Chavez-Angles attempted to hijack a city bus when Oklahoma
City (OK) Police Officer Heather Lane boarded the vehicle to attempt to determine the
circumstances relating to an automated emergency call activated by the bus driver. Mr.
Chavez-Angles attacked Officer Lane and attempted to gain control of her handgun
before he was shot by Officer Daniel Carli as he assisted in the call. Mr. Chavez-Angles
had been released from a mental health facility two hours before the incident. If the
recent release from mental health care or the nature of the erratic behavior was known to
the responding officers, a single officer entering the scene could have been avoided and
negotiations may have been conducted with Mr. Chavez-Angles to seek a non-violent
resolution.
Shared cultural wisdom influences an officer’s interpretation of the police reality
to allow responses to ambiguous or novel calls. The public provides poorly organized
information that contains eyewitness accounts of incidents as multiple parts of the police
communication system relay the information to the officer. Events can be processed or
encoded improperly, which can result in the information provided by the caller not being
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relayed to officers when a call is dispatched. The police officer must receive, sense, and
sort facts in the initial call, often with time constraints that do not allow a reconstruction
of the initial notifications as received by the dispatcher. Such constraints force the officer
to define the event using the context of shared police culture and guidelines. The less
accurate information that an officer possesses, the more interpretation of the event must
occur using local police culture and related situational filters to gather information and
make responses which value local police objectives over personal preferences (Manning,
1988).
In Case 75, Alvia Braziel was twirling in an intersection when two unidentified
Houston (TX) police officers drove into the event. Mr. Braziel pointed a handgun at the
officers, and they discharged their handguns immediately. Before leaving their protected
area behind the vehicle doors, both officers asked witnesses why Mr. Braziel pointed a
handgun at them. Using local police culture and training, the officers responded quickly
while not possessing any knowledge of the salient facts about the situation.
Decision Making
Shared language is used by police officers to communicate and distribute
specialized knowledge among themselves. Continuous conversation exchanges allow an
affirmation of the shared reality among officers to strengthen decision making in
accordance with the accepted views of the police collective. These shared views become
durable and counter definitions of reality are dismissed within the collective, resulting in
competition between the police and different social groups. Definitions can provide
interpretative schemes that support identity maintenance and become the basis for the
police group to verify their reality. If multiple individual experiences are accepted, it
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becomes difficult for single members of a society to make decisions that are considered
acceptable to the group (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Blumer, 1969).
The decisions of police officers are influenced by regulations, legal precedents,
policies, and directives when forming solutions during incidents. Limited information
about an incident can force the officer to make interpretations of the event using his or
her observations, interests, and personal perspectives. As the officer identifies an
incident, she or he projects thoughts and experiences influenced by his or her police
culture to reach a potential resolution consistent with the assumed practices of other
officers. The resulting interpretation may not accurately represent the pertinent factors of
the event (Manning, 1988; Fyfe, 1988).
In Case 123, Brent Quinn shot Leland (NC) Police Officer Jacob Schwenk after
the officer followed his car into a cul-de-sac while investigating a suspicious vehicle call.
After Mr. Quinn stopped his car, Office Schwenk approached the vehicle and Mr. Quinn
shot him. Officer Schwenk returned fire and killed Mr. Quinn. The term “suspicious
vehicle” did not contain any information that indicated the potential of a dangerous
situation and Officer Quinn walked in front of the vehicles and was illuminated by both
sets of headlights before he was shot. Past shared encounters involving “suspicious
vehicles” may have suggested to Officer Schwenk that the incident was routine and did
not require caution.
Officer Discretion
Police officers favor priority incidents that contain potential active intervention to
resolve situations and reduce the time span of encounters. Law enforcement
organizations emphasize command, control, and supervision, but do not normally
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evaluate individual incidents, providing officers with great autonomy to frame acceptable
resolutions in uncertain situations. Supervisors may lack the ability to influence daily
behavior as they oversee their subordinates from a distance (Miller, 2015).
While performing duties as a police officer without close supervision, discrete
institutional processes are interpreted by individual officers using tacit information that
allows meanings consistent with police culture. These meanings are combined to give
understanding to the event using established situational filters to gather information and
choose resolutions. The officer may interpret separate bits of information and arrange
them by significance using the shared reality of the police collective (Manning, 1988).
In Case 74, St. Anthony (MN) Police Officer Jeronimo Yanez shot Philandro
Castile during a pretext traffic stop while an unidentified officer is standing on the other
side of the car and does not draw his handgun during the incident. Officer Yanez
apparently interpreted the event differently that the other officer and used lethal force
while the other officer appeared confused at the lethal force response. The difference
between the behaviors of the two officers illustrate the wide range of behaviors that are
subject to interpretation by each individual when supervisors are not physically present.
RESEARCH THEME ONE – MENTAL ILLNESS
Research theme one arose from the review of associated videos and news media
articles in which mental illness was noted. The discovery of the mention of mental
illness in 45 cases (34.88%) in this dataset concurs with a study by DeGue, Fowler, and
Calkins (2016) that stated up to 50% of deaths by police officers involved subjects that
suffer from mental illness. Please see Appendix B on page 185 for a listing of the cases
in which mental illness was noted.
Mental Illness and Police Contacts
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The lack of financial resources to secure treatment may lead mentally ill persons
into encounters with the police. Dorner and Mittendorger-Rutz (2017) found that
socioeconomic inequalities resulted in differential care and mental health development
among people with common mental disorders and noted that marginalized people
received a lower level of mental health treatment than more affluent people.
One study of police contacts with the mentally ill in Baltimore (MD) stated
71.30% of those sufferers had annual incomes of under $25,000.00 and lived in marginal
areas where they were more likely to encounter police officers as the first contact during
mental health episodes. The study also found that persons with mental illness had
negative perceptions about the police and distrusted officers, making them apprehensive
about cooperating with the police. Another study found that police officers viewed
mentally ill patents as a danger to themselves, particularly if they did not recognize a
mental health event or were not properly trained to interact with people experiencing a
personal crisis during the performance of their jobs (Goldberg, White, & Weisburd,
2019).
Gilmer, Stefacic, Ettner, Manning, and Tsemberis (2010) found persistent
homelessness in people with serious mental illness who spent decades living on the
streets or in shelters as they cycled between jails, hospitals, and out-patient programs
with little continuing mental health care, increasing the likelihood of being in a police
encounter.
A decrease in deaths by police actions during incidents involving mental health
crises can begin to strengthen the strained reputation of police officers with
disadvantaged populations. Members of marginalized classes in society may have less
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access to insurance and health care, leading to untreated mental illnesses and increased
exposures to local criminal justice agencies.
Case 78 illustrates the need for affordable and locally available mental health
care. Miller Jozwiak and Jason Smathers, writing for The Sheboygan Press website,
stated that Kevin Higgins, a mentally ill male, received mental health treatment at a
hospital and was prescribed new doses of his old medications and was given new
medications. Mr. Higgins learned coping techniques that included cognitive behavioral
therapy and cognitive processing therapy to enhance his mental health. However, Mr.
Higgins could not afford the care. His insurance didn’t cover the civilian hospital and he
was transferred back to the psychiatrist at the Cleveland Veteran’s Administration Clinic.
Mr. Higgins later robbed a local bar with an assault rifle and was fatally shot by
responding police officers although he knew they were responding and had ample time to
flee the bar (retrieved from https://www.-sheboyganpress.com/story/news/2016/08/11/widow-shooting-subject-va-let-us-down/88544858/ on May 15, 2017).
Not all mental illnesses suffered by the subjects were known to the respective
police agencies at the time of the incident. Police officers were aware of mental illness in
13 cases (10.08%) of the cases in this dissertation. When subjects display signs of mental
illness during a law enforcement encounter, police officers may not know an appropriate
response to their condition (Blumer, 1969; Manning, 1988).
People experiencing the effects of mental illness may not act rationally or respond
to police in an anticipated manner. Police academies teach trainees that civilian subjects
will act or react rationally during a law enforcement encounter. However, an unknown
portion of these subjects may be experiencing a mental health crisis and may not react
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logically towards verbal commands or force options not intended to be lethal. These
illogical actions can result in a potential false interpretation of behavior by responding
law police officers (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Blumer, 1969). Homant, Kennedy, and
Hupp (2000) cited that perceived danger, rather than actual danger, was associated with
deadly force used by police officers as authorities are unable to discern the danger present
until after the incident had occurred.
Mohandie et. al (2009) observed that 62% of subjects in suicide by cop incidents
had a confirmed or probable mental health history and this dataset revealed that 45 cases
(34.88%) had mental illness mentioned as a contributing factor in these fatal incidents.
Ralph Grenon, in Case 31, suffered from mental illness but was not taking his prescribed
medication properly when a mental health worker requested police assistance. Officers
breached his apartment door and Mr. Grenon was shot after he threatened the officers
with a knife. When officers face subjects who are non-cooperative, there are increased
chances for injury or death of one or more of the participants (retrieved the U.S.
Department of Labor website https:// www.bls.gov/iif/-oscwc/cfoi/police-officers2014.htm on May 30, 2018).
The Madison (WI) Police Department has instituted programs to aid officers
when they encounter persons suffering from mental illness. Amanda Finn, writing about
Case 70 on the Madison.com website, stated:
Sometimes those types of situations can be averted through community-based
programs, Lampert (Ronald Lampert, the Chief Executive Officer and President
of Journey Mental Health Center) said. One example is the Madison Police
Department’s Mental Health Liaison program. Capt. Kristen Roman, who
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oversees the liaison program, said it was chosen in 2010 by the Council of State
Governments Justice Center in conjunction with the Bureau of Justice Assistance
as one of six in the country to act as a resource for other agencies who want to
enact a similar program. While all Madison police officers are trained in mental
health response and de-escalation, about 20 officers act as volunteer liaisons who
follow up with individuals in their service areas who have been contacted by
police. In 2015, the department added five full-time mental health officers who
“take the work the liaisons do part time and do more focused, concentrated
follow-up,” Roman said. Part of the role of the mental health officers is to create
care guides for the individuals that they encounter so that any future encounters
can be handled as smoothly as possible. “The more information we have, the
better the outcome will be moving forward,” Roman said. “Mental health officers
put together plans to help a responding officer so that, if the situation allows as
the officer is responding, they can then bring the information and contact case
managers and family members that they wouldn’t otherwise have.” At the
beginning of 2016, the department gained one crisis worker who works three days
a week through Journey, Roman said… Since the initial liaison program was
created in 2004, Roman said she believes it has made positive impacts in the
community because she hears good feedback every day (retrieved from
https://madison.com/wsj/ news-/local/crime-and-courts/man-fatally-shot-bymadison-police-officer-struggled-with-mental/article_0566fd8f-5983-57bb-9c4c60293aeba81e.html on June 9, 2017).
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Peak and Sousa (2018) reported that over 90% of law enforcement officers
reported having an encounter with at least one person experiencing a behavioral crisis
each month. This figure suggests that police officers maintain an admirable successful
contact rate in dealing with persons in mental crises on a national basis. However, in
Case 16, Tom Dart wrote for The Guardian on February 19, 2016 and reported the death
of an unarmed black teenager shot by an Austin (TX) police officer had sparked outrage
as the officer failed to follow procedures during an apparent mental health crisis. David
Joseph, 17, was naked when officer Geoffrey Freeman encountered the high school
senior and fatally shot him within seconds. “Clearly there was something taking place
with him mentally that needed to be addressed in a very different way,” said Nelson
Linder, president of the Austin branch of the NAACP. The post-mortem results of
investigations of Mr. Joseph failed to reveal any history of mental health issues or
treatments but did find Xanax (an anti-anxiety medication that requires a medical
prescription) and marijuana in his blood system. His death was influenced by a condition
known as substance induced excited delirium (retrieved from https://www.theguardian.
com/usnews/2016/feb/10/-david-joseph-mental-health-austin-police-killing on May 10,
2017).
Case 29 occurred when Map Kong was shot by three officers of the Burnsville
(MN) Police Department after two strikes with a conducted energy weapon failed to
persuade Mr. Kong to put down the knife he held in his hands. Mr. Kong had been
committed to residential care facilities on two prior occasions for mental health issues
and chemical dependency. Although the officers attempted to use force options not
intended to be lethal, they were not successful in their efforts to communicate with Mr.
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Kong. He did not appear to acknowledge the presence of police officers during the
videotaped incident. An investigation by the Minneapolis Star Tribune found that “at
least 45 percent of those who have died in encounters with law enforcement in the state
since 2000 had a history of mental illness, as Kong did, or were in the throes of a mentalhealth crisis.” An autopsy report on Mr. Kong after his death revealed the presence of
amphetamine and methamphetamine in his body (retrieved from http://www.
startribune.com/bca-releases-body-cam-video-from-burnsville-officer-involved
shooting/-383973811/ on May 15, 2017).
Other attempts using verbal communication and family members as intervention
efforts were not successful in situations involving mentally ill people. In Case 36,
Melinda Boarts was shot and killed by Auburn (AL) Police Officers Gregory Miller and
Derrick Johns on a U.S. Forest Service Road after responding to check the welfare of the
mentally ill woman. Ms. Boarts ignored the verbal commands of the officers and was
shot. According to Amy Yurkanin on the AL.COM News media website, Ms. Borats and
was killed by an Auburn police officer after charging officers with a knife. The
responding officers may not have known non-lethal techniques to use during the
situation. Susan Baty-Pierce of National Alliance on Mental Illness-Birmingham stated it
was too expensive for many agencies to pay for community mental health officers solely
dedicated to handling mental illness calls. Demopolis (AL) Police Chief Tommie Reese,
who was president of the Alabama Association of Chiefs of Police, stated the main issue
was a general lack of resources for dealing with people with mental illness (retrieved
from https:// www.-al.-com/news/birmingham/2016/08/a_deadly_ mix_in-_policeshootin .html on May 17, 2017).
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Multiple resources and close supervision to assist people who suffer from mental
illness may not stop a violent conclusion to a police encounter with a person experiencing
a behavioral crisis. Case 40 recounts how Melissa Abbot, a resident in a facility designed
to help mentally ill people, was shot by Lake Hallie (MN) Police Officer Adam Meyers
in a Walmart. As reported by Chris Vetter on the Leader Telegram website, the incident
began when Ms. Abbot was identified as a disorderly female who refused to leave the
store. Officer Meyers arrived and confronted Ms. Abbott, who possessed a hatchet. Ms.
Abbott raised the hatchet above her shoulders charged Officer Meyers and was shot two
times. Ms. Abbott was living at a center for developmentally disabled people and had
been diagnosed with depressive disorder, borderline personality disorder, and a mild
intellectual disability. She had been hospitalized in the past at two other mental health
facilities and due to her aggressive behaviors, multiple physical and mechanical restrains
had been used to manage her behaviors. Ms. Abbot has threatened to kill others and
wrote in her journal a desire that “when the cops get called I will grab their gun and there
will be a shootout between me and the cops” (retrieved from https://-www.leadertelegram.-com/news/daily-updates/da-officer-cleared-in-lake-hallie-walmartshooting/article_1c9e8faf-83b4-5456-b178-110f3da76818.html on May 17, 2017).
RESEARCH THEME TWO - ADVERSE BEHAVIORAL REACTIONS
Adverse behavioral reactions were defined as those acts that are contrary to how a
reasonable officer or subject would act in a similar event or circumstances and occur after
the arrival of the police. These reactions are performed without regard to the underlying
intent or motivation of other participants during the encounter.
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An example of adverse behavioral reactions included civilians advancing towards
armed police officers while displaying a knife such as Case 88 when Juan Torres
approached officers at the conclusion of a pursuit with a knife in his hand and was shot.
Police officers displayed abnormal behavioral reactions by using excessive force which
compelled a citizen to act in self-defense and resulted in lethal force by the officer such
as Case 8 when Robert “LeVoy” Finicum was fired upon by FBI agents during a forced
traffic stop. Each instance is noted in Appendix C on page 187 with a description of the
qualifying act.
Police Officer Adverse Behavioral Reactions
Some police officers may suffer from personality disorders that include
dysfunctional traits that lead to abusive behavior, particularly when threats to their
authority are perceived (Miller, 2015). Fourteen cases (10.85%) in this study revealed
that police officers did not regulate their emotions while performing their duty.
Case 54 occurred when Florida State Trooper Misael Diaz stopped Doll Pierre
Louis for speeding and a minor auto accident, putting himself in a dangerous situation by
leaping on Mr. Louis’ car during the incident. Charles Rabin reported the incident on
The Miami Herald website and stated that Mr. Louis was driving over the speed limit and
being followed by a Florida Highway Patrol trooper before the officer leaped onto the
hood of Mr. Louis’ car and, fearing for his life, shot him. The lethal force encounter was
captured on the surveillance camera of a nearby gas station (retrieved from https://
www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article-80135837.html on May 24, 2017).
In three cases, police officers placed themselves into dangerous situations by
lunging into the passenger compartments of targeted vehicles during investigatory stops
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of motor vehicles, then used lethal force on the drivers. Case 45 occurred when Willie
Tillman attempted to flee from a traffic stop and a police officer lunged into the car and
was driven from the scene with his legs hanging outside of the vehicle. During Case 47,
Ashtain Barnes was killed after being stopped for not paying a highway toll and the
officer entered the driver side window to prevent Mr. Barnes from escaping. Derek
Adame was killed after an officer reached into the passenger compartment and was drug
by the car during an escape attempt after being stopped as a suspicious vehicle in Case
120. None of the initial circumstances of the traffic stops were sufficient grounds for the
application of lethal force and the involved officers placed themselves in danger by their
own actions, not the actions of the subjects.
Subject Abnormal Behavioral Reactions
Seventy eight cases (60.47%) involved adverse behavioral reactions by the
individual civilian that influenced responding police officers to use lethal force. Case 25
cumulated with Darrell P. Bosell being killed by an unidentified Cheektowaga (NY)
police officer who was trained in crisis intervention to interact with people suffering from
mental health issues. Cheektowaga Police Chief David Zack stated that Mr. Bosell was
suffering from a severe emotional distress and that the responding officer had spoken to
Mr. Bosell in a telephone conversation before their fatal encounter. Mr. Bosell later
pointed an unloaded gun at the officer during what appeared to be an unrelated call where
the officer was unaware that Mr. Bosell was the person who had called the police
department earlier. Chief Zack stated that the shooting underscores the need for
mandatory training for all police officers in crisis intervention and that mental health
issues are of the same importance to the current opioid epidemic (retrieved from
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https://buffalonews.com/cityregion/cheektowaga/cellphone-tracking-led-cheektowagapolice-to-hotel-armed-java-man-20160307 and http://live.buffalonews.com/2016/03/16/
video-police-release-footage-cheektowaga-fatal-shooting/ on May 7, 2017).
RESEARCH THEME THREE – ERRATIC BEHAVIOR
Research theme three explored if the deceased civilians exhibited erratic behavior
before the arrival of police officers. Erratic behavior was identified in this study as
verbal and physical actions by the civilians that would not be considered a customary
activity or practice for the social settings or circumstances present and occurred before
officers have responded to the scene. The erratic behavior may be related to the actions
that initiated a police response. Seventy-seven cases (59.69%) of the cases in this
dissertation exhibited such behavior. Appendix D on page 190 lists each erratic behavior.
The erratic behaviors observed in this study were reported to the police by
members of the public or the actual person causing the disturbance. Case 48 occurred
when Spokane (WA) Police Officers Ryan Adkins and Brandon Lynch shot Michael
Kurtz outside a downtown shelter. Mr. Kurtz reported himself to authorities, then
approached the responding officers with a knife and urged them to kill him. One officer
deployed his Taser, but it was ineffective and two of them fired, Fuller said. Police
believe that Mr. Kurtz called police to the scene, telling a dispatcher that he wanted to
hurt himself (retrieved from http://www.spokesman.com/stories/-2016/apr/28/man-shotdead-at-the-house-of-charity/ on May 17, 2017).
One subject appeared to encourage a lethal force response even though the officer
had called for assistance to control the situation in a less lethal manner. Case 70 involved
Madison (WI) Police Officer Hector Rivera, who responded to a break in of a home by a
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man, later identified as Michael William Schumacher, who had been reported as acting
oddly in a lake by talking to himself and slapping the water. Mr. Schumacher broke a
window of a nearby home by throwing a rock and residents called 911 and fled the home
after he destroyed items inside the house. Officer Rivera was waiting for backup at the
house when Mr. Schumacher approached the officer with a four-pronged pitchfork,
ignoring multiple orders from the officer to stop (retrieved from https://madison.com/wsj/
news/-local/crime-and-courts/man-killed-in-police-shooting-identified-madison-officialsplace-responsibility/-article_41f41564-34c0-5a65-9014-99ced8d99cd9.html on June 1,
2017).
Mr. Schrumacher suffered from a long-term mental illness according to Dean
Loumos, who headed the local program that provided shelter and support to him since
2008. “These incidents are rare, and they make the news because they’re tragic,” said
Ronald Lampert, chief executive officer and president of Journey Mental Health Center.
Mr. Lampert further stated:
The insidious part is when people have a severe mental illness and they hear
voices or see things, and the voices tell them to do things, no one knows except
them that the voices are telling them to do things, Lampert said. That’s part of the
impulsiveness that causes people who have a mental illness to do things out of
their normal pattern (retrieved from https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/crimeand-courts/man-fatally-shot-by-madison-police-officer-struggled-withmental/article_0566fd8f-5983-57bb-9c4c60293aeba81e-.html on June 1, 2017).
Case 76 also represented notable erratic behavior before police officers arrived.
Sacramento (CA) Police Officers John Tennis and Randy Lozoya shot Joseph Mann after
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responding to a call for service due to a man with a gun acting strangely. Joe Khaulil on
the Fox 40 website stated the shooting occurred during a confrontation with Sacramento
police after he was acting erratic and advanced towards police officers while holding a
knife. The initial call to police dispatchers reported a man acting strangely who was
making karate motions in the air, Mr. Mann became agitated after police officers arrived
and was described by a witness as furious. Mr. Mann refused to drop his knife and
charged an officer who was inside a patrol car. The officers chased him until he stopped
and turned towards the officers, raising the knife. Two officers fired their service
weapons at the Mr. Mann, and he was killed (retrieved from https://fox40.com
/2016/07/11/police-officer-injured-during-shooting-in-north-sacramento/?utm_edium=social&utm_source=twitter-_FOX40 on June 2, 2017).
Many subjects in this study appeared to suffer from a condition known as
emotional dysfunction and contributed to the lethal force event by their actions.
EMOTION DYSREGULATION
As each affected individual ultimately lost his or her life during the examined
incidents in this study, it is difficult to determine if the deceased persons suffered from a
condition known as emotional dysregulation. However, many cases exhibited behaviors
that have been attributed to emotion dysregulation which may be an important predictive
cue of potential violence in a police encounter. Simply stated, emotion dysregulation is a
term used by mental health professionals to describe an individual who does not respond
to a person or event within a normal range of emotions.
Emotion dysregulation has been described as having a distinct and clinically
meaningful connection to psychiatric crises and is a key part of many psychiatric
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disorders. The condition includes a tendency for intense emotions to become
uncontrollable in a rapid progression as to make control and coping strategies difficult.
Emotional dysregulation has been identified as a matter of high public health importance
in populations at risk of depression, post-traumatic stress syndrome, and substance abuse.
Studies support emotion dysregulation as being a component of multiple psychiatric
disorders and it may be present in conditions that include excessive emotionality,
excitement-seeking, interpersonal isolation, aggression, alcohol and abuse, self-harm, and
suicidality (Bradley et. al, 2015).
Miller (2015) found that irrational actions have contributed to lethal force
incidents when police officers or citizens suffered damaging impulses that were
inappropriate for the situations. These impulses include anger, intoxication, and
delusional mental status and make police encounters unpredictable when innocuous
gestures or words by a police officer can transform a compliant citizen into an assailant
without prior recognition by the officer.
Mohandei et. al (2009) noted that 81% of subjects in their study of suicide by cop
became suicidal in response to the situation and had not intended to die by suicide,
suggesting that the incidents resulted in more emotional and reactive impulses that
transform quickly into a resolute intention to be killed by police officers, supporting the
presence of emotional dysregulation.
Aggressive response behaviors related to emotional dysregulation were observed
throughout this dataset. Case 60 provided am example when Wagoner (OK) Police
Officer Robert Reynolds shot Andrew Hansen at the conclusion of a vehicle pursuit.
Samantha Vicent of The Tulsa World wrote on the news website that Andrew Henson
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told Officer Reynolds that he needed to kill him and used a racial slur shortly before he
was killed. The shooting occurred after Mr. Henson rammed Officer Reynolds’ patrol
car multiple times when he tried to force the police vehicle off the road. Police body
camera footage shows Mr. Henson turning toward the officer with both arms extended in
a manner consistent with holding and pointing a handgun and stating “You’re gonna have
to kill me n-----” at Officer Reynolds, who is white. Wagoner Police Lieutenant Donnie
Cox searched Mr. Henson after the shooting but did not find a weapon. The city of
Wagoner released the body camera footage and stated that Mr. Henson failed to comply
with the commands he was given, and Officer Reynolds reacted to what he perceived as a
dangerous situation. Lieutenant Cox perceived the situation as a suicide by cop incident
(retrieved from https://www.tulsa-world.com/-news/crimewatch/newly-released-videoshows-man-killed-by-officer-in-wagoner/article-_2e78147a-89db-5bc9-8db0cf54693ed23a.html on May 31, 2017). Officer Reynolds reacted to Mr. Henson in a
manner that supported observations of the local police collective by interpreting his
behavior as dangerous (Blumer, 1969; Manning, 1988).
Emotion dysregulation has been defined as a condition involving poor awareness
and understanding of emotions, lack of acceptance of emotions, reacting to situations
with inappropriate anger or sadness, a reduction in the ability to control impulsive
behavior or behave in accordance with desired goals while experiencing negative
emotions, and an inability to be flexible in the use of effective emotion regulation
strategies to control personal emotional responses appropriately to meet individual goals
and situational demands (Gratz and Romer, 2004; Garofalo et. al, 2018).
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Bradley et. al (2015) cite a growing body of research on emotion dysregulation
that supports the formulation of emotion dysregulation as a distinct and clinically
meaningful phenomenon associated with psychiatric distress. They identify emotion
dysregulation as a tendency for emotions to spiral out of control, change rapidly, and be
expressed in intense and unmodified forms that overwhelm both the coping capacity and
reasoning of the individual. Their research supports the conceptualization of the
condition as a distinctive component that is found in many forms of psychopathology.
Rumination, panic, self-criticism, social inhibition, interpersonal isolation, concentration
difficulties, and attention problems can reflect the internalized failures of emotion
management while aggression, alcohol and substance abuse, disordered eating, self-harm,
and suicidality may be associated with the external behaviors of the condition.
Another possible manifestation of emotional dysregulation, which included
suicide, occurred in Case 79 when Tulsa (OK) Police Officers Richard Urban and Jerod
Lum responded to a domestic violence call and shot Jerry Brimer as he approached
officers with an ax and made statements indicating he wanted to end his life. Katiera
Winfrey stated on The News6 website that the officers shot and killed Mr. Brimer after
he charged at officers with an ax during a domestic dispute. Mr. Brimer made statements
and comments to the officers that he wanted to die after the violent interaction with his
wife (retrieved from https://www.newson6.com-/story/32473774/tulsa-policeinvestigating-fatal-officer-involved-shooting on June 3. 2017).
Emotion dysregulation is integral to the disease of borderline personality disorder
and includes the inability to respond and manage emotions in an appropriate manner.
Maladaptive regulation strategies may manifest as unsuitable behaviors instead of using
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appropriate emotion regulation adaptations to respond to adverse situations. Emotion
dysregulation includes three aspects: a high sensitivity or vulnerability to emotional
stimuli, a high amplitude of emotional response to such stimuli, and a slow return to an
emotional baseline after affective arousal (Carpenter and Trull, 2013).
Newhill, Eack, and Mulvey (2012) found that elevated baseline levels of, and less
improvement in, emotion dysregulation is a significant predictor of violent behavior.
They also found that emotion dysregulation may serve as a catalyst for violent behavior
in multiple personality disorders that are characterized by antisocial traits. Mohandie et.
al (2009) examined suicide by cop incidents and noted that 98% of their subjects pointed
a weapon at someone during the incident and 70% of their subjects verbalized a threat to
another person and exhibited more aggression towards police officers. These
observations supported the presence of emotion dysregulation.
Thompson (1994) cited that discrete emotions and their consequences can result
in individuals displaying highly variable responses in behavior that change the perception
of an emotional experience into emotional arousal. The condition also has the capacity to
radically change how individuals respond to stimuli. He stated that:
Emotion experience derives from an interaction between biologically based
emotive processes and the socialized monitoring, evaluative, and regulatory
processes by which emotion experience is interpreted and managed in culturespecific ways. The common theme underlying these studies is how emotional
arousal comes to mean different things to different individuals (e.g., why anger is
empowering to some people, disorganizing for others, and to be denied or avoided
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for others), and emotion regulation is a significant component of these individual
differences (p.26).
Thompson (1994) defined emotion regulation as the “extrinsic and intrinsic
processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating, and modifying emotional reactions,
especially their intensive and temporal features, to accomplish one’s goals” (p. 27).
Emotion regulation is an acquired strategy of reactive self-management in stressful
situations but is susceptible to external influences via the actions of others by a broad
base of interconnected processes. The process is eroded when the range of responsive
options becomes limited or leads to unacceptable resolutions as emotion management is
reliant on acceptable outcomes during the encounter. Thompson (1994) stated:
But it is quite likely that deficiencies in emotion management as well as social
information processing contribute to the social dysfunction; under threatening
circumstances, the affective salience of social cues, their interpretation, and the
thoroughness of one’s search for evaluation of alternative response options are all
likely to be affected by skill at self-regulating emotion (p. 44).
Inappropriate emotional response related to emotional dysregulation may have
been present in Case 32 when Winslow (AZ) Police Officer Austin Shippley killed
Loreal Tsingine as he responded to a shoplifting call. Officer Shippley forced Ms.
Tsingine to the ground after she ignored his verbal commands to stop walking away from
him. Instead of using a safer control technique, he allowed Ms. Tsingine to stand, and
she advanced towards him with a small pair of scissors in an apparent effort to fight him.
Officer Shippley then shot her. This use of excessive force by a responding police officer
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to the offense of shoplifting with a perceived lethality of manicure scissors may be an
example of emotion dysregulation.
Case 99 occurred when El Cajon (CA) Police Officer Richard Gonsalves was
called to assist during a mental health call and subsequently shot Alfred Olango. Mr.
Olango had been diagnosed as suffering from mental illness and his family had called the
police department for assistance as he was displaying odd behavior. Mr. Olango
attempted to flee from the officers and was finally stopped in the parking lot of a fast
food restaurant which had a camera mounted on an outside wall. Mr. Olango pointed a
vaping device in such a manner as to resemble a firearm and was subsequently shot and
killed, supporting the concepts of Blumer (1969) that the interaction with Mr. Olango
was interpreted by the officers in a manner consistent with their local police culture (also
Manning, 1988).
Newhill, Eack, and Mulvey (2012) found that emotion dysregulation is a
significant contributor to violence in personality disorders and may be the primary factor
that increases the risk of violence in people that suffer from that condition. These
researchers defined emotional dysregulation as a “low threshold, or high
sensitivity/vulnerability to emotional stimuli coupled with a high amplitude or emotional
response and a slow return to a normal emotional baseline” (p. 453) and found that the
disorder was predictive of violent behavior.
Cohn, Jukupcak, Seibert, Hildebrandt, and Zeichner (2010) noted that emotion
dysregulation is a coping strategy used to control interpersonal encounters that trigger
vulnerability and negative affect arousal, making people who associate negative feelings
with anger to become susceptible to violence and aggression.
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Emotion dysregulation appeared to be the primary cause of many deaths
examined in this dissertation. The inability to respond appropriately to the circumstances
of a police encounter affected both officers and subjects when events were interpreted as
dangerous by the officers.
MENTAL ILLNESS AND POLICE CULTURE
Mental illness and extreme emotional behaviors appeared to be significant factors
in 95 cases (73.36%) the police shootings examined in this study. Mohandie et. al (2009)
noted that missing mental health history remains common in criminal justice samples
(also Lord, 2014).
Persons having a personal crisis may act in manners considered too dangerous by
police officers to control by verbal commands only and police officers may interpret
intense reactions as dangerous to their physical safety. Lord (2014) found that officers
rely on their experiences, beliefs, and values when assessing danger rather than guidance
by policies. Officers may use excessive force when their interpretation of an encounter is
viewed as life-threatening (Miller, 2015), such as calls involving persons with emotional
crisis.
The public stigma of mental illness has been defined as the negative attitude of
prejudice and misinformation which is initiated by the exhibition of odd behavior or the
mention of past mental health treatment. Stigma can start a cycle leading to decreasing
self-esteem, low levels of self-confidence, and discrimination (Sartorius, 2007).
Throughout history, people with mental illness have been treated differently and
are often perceived as undesirable, defective, and unacceptable (Stickney, Yanosky,
Black, & Stickney, 2012). Such attitudes include the belief that people with mental
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illness are dangerous, need to be avoided, and are responsible for their own illnesses
(Smith & Cashwell, 2010) and pose a significant threat of homicide or violence towards
others (Mohandie et. al, 2009). Inaccurate knowledge leads to individuals being
discriminated against and when the stigma of mental illness interacts with police culture,
the perceptions of danger are enhanced during incidents (Knifton et. al, 2010). As police
officers share knowledge with each other via social interactions (Blumer, 1969), the
stigma of mental illness is strengthened within the local police collective.
Most officers believe that persons with mental illness present a high risk to officer
safety and make protective considerations a priority when dealing with the mentally ill
(Cordner, 2000). Officers are hesitant to compromise accepted tactics when interacting
with subjects experiencing mental health crises and would reject such efforts as counter
to their own personal safety (Wells & Schafer, 2006). By using words and phrases that
are contextually dependent on the local police culture, image formation occurs as officers
define the event (Manning, 1988) and most police training includes graphic depictions of
police officers who were seriously injured or killed due to insufficient tactical
considerations (Dupont & Cochran, 2000). This type of training negates efforts to teach
officers to deescalate a potential harmful encounter with a person with mental illness and
avoid lethal force.
Dupont and Cochran (2000) view this type of training as an obstacle to improving
officer interactions during encounters with the mentally ill. Imprecise communications
coding of calls and the stigma of mental illness combine with training experiences to
allow officers to make false or multiple interpretations of an event when a person acts in
a manner not consistent with reasonable expectations (also Manning, 1988).
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Stigma related to mental illness is also reflected within a society and the
institutions which represent it. Persons suffering from mental crises are perceived as
dangerous throughout the general population and institutional stigma appears to affect
organizations and their policies, procedures, and culture. Stigma can also affect
components of the criminal justice system and the persons working within them, resulting
in inappropriate use of police force during contacts with the public (Huggett et. al, 2018;
Manning, 1988). Due to increased agitation, disturbed perception, impaired judgement,
and lack of self-control, mentally ill persons may require more physical restraint than an
average citizen and aggressive acts may cause by-standers and family members to call the
police with the expectation they will control the person to preserve public safety (Miller,
2015). As an example, in Case 36, Amy Yurkanin wrote in the AL.COM News media
website:
Advocates for the mentally ill say police chiefs and sheriffs have been slow to
embrace training, leaving officers unequipped to safely handle confrontations
with suicidal or unstable suspects… Without proper training, police officers are
more likely to use tactics that can escalate aggression in a person suffering from
severe mental illness, experts say, increasing the likelihood of injury or death. In
Alabama, only four hours of the 13-week police academy curriculum is dedicated
to emotional disturbance. Some states require up to 40 hours, but many, like
Alabama, require far less (retrieved from https://www.-al.-com/news/birmingham/
2016/08/a_ deadly_mix_in_police-_shootin.html on May 17, 2017).
Lack of specialized training results in lethal force being used during police
contacts with people who suffer from mental illness. Many mentally ill patients have

146

conditions that increase their exposure to police officers such as homelessness, substance
abuse, and joblessness. These conditions result in mentally ill persons being present in
many lethal force cases that should not cumulate in lethal force (Miller, 2015).
Police departments do not provide clear guidelines for officers during mental
health or emotional crisis, resulting in frustrations by officers who rely on their personal
perceptions, biases, and beliefs during encounters with mentally ill persons (Patch &
Arrigo, 1999). Officers construct meaning to incidents using the shared contexts of past
similar events as they respond to current incidents (Burger & Luckman, 1966; Manning,
1988). Police officers perform as primary responders to persons in mental health crises
and are dissatisfied with law enforcement training techniques, which has been described
as inadequate and not successful during encounters with people suffering from mental
illness (Cordner, 2000; Fry, Riordan, & Geanellos, 2002; Cooper, McLearen, Zapf, 2004;
Wells & Schafer, 2006; Miller, 2015; Goldberg, White, & Weisburd, 2019).
Karen Rivedal, writing on the Madison.com website, interviewed Dane County
(WI) District Attorney Ismael Ozanne, who stated that the community must do more to
assist people suffering from mental illness:
“I mention this because this is the 15th officer-involved shooting which I have
had to make a decision in over the past six years,” he said. “In these OIS
incidents, mental health issues have been present in far too many of them. This is
a fact we cannot ignore if we hope to learn from each incident to hopefully
prevent the loss of other lives” (retrieved from https://madison.com/wsj/news/
local/crime-and-courts/madison-police-officer-cleared-in-fatal-shooting-of-
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mentally-ill/article_7ef8f698-054b-5afc-a509-c67d9cbf4238.html on June 1,
2017).
RACE
Persons who exhibited behaviors as defined in the research themes were identified
in 95 cases in this study. Blacks were killed in 46 cases (48.42%) while Whites were
killed in 34 cases (35.79%). Hispanics were killed in 11 cases (11.58%). Asians and
Native Americans were killed in 4 cases (04.21% for each race).
Some racial groups may be disproportionately represented in lethal force
incidents, but this may be related to the demographics of criminal behavior and officer
assignment to in various communities. Miller (2015) concluded that there is no evidence
that police officers systematically target members of an ethnic group for more forceful
confrontations, including lethal force incidents.
Transparency can lead to legitimacy via full public disclosure concerning police
use of lethal force and may produce such evidence. Jordan, Panza, and Dempsey (2020)
examined suicide by cop deaths in the jurisdictional areas of the Los Angeles Police
Department and concluded that no significant associations were found for any
demographic variables. However, Nix, Campbell, Byers, and Alpert (2017) found that
implicit bias existed as non-White subjects were more likely to be subjected to lethal
force by police officers than White subjects, Black civilians were more than twice as
likely as White subjects to have been unarmed during the confrontations, and that
members of racial minorities were less likely to have attacked an officer during the lethal
force event when compared to White subjects. Police administrators should accurately

148

report such events to allow for extensive research to determine the role of race as it
influences lethal force encounters.
Race was a noted factor in mental health treatment during a study by Cooper,
McLearen, and Zapf (2004) concerning police officer interactions with the mentally ill.
Their study concluded that no racial bias was discovered during the decision making
process, but Whites were more apt to be committed which resulted in less mental health
resource available for minorities, who were incarcerated at a high rate while Dorner and
Mittendorger-Rutz (2017) noted that marginalized people received a different level of
mental health treatment than more affluent people due to a lack of financial resources.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICING
Looking across the findings of this study, erratic behavior by the subjects and
adverse behavioral actions by the subjects and the officers combine with implicit
meanings of police culture to contribute to a lethal encounter. These actions support
Blumer (1969) and Manning (1988) as that officers referenced past solutions to resolve
current issues. Observations suggest a call for specific tactics, innovative field
procedures, and identification of improved practices that minimize fatal incidents
involving people diagnosed with mental illness or suffering from an emotional crisis.
The encounter with an armed and suicidal person requires elevated concerns for the
safety of officers and civilians present during an incident (Mohandie et. al, 2009) but the
adoption of police policies that places value on the lives of each citizen during conflict
resolution can decrease deaths to members of the public (Zimring, 2017).
Klinger (2001) noted that police officers may use lethal force against citizens to
protect themselves against a threat they reasonably perceive to be present, regardless of
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the results of any subsequent consideration of the facts. Defensive lethal actions can be
made in circumstances which are later determined to have not been a threat to the safety
of the officers or the public and include individuals who threaten others with unloaded
firearms or other objects that can be mistaken as dangerous by the officers, also
supporting the observations made by Blumer (1969) that past encounters influence
current resolutions.
Police jurisdictional coverage is historically based on isolated patrols of
geographical areas, making officers responsible for decisions without supervisory
oversight. Police contacts with people suffering from mental illness or emotional crisis in
the cases in this dataset indicate that further training and policies need to be formulated to
guide officers to non-lethal resolutions during confrontations with these members of our
society. The shared police collective requires change to frame encounters with people
suffering from mental illness from “dangerous” to “needing medical assistance” to allow
officers to formulate acceptable resolutions without actual supervisory guidance at the
scene of the incident.
Event Progression
Conflict management training can improve the communication skills of police
officers to make verbal expertise the primary tool for controlling irrational citizens by
extending the time of the encounter and offering acceptable resolutions to the mentally ill
subject. The use of role-playing training scenarios to practice mitigating techniques may
reduce the potential for violence (Miller, 2015) and reduce the stigma of mental illness in
police culture. De-escalation techniques to minimize conflicts should include enough
time to allow individuals to attempt to regulate their emotions by using verbal
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interactions to allow a longer recovery time and offer safer resolutions to the citizen. By
encouraging non-lethal outcomes during critical events, police legitimacy and community
acceptance of police efforts may be improved. Local police cultures should reflect nonlethal responses to be the acceptable and desired outcomes using negotiations and should
identify subjects with mental illness as patients, not criminals.
Tactics and procedures that increase the time of the encounter are important to
allow officers to gain information to determine if mental illness or emotional crisis are
present and attempt non-lethal resolutions. American police officers use force that is not
intended to be lethal to deescalate or resolve physical confrontations when time and
circumstances permit (Miller, 2015). Officers can use other resolutions to change the
circumstances and increase the time span of an incident, such as obtaining an arrest
warrant after the subject has been identified or using verbal skills to offer acceptable
resolutions for compliance to the subject without resorting to lethal force.
In 67 cases (51.94%) of this study, officers discharged their weapons within 30
seconds of arrival at the scene. In those situations when the use of firearms is
appropriate, the shooting should stop when the actions that necessitated the use of a
firearm cease. The goal of any use of force action by a police officer should be to stop
behavior that threatens the safety or lives of officers or civilians, not to inflict death.
Fewer shots that are accurately aimed may provide a better chance of survival for a
civilian during confrontations. Zimring (2017) notes that police officers continue to
shoot subjects after the cause for applying lethal force has stopped as excessive lethal
force is not a concern for most police managers.
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Initial responding officers discharged their weapons in 86 cases (66.67%) in this
study. Researchers in Sweden stated that in police shootings, sequences of events occur
at a rapid pace, putting the officer at a disadvantage when making lethal force decisions.
In their study of Swedish police officers, Petersson et. al (2017) stated that initial
responding officers were involved in shootings in 80% of the cases they examined. The
officers were not able to predict or prevent the sudden threats they encountered and 92%
of the lethal force events were concluded within 60 seconds. Although they advocated
training to aid officers to respond to factors common in incidents, they noted that the
short time frame may negate such training.
Officers may not possess sufficient time to gather additional information after
their arrival at the scene. In this study and the Swedish study, many cases occurred as
officers discharged their firearms in 60 seconds or less after their arrival at the scene,
indicating that officers make quick decisions using limited information with minimal
interactions with people present at the location of the incident who could provide
additional information, supporting observations by Manning (1988).
Fyfe’s “Split Second Syndrome” (1988), in which police officers treat current
incidents in a similar manner as past incidents, is supported by the quickness in which
lethal force was used by responding officers in this study. Without enough knowledge of
the circumstances of an event, officers must rely on past events when making decisions
due to time constraints (also Blumer, 1969). These constraints may result in deaths that
are later determined to be erroneous or possibly avoidable. Fyfe’s observations support
Berger and Luckman’s (1966) concept of the potential for misinterpretation of
information due to possessing limited context of the event.
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Klinger (2020) interpreted Perrow’s Accident Theory using tight coupling and
interactive complexity as contributors to undesirable outcomes during human interactions
in stressful events. The observed interactions suggest support for Klinger as officers
made swift interpretations of events that result in lethal force decisions. Klinger (2005)
noted that when police officers create or maintain distance from armed citizens and make
situations less complex, lethal force incidents may be reduced in number although not all
injuries or deaths in police encounters arise from tight coupling and interactive
complexity. He also stated that police officers are only responsible for the aspects during
an interaction which they can control and behavior by subjects can force an officer to use
lethal force in life threatening situations. The observation by Klinger supports the use of
techniques that extend the time span of an encounter to allow regulation of the emotions
of the participants.
Handguns were the predominate law enforcement firearm used in 113 cases
(87.60%) while rifles were used in 20 cases (15.50%) and shotguns were used in 3 cases
(02.33%) in this study. In 5 cases (03.88%), the type of firearm could not be identified.
Handguns are the weapon universally carried by police officers, both on-duty and offduty. Shotguns and rifles are normally stored and locked inside a police vehicle and not
carried with officers on a regular basis. Such storage of the firearms requires extra time
to obtain one, which may not be afforded to officers during critical situations when
deadly force is applied within seconds after their arrival, suggesting that officers did not
possess accurate information concerning the event or sufficient time to investigate the
circumstances of the incident as noted by Manning (1988).
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Incidents mentioning a firearm such as a “shots fired” call were represented in 29
of the examined 129 cases (22.48%). While disturbance calls accounted for 19 of the
cases (14.73%) and domestic violence related calls were present in 16 cases (12.40%),
mental illness was announced during the dispatch phase of 11 cases (08.53%). These
categories accounted for 64 cases (49.61%). Limited information during the dispatch
phase can force police officers to make flawed assumptions during critical incidents
(Manning, 1988).
In Case 21, Calvin Smith vandalized his girlfriend’s car and fled from Baton
Rouge (LA) Police Officers Sean Garic and Theodore Smith III, who responded to the
vandalism call. Mr. Smith stopped at his residence and attacked the officers with an
assault rifle. The officers came under fire while still arriving at the residence, endured an
intense gunfight, and suffered gunshot wounds until Mr. Smith was fatally shot. Neither
officer was initially able to call for assistance or attempt non-lethal resolutions. It was
subsequently revealed that Mr. Smith had been a patient in a mental health facility in
Shreveport, although neither officer was aware of this information. He was identified as
the suspect in the vandalism event before the arrival of police officers and the pursuit
should have not been initiated, allowing sufficient time to investigate Mr. Smith and
obtain an arrest warrant which could have been executed under safer circumstances.
The offender, the officer, and the circumstances of their interaction join in a
dynamic interplay in each police encounter with no predetermined resolution to the event.
Perception and interpretation of the actions of the participants play a major role for both
the officer and the subject during the encounter. Self-awareness can be a critical
component for officers to survive lethal force events but when the officer’s perception of
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the circumstances of the incident is distorted or altered, his or her safety can be affected
(Miller, 2015). Higher educational level of officers, an increase in mental health
responses coupled with verbal crisis intervention techniques, and stronger efforts at
community relationships can lead to a lessor number of lethal force incidents involving
the mentally ill (Miller, 2015).
Police Training
Lethal force situations involve learned values and physical skills obtained during
training of police officers. Training influences the responses of an officer during critical
incidents using the affective domain, how a law enforcement officer responds
emotionally to situations and confrontations through learned values and attitudes, and the
psychomotor domain, how officers respond physically using skills practiced during
periodical training sessions. Police officers engage in repetitive training to decide when
to apply force within the context of both domains. When officers encounter similar
conditions as experienced in training, it is expected that they will respond in a manner
consistent with that training. However, if slight differences exist, these trained officers
may not respond using resolutions they were taught (U. S. Department of Homeland
Security/Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, 2011; Manning, 1988).
Existing legal framework and policies are unclear and lead officers to initiate
control efforts by interpreting the event as it occurs. The human subconscious requires
time to evaluate an incident and the behaviors in the encounter combine with
psychological stress to increase the time used by the officer to process information to
arrive at potential resolutions. Such stress may make a rational analysis of the events
difficult or impossible (Petersson et. al, 2017). Failure to comply with the officer’s
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verbal commands can interact with other factors in the encounter and result in the
application of force. Training that increases the time span of an incident and maximizes
distance from the subject will enhance the ability of all participants to manage stress and
encourage rational decisions by law enforcement officers.
Many officers recall that they respond to lethal force threats automatically and
without prior thought but with a sense of robotic detachment (Miller, 2015), indicating
the importance of skill training in critical situations. Jordan, Panza, and Dempsey (2020)
found that officers who were trained in de-escalation techniques used force only during
incidents of aggressive and threatening behavior and at a lessor level than officers who
were not trained to interact with the mentally ill. Zimring (2017) noted that proper
research may lead to a comprehensive understanding of the actual situations when lethal
force should be applied and those incidents where it should not be considered, such as
those incidents with individuals who are mentally ill.
Training to assist police officers during encounters with the mentally ill should be
designed and accomplished at local levels to ensure the maximization of local mental
health resources. Larger urban areas may have increased number of resources to deploy
during these encounters, but smaller areas can still develop training and protocols to
assist officers when encountering persons displaying the characteristics of a behavioral
crisis.
Police leadership can use reviews of incidents involving the mentally ill to
determine new tactics and training procedures to lessen the use of lethal force. Police
administrators can review these encounters to identify potential problems and implement
policy improvements to lower the rate of lethal force incidents at the jurisdictional level.
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Klinger (2020) suggested that reviews of video and audio recordings of incidents can
provide police supervisors and administrators with opportunities to evaluate tactics and
training to make encounters safer. Successful new concepts can be introduced in training
academies and in-service training to offer more resolution choices during encounters with
members of the public suffering from a mental health crisis.
In Case 92, Bell County (TX) Sheriff’s Corporal Shane Geers shot Lyle Blancard
during a traffic stop. Mr. Blancard had previously been contacted by sheriff’s deputies
for shooting a rifle at airplanes flying over his house. Not armed at the time, Mr.
Blancard led Corporal Geers down a gravel road, then exited his vehicle and started
shouting at the corporal. Corporal Geers then shot Mr. Blancard. This encounter could
have been made safer if Corporal Geers and the Bell County Sheriff’s Department had
training for officers to use during encounters with persons that exhibited behaviors
associated with mental illness. Corporal Geers could have used his police vehicle to
lengthen the time span of the incident for Mr. Blancard to regulate his and Mr. Blancard’s
emotions.
In the examined cases where abnormal behavioral responses or erratic behavior
were observed, the responses perceived by the police officers were interpreted as a threat
to their safety or to the public. The officers in these cases may not be trained to
deescalate such situations or to seek the assistance of mental health providers during
these rapidly changing incidents as the ability to deploy mental health resources can be
constrained by situational or jurisdictional realities. Interim intervention techniques can
include improved training to lengthen the time of an incident to allow enough time for
persons suffering from emotional dysregulation to regulate their behavior or to offer non-
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lethal resolutions to the subject to encourage peaceful endings. Potentially safer
procedures and tactics can minimize deaths during future incidents if encouraged by local
police managers. Zimring (2017) stated that specific policies and procedures that favor
non-lethal resolutions may be more effective than general police reform to reduce the
number of people killed by police.
Established and vetted protocols can help members of the criminal justice system
respond appropriately to persons suffering from emotional crises. By defining techniques
and training protocols before the next incident occurs, police officers can rehearse and
evaluate techniques that may give them the best chance to end the conflict without lethal
force.
Potential tactical and policy suggestions should arise from the local level to
maximize resource allocation and encourage rapid responses that include mental health
providers. Police administrators need to stress their preference that such incidents result
in non-lethal outcomes with the priorities of protecting officers and civilians from life
threatening injuries and to minimize the deaths and injuries to subjects. Training new
officers and retraining existing officers in specific mitigating techniques may provide
alternatives to encourage non-lethal resolutions (Zimring, 2017). Police departments can
identify sympathetic individual officers to champion the efforts of crisis intervention
techniques during events when persons exhibit emotional crisis or erratic behavior.
Supervisors should ensure that subordinate police officers are aware that mental
health providers can assume responsibility for the patient care of the mentally ill while
the officers are expected to provide safety during the encounter and to limit use of force.
The current officer mindset of quick resolutions to control incidents should be discarded
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during mental health calls to allow subjects to gain coping strategies and select
reasonable responses, making the goal of mental health care the primary goal.
Tactical Responses to the Mentally Ill
Police officers function as first responders to incidents when people suffer
emotional crisis or mental health issues and may be armed with weapons other than
firearms. Proper training and interaction with mental health patients during training
sessions may remove the institutional stigma of mental illness within local police cultures
and encourage police officers to use alternative force options rather than firearms.
There is no universal model of tactics or techniques available for police contacts
with mental illness as individual jurisdictions have varying access to mental health care
providers and facilities. However, crisis intervention teams can be established in
communities which include police officers and mental health professionals who are
available to respond to events or remotely advise officers during incidents which have
elements of emotional crisis or mental illness. The objective of these teams would be to
treat the subject as a patient rather than an offender and encourage a resolution that favors
mental health care instead of incarceration. Verbal interaction can be used by the
responding mental health professional while the police officer maintains a minimum role
to ensure safety if the individual threatens another person. Supportive care after the
person has been released from a mental health facility or jail would allow participants to
obtain required medicines, ensure testing to monitor appropriate medicine use, and help
them reenter society. The Los Angeles Police Department utilizes a Mental Evaluation
Unit to resolve incidents in manners that promote the use of mental health resources, as
opposed to using only the criminal justice system, and has achieved notable success for
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victims and increased safety for involved police officers (Jordan, Panza, & Dempsey,
2020).
Police tactics to mitigate dangerous situations may not rely on expensive
equipment or training (Zimring, 2017). Specific tactics using commercially available
oleoresin capsicum spray can allow responding officers to safely control those persons
using edged or blunt weapons that can cause injury when they are close to the officers or
members of the public. Oleoresin capsicum spray used in correctional settings can allow
police officers to maintain a safe distance of up to 35 feet by remaining outside the
effective range of edged or blunt weapons until the subject becomes incapacitated.
Specific protocols should include increased proximal distancing and verbal negotiations
to allow sufficient time for affected citizens to return to a rational state. Police officers
and mental health professionals can bring family members to the scene to encourage
efforts to support peaceful resolutions or allow the oleoresin capsicum spray to
incapacitate the person to make the situation safe.
Police officers and dispatching call centers should be cognizant to erratic
behaviors when the initial public report is made. Only eleven cases (08.53%) in this
study were dispatched to officers as potential mental illness issues. Zimring (2017) noted
that mental illness was not an initial concern noted in any of the cases he studied. By
acknowledging the presence of erratic behavior, officers can recognize the potential of
mental illness being present and formulate potential outcomes using non-lethal
techniques to control subjects.
Contact protocols can be used by police dispatchers to advise responding officers
of potential resolutions during their contact with the identified individual. Many people
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suffering mental illness or emotional crisis have a history of prior suicide attempts or
mental health treatment. As a person is entered into the criminal justice system after an
event, local mental health professionals can formulate individual contact protocols for
each officer to use to encourage safer responses during future contacts. The participation
of each involved person can be mandated by court order or may be a voluntary
participation by the affected person or their families. Individualized contact plans would
utilize mental health resources available in local jurisdictions and allow responding
officers to follow a tactical procedure that was formulated to encourage non-lethal
outcomes while preserving public safety during confrontations and increase coping
strategies available to the subject. Criminal justice supervisors should review and
evaluate each incident to identify future less lethal resolutions in similar circumstances
and potential improvements to local policies and guidelines.
Regional mental health facilities should be established in areas where no inpatient care services are present. Jails do not provide adequate mental health care and
normally only large metropolitan areas have in-patient care. The use of regional facilities
to serve numerous municipalities would allow police officers an alternative to
incarceration during a behavioral crisis and allow for citizens to received needed care and
aftercare from mental health providers. Funding should be allocated to allow these
centers to operate and meet the needs of mental health in a professional setting rather
than a jail.
The policy implication of using words during the dispatch phase that exclude
information and requires officers to quickly formulate responses is inadequate and
supports Fyfe’s Split Second Syndrome (2015) as many officers in this study discharged
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their weapons quickly and without adequate time to investigate the circumstances of the
incident they were dispatched to oversee. Code words used in dispatching messages such
as “emotional crisis” or “erratic behavior” can be substituted for “disturbed person” or
“crazy subject” to encourage less aggressive resolutions and imply that more time is
needed to investigate the incident and offer non-lethal resolutions that are acceptable to
the subject. Dispatching more than one officer to incidents may allow multiple officers
to resolve the issue without relying on the perceptions of a single officer. In 86 cases
(66.67%) in this study, the initial responding officer used lethal force with no other
officer present.
Mental health care should be made available to persons who suffer from mental
illness, erratic behavior, and adverse behavioral reactions during police contacts. Private
mental health care can be financially unobtainable for many people, particularly long
term sufferers that may not have regular employment or health insurance. Post incident
care should include access to mental health counseling, needed medications, and general
health care. Other social support, such as housing and food supply, can be gained by
using established channels found in local communities.
LIMITATIONS
The Guardian and The Washington Post only collected data for 2015 and 2016.
Neither corporation offers an explanation as why their respective studies were limited,
and no other years were examined by either news media corporation. As such, this data
may contain dated information and not allow for a precise examination of mental illness
during police lethal force events. As the data for the study arose from news media and
You Tube sources, this sample should be considered non-representative and exploratory.
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Public data can have shortcomings such as journalism bias, inaccurate data, and
dated information which may have influenced this dataset by presenting only videos that
support a specific narrative of police lethal force events. Law enforcement agencies and
special interest groups can have differing reasons to make the videos available to the
public. Bias could be present when videos are released which support a favored
narrative, but police transparency can interact with advocacy and legitimacy when
examining use of force videos to offer an accurate representation of shooting incidents
and changing local protocols as needed.
The use of body worn or carried cameras, dash mounted cameras, and cellphone
cameras allow for additional information to be examined by police administrators, public
officials, and members of the public. Body worn or carried camera systems are relatively
new and expensive, resulting in some police departments not using such technology.
Current body worn cameras and storage of video remains expensive and will limit the use
of these vital tools. A central repository of police videos which records use of force
incidents is necessary for increasing public acceptance of police tactics and formulating
improved practical techniques which can be used to lessen deaths of citizens by officers
(Zimring, 2017). Recordings made by the public will continue to be useful tools to
analyze lethal force events that are not recorded by police officers.
Police departments are not currently required to report lethal incidents to a central
national source, resulting in an absence of a single source to gather information to study
tactics used by police officers when encountering the mentally ill. The United States
Department of Justice has instituted a program, but details and the identification of
participating agencies have not been made public. Transparency can strengthen the search
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for truth and lead to better police practices to encourage public trust in law enforcement
agencies.
The representation of race in this study is not conclusive as the racial composition
of each police jurisdiction in not represented. The racial composition of the national
population is not representative of each police jurisdiction, making racial comparisons
nebulous. Further studies should compare police use of lethal force to the composition of
race in each area of responsibility or jurisdiction. The rates of deaths as related to race
within jurisdictional areas may be higher or lower than the national average and
additional studies are needed to provide an accurate understanding of the role of race in
police lethal force incidents involving the mentally ill at the jurisdictional level.
Additionally, more research is needed to examine the contribution of race to mental
health stigma as interpreted by police officers to determine if persons of color are treated
differently during police calls involving mental health.
The mention of mental illness by news media, family members, and police
officials in this study does not confirm that a diagnosis was made by a trained mental
health official, hence this data could be inaccurate. Future official databases should note
if the deceased citizen was a patient of a mental health provider and specify the diagnosis.
CONCLUSION
Behavioral factors contributed to lethal force conclusions during police contacts
in this study. The observation and identification of the two identified behavioral
conditions related to mental illness can contribute to the academic and vocational
discussion of the use of police lethal force. By observing behaviors that contribute to or
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may predict attacks, alternative tactical influences may be suggested to minimize
fatalities and injuries.
This content analysis gives “voice” to those persons who were killed and may
lead to a better understanding of how the interaction of participants and the interplay of
developing factors can lead to lethal force outcomes in police responses during
interactions that involve the mentally ill of a community. This research enriches the
national discussion by expanding the knowledge of how the actions of individual
participants promote police lethal force incidents. Potential changes to local policies and
vocational practices may lead to fewer deaths by allowing police officers to recognize
and respond to behaviors during an encounter with persons suffering from mental illness
and encouraging safer conclusions during these incidents. These events should conclude
with local mental health treatment rather than incarceration when possible.
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Appendix A. Coding Instrument
AGENCY INFORMATION

Name of Law Enforcement Agency

City & State

Dash Cams

Body Worn Camera

174

INCIDENT INFORMATION

Date

Time

Type of location

Urban

Rural

Residential

Number of Officers Involved

Industrial

Type of Firearms Used

175

Body Worn Cameras Present and Used

Video Released

Number of Officers Present when Involved Officer Arrives at Scene

Number of officers discharging weapons during the incident

Type of call initially

176

Call for Service

Type

Execution of Warrant

Type

Special Ops

Type

Traffic Stop

Type

Patrol

Type
177

Investigation

Type

Off-Duty

Type

Other

Type

OFFICER INFORMATION

Visual Descriptors of Involved Officer
178

Sex

Age

Ht/Wt

In Uniform

BWC

Dash Cam

Symbols of Authority Present (badge, raid jacket)

Does officer try to move towards a position of dominance?

What feature used as a POD?

179

CIVILIVAN INFORMATION

Visual Descriptors of Involved Citizen

Sex

Age

Ht/Wt

Erratic Behavior Upon Arrival

At Residence

Signs of Intoxication

Known or Suggested Mental Health Issues

Weapon Visible?

180

Was civilian armed?

Type

Did civilian exhibit erratic behavior later?

Describe

Did officer attempt other levels of force before lethal force was applied?

Response from involved citizen
181

Did citizen advance towards officer(s)?

Mannerism of citizen:

Does civilian flee from officer?

Mannerism:

Does officer participate in a foot pursuit?

How long?

182

Number of seconds on scene before involved officer discharges weapon

Number of shots fired at civilian by any officer

Activity by civilian after shots are fired

PRE ATTACK CUES BY CIVILIAN

183

Hands visible?

Weapon visible?

If hidden, where were hands?

Behind back

In Pockets

Inside Waistband

Under Garments

Hidden by part of vehicle

184

Hidden by part of scene

Civilian Looking at officer?

Other

Targeting Stare

Or

Escape routes

Assistance for Escape

Weapon of Opportunity at scene

185

If Officer has back-up/assistance

Notes:

186

Appendix B Comments of Civilian Mental Illness
Case Number
Name
Case 1
Joshaua Adam Sisson
Case 7
Case 9

Cedric Norris
Janet Wilson

Case 11

Bruce Kelly, Jr.

Case 13

Randy Joe Nelson

Case 16

David Joseph

Case 18
Case 21

Sahlah Ridgeway
Calvin Smith

Case 22

Paul Gaston

Case 24

Kionte Spencer

Case 25

Darrel P. Bosell

Case 29

Map Kong

Case 30

Robert Dentmond

Case 31
Case 33

Ralph Grenon
Jesse Juarez

Case 36

Melissa Boarts

Case 37
Case 38
Case 40

Laronda Sweatt
Luis Gongora
Melissa Abbott

Case 43

Jakob Wagner

Case 44
Case 48

Mitchell Oakley
Michael Kurtz

Case 49

Arthur DaRosa

Case 57

John Coffey

Case 61
Case 63

Clifford Tucker
Michael Rasmussen

Case 66

Miguel Chavez-Angles

Description
Had a history of mental illness and violence. Held a knife to his boyfriend’s throat, then
attacked a police officer who responded to the domestic violence call.
Treated for mental illness while in prior custody.
Described by witnesses as having “some type of mental incapacity” and as a “disorderly
mental female.” Was also described as having “mental health issues.
Prior diagnosis of substance abuse and described as “suffered from severe mental health
issues.” Mental illness diagnosed as a child.
Was struck by a conducted energy weapon in a local emergency department while there
for a mental illness crisis. Several involuntary commitments for bipolar disease.
No reported history of mental illness but citied as having a mental or behavioral crisis
when shot by the responding officer.
Prior treatment at local hospital for suicidal thoughts. Mother suspected bipolar disease.
History of mental illness and was treated for such living in Shreveport. Family
attempted to have him continue treatment. Previously attempted suicide.
Friends described as “having problems” and “had a few issues here and there.” Also
described as rude and aggressive. Pointed a bb-gun at responding police officers.
History of mental health issues and admission into treatment programs. Was described
as having a “troubled life.” Pointed a bb-gun at responding police officers.
Initially reported as an emotional crisis. Clear to responding police he was in severe
emotional distress. Cited in news briefing as having “a mental health issue.”
Was committed via petitions in 2005 and 2006 for mental illness and chemical
dependency.
Depressed and suicidal. Grand Jury examining case looked at mental health solutions.
Challenged responding officers with a realistic-looking but fake assault rifle.
Diagnosed mental illness but not taking medication properly.
Previous hospitalizations for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Not currently taking
his prescribed medications.
Diagnosed as suicidal and bipolar. Family called out-of-state authorities by tracking her
via a hidden GPS device on her car.
Disabled due to bipolar disease.
Homeless man described as “crazy.” Walking down street waving knife at passersby.
History of mental illness that includes depressive disorder, borderline personality
disorder, and intellectual disability. Swinging a hatchet in Walmart, scaring other
shoppers. Charged responding officer with the hatchet raised.
Described as “socially awkward” and “troubled.” His family questioned his fitness for
gun ownership. Had attempted suicide in the past.
Prior commitment after being determined to be criminally incompetent.
Suspect called 911 and threatened officers. Was described as in a “rage” and threatened
responding officers with a knife so he could join his recently deceased wife in heaven.
Episode began 10 hours after being released from a mental health facility for treatment
of depression. Killed two and assaulted 5 more people with a knife before being killed
by responding officers.
Post mortem toxicology showed an anti-depressant, Sertraline, in his blood. Was sitting
in a fast food parking lot with a shotgun in his lap before being shot by responding
officers after exiting his vehicle with the shotgun in his hands.
Called local hospital and threatened to commit suicide.
Called 911 and stated that he wanted to take his own life. Shot when he approached
deputies with a loaded shotgun and ignored orders to stop.
Had been released from the hospital for a mental health episode less than 2 hours before
being shot while attempting to hijack a bus and take a police officer’s weapon.
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Case 69

Sherman Evans

Case 70

Michael Schumacher

Case 76

Joseph Mann

Case 78

Kevin Higgins

Case 80

Javier Gaona

Case 83

Jawari Porter

Case 88

Juan Torres

Case 98

Keith Scott

Case 99

Alfred Olango

Case 105

Rex Wilson

Case 107

Javier Munoz

Case 110

Michelle Shirley

Case 113

James Ritchie

Case 118
Case 125

Steve Vananda
Earl Eubanks, Jr.

Case 126
Case 128
Case 129

Michael Jacques
James Tylka
Ricky Whidden

Friends stated that he suffered from depression after his wife died. He threatened several
responding police officers with a bb gun that appeared to be a functioning handgun.
Broke into a house and threatened a responding police officer with a pitchfork. Law
enforcement authorities stated they were aware of his mental illness history.
Suffering from a history of mental illness, he challenged responding officers with a knife
after threatening by-standers.
Per the Veterans Administration, he suffered from PTSD and depression and was
awarded an 80% disability due to these conditions. Attempted to rob a bar but stayed at
the location with a rifle after realizing that police had been called.
Shot by responding officers after he threatened others and the officers with a knife.
Police were aware of his mental illness through past encounters with him.
He attacked a responding police officer after an armed robbery of a grocery store. He
had multiple court ordered commitments.
Had a previous diagnosis of schizophrenia, paranoia, and anti-social disorder before he
attacked officers with a knife at the conclusion of a vehicle pursuit.
Had suffered a traumatic brain injury and was not taking his prescribed medication. Did
not comply with police commands after being observed in possession of a firearm.
Police responded to his family’s call for assistance during a mental health crisis and he
pointed a vaping device in a manner that resembled a handgun.
Had a history of depression and mental illness and was shot after he carjacked a vehicle
and pointed a replica handgun at officers.
Shot after a carjacking and was described as having a severe drug addiction and was
“troubled.”
Diagnosed with manic bi-polar disorder and active in community mental health
awareness issues, she was shot after trying to run police officers over with her car.
Suspected as a serial killer, he attacked an officer who wanted to question him about a
skipped cab fare. Described by his mother as a “ticking time bomb.”
Had been suicidal for “many years” when he pointed a firearm at responding officers.
Battled depression and begged officers to shoot him during a domestic violence
disturbance.
Suffered from PTSD arising from a jail term as a sex offender.
Before killing his wife, he told her about suicide attempts in 2015.
Diagnosed with schizophrenia, he was shot by a deputy as he was running away.
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Appendix C Adverse Behavioral Reactions
Case Number
Name
Case 1
Joshaua Sisson
Case 2

Stephen Burwich

Case 3

Robert Tenbrink

Case 8

Robert “LeVoy” Finicum

Case 9

Janet Wilson

Case 11

Bruce Kelly, Jr.

Case 12

Edgar Alvardo

Case 13

Randy Joe Nelson

Case 16

David Joseph

Case 19

Ali Yahia

Case 21

Calvin Smith

Case 22

Paul Gaston

Case 24
Case 25

Kionte Spencer
Darrel P. Bosell

Case 27

Gevork Alachadzhyan

Case 28

Daniel Wooters

Case 29

Map Kong

Case 30
Case 31
Case 32

Robert Dentmond
Ralph Grenon
Loreal Tsingine

Case 33

Jesse Juarez

Case 35

David Mack

Case 36
Case 37

Melissa Boarts
Laronda Sweatt

Case 38

Luis Gongora

Case 39

Lamont Gulley

Description
Held a knife at boyfriend’s throat, then advanced towards responding
officers with the knife in a threatening manner.
Upset about recent gun legislation passed by President Obama. Made
incoherent statements to responding police.
Attempted armed robbery of a store, then pointed a “realistic” bb gun
towards responding officers while ignoring their commands.
FBI special agents fired upon Finicum after he left his stranded vehicle
during an incident in which his vehicle was forced off the road at a police
roadblock.
Attempted to strike private security officers and responding police
officers with her car after creating a disturbance at a shopping mall.
Attacked responding officers after being reported for public intoxication.
Attacked many officers with a knife and killed a police dog.
Told female friend he was going to kill cops. Years of aggressive
behavior and threats towards neighbors. Family attempted to have him
arrested for active warrants for his safety.
Attacked hospital staff and responding officers with emergency room
equipment before dying from a conducted energy weapon strike.
Reported for being naked in a subdivision and ran towards the responding
officer.
Attacked 3 responding officers during questioning in a motel lobby for
possible possession of illegal substances. Told the officers to “go ahead
and get it over with,” then attempted to shot them.
Engaged 2 responding officers in an instant gunfight as they attempted to
question him about vandalism to his girlfriend’s car.
Friends described as “having problems” and “had a few issues here and
there.” Also described as rude and aggressive. Pointed a bb-gun at
responding police officers.
Pointed a replica gun at officers responding to a “man with a gun” call.
Held an officer trained in mental health Crisis Intervention Techniques at
gunpoint after the officer responded to investigate a stolen gun. Original
interaction with the police started as a “mental health issue.”
Suspect stated he had been injected with a foreign material and displayed
erratic behavior upon officers’ arrival, then stole a marked police car and
led officers in a lengthy high-speed pursuit in the Los Angeles area.
Police responded when he wandered into a restaurant and threatened to
kill patrons. Stole a police car and threatened officers with a knife when
stopped.
Ignored police commands and ran from his car with a knife in a
threatening motion towards officers and citizens.
Challenged responding officers with a replica assault rifle.
Advanced towards an entry team of officers with 2 knifes.
Was the subject of a shoplifting call and was subjected to extreme use of
force by the responding officer. She responded with scissors to defend
herself and was shot by the officer.
Advanced towards a responding deputy with a manual weed cutter during
a burglary call.
Attacked a deputy with a conducted energy weapon during a traffic stop
for a moving violation.
Attacked responding officers during a welfare check.
Attacked initial responding officer and a back-up officer with an ax
during an eviction notice service.
Homeless man described as “crazy.” Walking down street waving knife
at passersby.
Killed wife with knife before officers arrive. Has self-inflected knife
wounds to neck. Tells cops to shoot him as he has a gun.
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Caused By
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Officers

Civilian
Civilian
Civilian

Civilian
Officer
Civilian

Civilian
Civilian

Civilian
Civilian

Civilian

Civilian

Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Officer

Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian

Case 40

Melissa Abbott

Case 42

Mario Mejia-Martinez

Case 43

Jakob Wagner

Case 44

Mitchell Oakley

Case 45

Willie Tillman

Case 46

Darrel Machemehl

Case 47

Ashtian Barnes

Case 48

Michael Kurtz

Case 49

Arthur DaRosa

Case 53
Case 54

Derek Prophet
Doll Pierre-Louis

Case 56

Donald Brown III

Case 57

John Coffey

Case 60

Andrew Henson

Case 61

Clifford Tucker

Case 62

Noel Rodriguez

Case 63

Michael Rasmussen

Case 64

Devin Scott

Case 66

Miguel Chavez-Angles

Case 67

Dylan Nobel

Case 68

Michael Disbrowe

Case 69

Sherman Evans

Case 70

Michael Schumacher

Case 71

Delrawn Small

Case 72
Case 74
Case 75

Alton Sterling
Philandro Castile
Alva Braziel

Case 76

Joseph Mann

Case 77

Donald Myers

Case 78

Kevin Higgins

Case 79

Jerry Brimer

Case 80

Javier Gaona

Case 83

Jawari Porter

Threatened shoppers in a Walmart with a hatchet before vandalizing bags
of dog food. Attacked the responding officer.
Threatened pedestrians with a knife then advanced towards responding
officers using the knife in an aggressive manner.
Shot at former high school classmates during their prom before being
shot by an officer assigned as security in the parking lot.
After being reported as a trespasser, he shot at 2 officers as they
approached him inside a Walmart.
Fled from a traffic stop and an officer lunged partially into the car as it
was speeding away.
After losing his sawed-off shotgun during a pursuit for robbery, he placed
his hand inside a bag and simulated pointing the weapon towards
responding officers who were also unaware that the weapon had fallen
out of the bag.
Was stopped for not paying a highway toll when he attempted to flee, the
officer lunged partially inside the car as it was speeding away.
Suspect called 911 and threatened officers. Was described as in a “rage”
and threatened responding officers with a knife so he could join his
recently deceased wife in heaven.
Killed 2 people and injured 5 more with his knife before being shot by an
off-duty deputy.
Attacked an officer with a knife after being told to pick up his trash.
A Florida state trooper jumped on Pierre-Doll’s hood after a minor traffic
accident when Pierre-Doll attempted to flee. The trooper shot him.
Charged responding deputies with a knife during a traffic stop for armed
robbery.
Self-reported as a “man needing assistance” then challenged 8 responding
officers with a shotgun.
Told responding officers after a pursuit that they would have to kill them,
then assumed a combat shooting stance but did not possess a handgun.
Called local hospital and threatened to commit suicide. Attempted to
retrieve a weapon after telling the responding officer to “blow my
fucking head off.”
Asking irrational questions to others present before attempting to use his
vehicle to strike several people, including responding police officers.
Called 911 and stated that he wanted to take his own life. Shot when he
approached deputies with a loaded shotgun and ignored orders to stop.
Attacked responding officers with a knife during a domestic violence
call.
Hijacked a public bus and attacked a responding officer with a fire
extinguisher before attempting to take her service weapon.
Advanced towards responding officers while ignoring commands to stop
during a “man with a gun” call.
Threatened neighbors and responding officers with an airsoft handgun
that was a replica of a firearm.
Threatened several responding police officers with a bb gun that
appeared to be a functioning handgun.
Attacked a responding officer with a pitchfork while breaking into a
house.
Shot by an off-duty officer in a road rage incident.
Shot by an officer while mildly resisting during a “man with a gun” call.
Shot by an officer during a pretext traffic stop.
Was twirling in an intersection when two police officers drove up and he
pointed a handgun at them.
Attacked responding officers with a knife after threatening members of
the public.
Told responding officers to shoot him at the end of a foot pursuit in a
narcotics call. Had lost his handgun during the chase.
Waited for responding officers in a bar he had just robbed with an assault
rifle. Had time to flee but did not.
During a domestic violence incident, he told responding police officers
that he wanted to die before approaching them with an ax.
Threatened responding officers with a knife after telling them to kill him
during a disturbance call.
Attacked a responding officer with a knife after threatening a security
officer with a knife during a shoplifting incident in a grocery store.
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Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Officer
Civilian

Officer
Civilian

Civilian
Civilian
Officer
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian

Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Officer and
Civilian
Officer
Officer
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian

Case 84

Darnell Wicker

Case 85

Dominic Rollice

Case 86

Omer Ismail Ali

Case 87

Todd Browning

Case 88

Juan Torres

Case 89

Kelley Forte

Case 90

Jerry Jackson

Case 92
Case 94
Case 95

Lyle Blanchard
Sadiq Idris
Jesse Beshaw

Case 96
Case 97

Terrence Crutcher
Dahir Adam

Case 99

Alfred Olango

Case 100

Jeffery Cave

Case 103

Devan Desnoyers

Case 104

Kheyanev Littledog

Case 105
Case 108

Rex Wilson
William Frost, Jr.

Case 110
Case 112
Case 113

Michelle Shirley
Christian Redwine
James Ritchie

Case 114
Case 116

Juan Fernandez
Luke Smith

Case 117

Darius Jones

Case 118

Steve Vananda

Case 120

Derek Adame

Case 122

Daniel Riedman

Case 123
Case 125

Brent Quinn
Earl Eubanks, Jr.

Case 126

Michael Jacques

Case 127

Gearld Hall

Case 128

James Tylka

Case 129

Ricky Whidden

Attacked responding officers with a pruning saw during a domestic
incident.
Officers responded to a domestic disturbance call and he attacked them
with a hammer.
Returned to a store he had just robbed and attacked a responding officer
with a wooden pole.
Told the responding police officer that he would have to kill him, or he
would kill the officer.
Attacked responding officers with a knife at the conclusion of a vehicle
pursuit.
Was robbing a pharmacy and holding a knife against the pharmacist
when he charged responding officer with the knife.
Police responded to a domestic violence incident and he charged them
with a knife.
He was shot by a deputy after a brief vehicle pursuit.
Pointed an unloaded stolen gun at a responding police officer.
Charged a responding deputy, stating that he had a gun, and told him to
shoot him.
Shot by a responding officer investigating a car stopped in the road.
Stabbed multiple people during a terrorist attack at a shopping mall.
Charged an armed off-duty officer and was shot.
Assumed a shooting stance and held a vaping device like a handgun to
officers who respond to an assistance call.
Answered a SWAT announcement with a handgun and shot one of the
members.
Pointed a replica handgun at officers attempting to arrest him for robbing
a drugstore.
Challenges 5 responding police officers with a handgun during a “man
with a gun” call.
Pointed a replica handgun at responding officers during a carjacking.
After threatening others with a knife, he lunged at a responding officer
with a knife.
Attempted to strike officers with her car during a “dangerous driver” call.
Shot after a two-state pursuit while attempting to elude arrest.
Suspected as a serial killer, he attacked an officer who wanted to question
him about a skipped cab fare.
Shot after killing one and pointing a weapon towards a hostage.
Shot after stabbing his uncle and approaching a team of responding
offices with a knife.
Observed by patrol officers killing a man, then came towards the officers
with the gun.
Had been suicidal for “many years” when he pointed a firearm at
responding officers.
Became belligerent during a suspicious vehicle investigation and the
officer reached into the car during an escape attempt, was drug by the car,
and shot the driver.
During a traffic stop in which the vehicle’s plate was noted as
“wanted/armed and dangerous,” he was shot as he attempted to retrieve a
handgun with three officers pointing handguns at him.
Shot a responding officer during a suspicious vehicle call.
Shot during a domestic violence call when he approaches an officer and
tells him to shoot.
Pulled an officer into his car during a traffic stop for reckless driving and
assaulted him.
Had stabbed a woman and tried to ignite a natural gas line inside an
apartment before lunging at responding officers with a knife.
After killing his wife, he shot a state trooper and waited to ambush
responding officers.
Although diagnosed with schizophrenia, he was shot by a deputy as he
was running away from the scene after threatening his family with a
knife.
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Appendix D Erratic Behavior before the Police Encounter
Case Number
Name
Case 1
Joshaua Adam Sisson
Case 2
Stephen Bukwich
Case 3
Robert Tenbrink
Case 8
Robert “LeVoy”
Finicum
Case 9
Janet Wilson
Case 11
Bruce Kelly, Jr.
Case 12
Edgar Alvarado
Case 13
Randy Joe Wilson
Case 15
Phillip Ferry
Case 16
David Joseph
Case 22
Paul Gaston
Case 24
Case 25

Kionte Spencer
Darrel P. Bosell

Case 27
Case 28
Case 29

Gevork Alachadzhyan
Daniel Wooters
Map Kong

Case 30
Case 31

Robert Dentmond
Ralph “Phil” Grenon

Case 33

Jesse Juarez

Case 36
Case 38
Case 39
Case 40

Melissa Boarts
Luis Gongora
Lamont Gulley
Melissa Abbott

Case 42
Case 43

Mario Mejia-Martinez
Jakob Wagner

Case 48

Michael Kurtz

Case 49

Arthur DaRosa

Case 56

Donald Brown, III

Case 57

John Coffey

Case 59
Case 60

Rodney Rogriguez
Smith
Andrew Henson

Case 61
Case 62
Case 63
Case 66
Case 67

Clifford Tucker
Noel Rodriguez
Michael Rasmussen
Miguel Chavez-Angles
Dylan Noble

Case 68
Case 69

Michael Disbrowe
Sherman Evans

Description
Had a mask over his face and was holding a knife.
Had barricaded himself and shot at others.
Performed two robberies and remained in the area.
Participated in the takeover of a remote nature and visitor
center.
Attempted to strike others with her vehicle.
Drinking and threatening others.
Had already carjacked 2 cars.
Attacked hospital staff.
Yelling incoherent statements.
Running naked through a housing area.
Involved in a hit and run vehicle accident and waved a firearm
at others while walking away.
Wore a mask and pointed a replica gun at others.
Called and spoke to an officer who was trained in Crisis
Intervention Techniques (CIT).
Stated he was injected with a foreign material.
Was smelling the hair of restaurant patrons.
Spent most of the night in a MacDonald’s parking lot with a
knife in his lap exhibiting what was reported by others as
“erratic” behavior.
Texted a message to friends stating his intent to die.
Threatened his apartment manager and a responding crisis
worker.
Fighting with a security officer after being observed breaking
into multiple cars during daylight hours.
Left a family function and stated her intent to harm herself.
Waving a knife while walking down a street.
Killed his wife during a domestic violence episode.
Attacked bags of dog food and threatened shoppers with an ax
at a Walmart.
Harassed others with a knife on a busy city sidewalk.
Preoccupied with firearms and was questioned by a family
member about his ability to own a firearm.
Threatened others with a knife and self-reported to police
authorities.
Killed 2 women, wrecked 2 cars, assaulted 3 people in a mall,
obtained a knife in a restaurant and killed 1 more person and
stabbed another.
Fled after performing an armed robbery and threatened others
with a knife.
Sitting in a Burger King parking lot with a shotgun in his lap.
Self-reported to police.
Shot his friend on a public bus.
Was the subject of an arrest warrant and fled from a traffic stop
for a moving violation.
Called a hospital and threatened to commit suicide.
Making incoherent statements and hit a vehicle.
Told 911 he wished to “commit suicide by cops.”
Tried to hijack a city bus.
Led officers on a vehicle pursuit after driving aggressively in
front of a marked police unit.
Threatening others with a handgun.
Reported as man with a gun.
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Case 70

Michael Schumacher

Case 73

Thomas Vandemark

Case 75
Case 76
Case 79

Alvia Braziel
Joseph Mann
Jerry Brimer

Case 80
Case 83

Javier Gaona
Jawari Porter

Case 84

Darnell Wicker

Case 85

Dominic Rollice

Case 87
Case 88

Todd Browning
Juan Torres

Case 90

Jerry Jackson

Case 91
Case 92
Case 94

James Richards
Lyle Blanchard
Sadiq Idris

Case 96

Terrence Crutcher

Case 97

Dahir Adam

Case 98

Keith Scott

Case 99
Case 100
Case 104
Case 105
Case 106
Case 107
Case 108
Case 109
Case 110

Alfred Olango
Jeffrey Cave
Kheyanev Littledog
Rex Wilson
Salvador Reyes
Javier Munoz
William Frost, Jr.
Michael Vance, Jr.
Michelle Shirley

Case 114
Case 116
Case 117

Juan Fernandez
Luke Smith
Darius Jones

Case 118
Case 119
Case 121
Case 124

Steve Vananda
Cloetha Mitchell
Richard Grimes
Waltki Williams

Case 125
Case 126
Case 127
Case 128

Earl Eubanks, Jr.
Michael Jacques
Gerald Hall
James Tylka

Case 129

Ricky Whidden

Reported as both a home invasion and a man in a lake,
“slapping water.”
Had assaulted a female and stayed on-scene to wait for the
police response.
Standing in the middle of an intersection, twirling in a circle.
Made “karate” motions in the air and urinated on himself.
Threatened wife with an ax during a domestic violence incident
and threatened suicide.
Reported as “man with a knife shouting obscenities.”
Threatened a security guard with a knife during a shoplifting
incident.
Armed with a knife, he kicked in the door of his girlfriend’s
apartment.
Violated a restraining order and entered his wife’s garage while
intoxicated.
Threatened others at an Auto Zone with a knife.
Stole a truck using a knife, then approached responding officers
with the knife.
Reported as a domestic violence incident as he entered a
residence and threatened his wife with a knife.
Threatened a hotel room of strangers with a handgun.
Had been previously arrested for shooting at aircraft.
Walking down the street with a handgun visible in his rear
pocket, threatened others.
Left his vehicle in the street, blocking one lane and partially
blocking the other lane.
Had been sullen and withdrawn for weeks according to family
members.
Sitting in a vehicle in an apartment complex parking lot with a
handgun.
Ran into and out of traffic and his family could not control him.
Answered SWAT entrance commands holding a handgun.
Trespassing and shooting a gun on commercial property.
Told his wife goodbye before pointing a fake gun at officers.
Took a child hostage and held a firearm to the child’s head.
Hijacked 1 vehicle and attempted the second hijacking.
Confronted a couple with a knife.
Had beheaded his uncle and shot 2 officers.
Was driving her car with both front airbags deployed after
crashing into a car.
Took a hostage and killed 2 other people with a firearm.
Stabbed his uncle and threatened others with a knife.
Had killed a person in front of police officers in a marked
patrol vehicle.
Fought with a family member and had a gun.
Shot two people before officers arrived.
Shot his pregnant girlfriend, killing the fetus.
Threatened his girlfriend with a handgun during a domestic
violence incident.
Was hitting his wife in a domestic violence call in a public area.
Was driving into snowbanks and nearly struck a bicyclist.
Had stabbed a female in a domestic violence incident.
Killed his estranged wife with a handgun in a domestic
violence call.
Threatened his family with a knife.
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Appendix E Interaction between the Research Themes
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 7
Case 8
Case 9
Case 11
Case 12
Case 13
Case 15
Case 16
Case 18
Case 19
Case 21
Case 22
Case 24
Case 25
Case 27
Case 28
Case 29
Case 30
Case 31
Case 33
Case 35
Case 36
Case 37
Case 38
Case 39
Case 40
Case 42
Case 43
Case 44
Case 46
Case 48
Case 49
Case 53
Case 56
Case 57
Case 59
Case 60
Case 61
Case 62
Case 63
Case 64
Case 66
Case 67
Case 68
Case 69
Case 70
Case 73
Case 75
Case 76
Case 77
Case 78
Case 79
Case 80

Joshaua Adam Sisson
Stephen Bukwich
Robert Tenbrink
Cedric Norris
Robert “LeVoy” Finicum
Janet Wilson
Bruce Kelly, Jr.
Edgar Alvarado
Randy Joe Wilson
Phillip Ferry
David Joseph
Sahlah Ridgeway
Ali Yahia
Calvin Smith
Paul Gaston
Kionte Spencer
Darrel P. Bosell
Gevork Alachadzhyan
Daniel Wooters
Map Kong
Robert Dentmond
Ralph “Phil” Grenon
Jesse Juarez
David Mack
Melissa Boarts
Laronda Sweatt
Luis Gongora
Lamont Gulley
Melissa Abbott
Mario Mejia-Martinez
Jakob Wagner
Mitchell Oakley
Darrel S. Machemehl
Michael Kurtz
Arthur DaRosa
Derek Prophet
Donald Brown, III
John Coffey
Rodney Rogriguez Smith
Andrew Henson
Clifford Tucker
Noel Rodriguez
Michael Rasmussen
Devin Scott
Miguel Chavez-Angles
Dylan Noble
Michael Ervan Disbrowe
Sherman Evans
Michael Schumacher
Thomas Vandermark
Alva Braziel
Joseph Mann
Donald Myers
Kevin Higgins
Jerry Brimer
Javier Gaona
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EB
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Case 83
Case 84
Case 85
Case 86
Case 87
Case 88
Case 89
Case 90
Case 91
Case 94
Case 95
Case 97
Case 98
Case 99
Case 100
Case 103
Case 104
Case 105
Case 106
Case 107
Case 108
Case 109
Case 110
Case 113
Case 114
Case 116
Case 117
Case 118
Case 119
Case 121
Case 122
Case 123
Case 124
Case 125
Case 126
Case 127
Case 128
Case 129

Jawari Porter
Darnell Wicker
Dominic Rollice
Omer Ismail Ali
Todd Browning
Juan Torres
Kelly Forte
Jerry Jackson
James Richards
Sadiq Idris
Jesse Beshaw
Dahir Adam
Keith Scott
Alfred Olango
Jeffrey Cave
Devan Desnoyers
Kheyanev Littledog
Rex Wilson
Salvador Reyes
Javier Munoz
William Frost, Jr.
Michael Vance
Michelle Shirley
James Ritchie
Juan Fernandez
Luke Smith
Darius Jones
Steve Vananda
Cloetha Mitchell
Richard Grimes
Daniel Redman
Brent Quinn
Waltki Williams
Earl Eubanks, Jr.
Michael Jacques
Gerald Hall
James Tylka
Ricky Whidden
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Appendix F Civilian Race
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 7
Case 8
Case 9
Case 11
Case 12
Case 13
Case 15
Case 16
Case 18
Case 19
Case 21
Case 22
Case 24
Case 25
Case 27
Case 28
Case 29
Case 30
Case 31
Case 33
Case 35
Case 36
Case 37
Case 38
Case 39
Case 40
Case 42
Case 43
Case 44
Case 46
Case 48
Case 49
Case 53
Case 54
Case 56
Case 57
Case 59
Case 60
Case 61
Case 62
Case 63
Case 64
Case 66
Case 67
Case 68
Case 69
Case 70
Case 73
Case 75
Case 76
Case 77
Case 78
Case 79

Joshaua Adam Sisson
Stephen Bukwich
Robert Tenbrink
Cedric Norris
Robert “LeVoy” Finicum
Janet Wilson
Bruce Kelly, Jr.
Edgar Alvarado
Randy Joe Wilson
Phillip Ferry
David Joseph
Sahlah Ridgeway
Ali Yahia
Calvin Smith
Paul Gaston
Kionte Spencer
Darrel P. Bosell
Gevork Alachadzhyan
Daniel Wooters
Map Kong
Robert Dentmond
Ralph “Phil” Grenon
Jesse Juarez
David Mack
Melissa Boarts
Laronda Sweatt
Luis Gongora
Lamont Gulley
Melissa Abbott
Mario Mejia-Martinez
Jakob Wagner
Mitchell Oakley
Darrel S. Machemehl
Michael Kurtz
Arthur DaRosa
Derek Prophet
Doll Pierre-Louis
Donald Brown, III
John Coffey
Rodney Rogriguez Smith
Andrew Henson
Clifford Tucker
Noel Rodriguez
Michael Rasmussen
Devin Scott
Miguel Chavez-Angles
Dylan Noble
Michael Ervan Disbrowe
Sherman Evans
Michael Schumacher
Thomas Vandermark
Alva Braziel
Joseph Mann
Donald Myers
Kevin Higgins
Jerry Brimer
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White
White
White
Black
White
Black
Black
Hispanic
Black
White
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
White
White
White
Asian
Black
White
Hispanic
White
White
Black
Hispanic
Black
White
Hispanic
White
White
White
White
Black
White
Black
White
White
Black
White
White
Hispanic
White
White
Hispanic
White
White
Black
White
White
Black
Black
White
White
White

Case 80
Case 83
Case 84
Case 85
Case 86
Case 87
Case 88
Case 89
Case 90
Case 91

Javier Gaona
Jawari Porter
Darnell Wicker
Dominic Rollice
Omer Ismail Ali
Todd Browning
Juan Torres
Kelly Forte
Jerry Jackson
James Richards

Case 94
Case 95
Case 97
Case 98
Case 99
Case 100
Case 103
Case 104

Sadiq Idris
Jesse Beshaw
Dahir Adam
Keith Scott
Alfred Olango
Jeffrey Cave
Devan Desnoyers
Kheyanev Littledog

Case 105
Case 106
Case 107
Case 108
Case 109
Case 110
Case 113
Case 114
Case 116
Case 117
Case 118
Case 119
Case 121
Case 122
Case 123
Case 124
Case 125
Case 126
Case 127
Case 128
Case 129

Rex Wilson
Salvador Reyes
Javier Munoz
William Frost, Jr.
Michael Vance
Michelle Shirley
James Ritchie
Juan Fernandez
Luke Smith
Darius Jones
Steve Vananda
Cloetha Mitchell
Richard Grimes
Daniel Redman
Brent Quinn
Waltki Williams
Earl Eubanks, Jr.
Michael Jacques
Gerald Hall
James Tylka
Ricky Whidden

Hispanic
Black
Black
White
Black
White
Hispanic
Black
White
Native
American
Black
White
Black
Black
Black
White
White
Native
American
White
Hispanic
Hispanic
White
White
Black
White
Hispanic
Asian
Black
White
Black
Black
White
White
Black
Black
White
Black
White
White
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